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Abstract	  
Marine	  capture	  fisheries	  around	  the	  world	  are	  widely	  perceived	  to	  be	  in	  a	  state	  of	  crisis,	  with	  
growing	   recognition	   that	   conventional	   resource-­‐centred	   management	   strategies	   are	  
insufficient	  to	  counter	  ongoing	  problems	  of	  overexploitation.	  This	  is	  considered	  particularly	  
true	   in	   the	   small-­‐scale	   sector,	   which	   employs	   the	   overwhelming	   majority	   of	   the	   world’s	  
fishers	  but	  has	  historically	  been	  overlooked.	  To	  manage	  marine	  resources	  more	  sustainably,	  
new	  approaches	  to	  fisheries	  governance	  have	  been	  sought	  that	  recognise	  the	  complex	  nature	  
of	   fisheries	   systems,	   paying	   attention	   to	   the	   social	   dimensions	   of	   fisheries	  management	   in	  
addition	  to	  important	  ecological	  processes.	  	  
In	   South	  Africa,	  many	  of	   these	  new	  approaches	  have	  been	   embraced	   in	   a	   recently	   adopted	  
policy	   for	   the	  small-­‐scale	  sector.	  Attempts	   to	  reform	  marine	   fisheries	  have	  been	  ongoing	   in	  
the	   country	   since	   the	   end	  of	   apartheid	   (a	   system	  of	   legislated	   racial	   segregation	   and	  white	  
supremacy	  that	  ruled	  for	  almost	  50	  years)	  but	  have	  largely	  failed	  to	  bring	  meaningful	  change	  
to	   impoverished	   fishing	   communities.	   Frustration	   at	   ineffective	   reform	   has	   contributed	   to	  
widespread	  non-­‐compliance—most	  notably	  in	  the	  abalone	  fishery,	  which	  has	  collapsed	  in	  the	  
face	  of	  rampant	  poaching	  driven	  by	  a	  lucrative	  illegal	  export	  market	  to	  the	  Far	  East.	  Although	  
the	  new	  small-­‐scale	  fisheries	  (SSF)	  policy	  has	  been	  hailed	  as	  a	  progressive	  shift	   in	  thinking,	  
questions	   remain	   about	   how	   it	   is	   to	   be	   implemented.	   One	  major	   challenge	  will	   be	   dealing	  
with	  illegal	  fishing.	  
The	  purpose	  of	   this	   study	  was	   to	  profile	   the	  human	  dimensions	  of	  abalone	  poaching	   in	   the	  
Cape	  Town	  fishing	  community	  of	  Hangberg,	  and	  to	  draw	   lessons	   for	   implementing	   the	  new	  
SSF	   policy.	   A	   qualitative,	   multi-­‐method	   research	   approach,	   based	   mainly	   on	   unstructured	  
interviews	   and	   participant	   observation,	   was	   used	   to	   access	   the	   clandestine	   fishery	   and	  
investigate	  its	  historical	  development,	  current	  structure,	  scale,	  and	  methods	  of	  operation,	  and	  
main	  socio-­‐economic	  drivers	  and	  impacts.	  	  
It	   was	   found	   that	   abalone	   poaching	   has	   become	   deeply	   embedded	   in	   Hangberg,	   having	  
evolved	  into	  a	  highly	  organized	  boat-­‐based	  fishery	  in	  a	  period	  of	  less	  than	  15	  years.	  At	  least	  
five	   local	   poaching	   groups—representing	   some	   250	   individuals	   in	   total—currently	   use	  
dedicated	   high-­‐powered	   vessels	   to	   access	   reefs	   around	   the	   Cape	   Peninsula.	   Profits	   earned	  
from	   poaching	   are	   substantial	   but	   vary,	   with	   poachers	   operating	   according	   to	   a	   loose	  
hierarchy	   and	   performing	   a	   range	   of	   different	   tasks	   in	   the	   fishery.	   This	   variation	  
notwithstanding,	  the	  illegal	  fishery	  appears	  to	  have	  become	  a	  mainstay	  of	  the	  impoverished	  
local	   economy,	   funding	   poachers’	   expensive	   lifestyles	   in	   addition	   to	   contributing	   more	  
meaningfully	  to	  the	  livelihoods	  of	  an	  estimated	  1000	  residents.	  The	  socio-­‐economic	  impacts	  
of	   abalone	   poaching	   have	   thus	   been	  mixed,	   contributing	   to	   reduced	   social	   cohesion	   and	   a	  
perceived	  loss	  of	  values	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  but	  to	  positive	  local	  development	  and	  the	  provision	  
of	  important	  services	  on	  the	  other.	  
The	  key	  finding	  of	  this	  research	  was	  that	  abalone	  poaching	  appears	  to	  constitute	  a	  functional	  
alternative	   to	   the	   formal	   fishery	   system	   in	   Hangberg,	   apparently	   filling	   a	   vacuum	   left	   by	  
ineffective	  reform	  efforts	  by	  the	  state.	  Implementation	  strategies	  for	  the	  SSF	  policy	  must	  take	  
this	  into	  account,	  and	  recognise	  that	  the	  criminal	  economy	  has	  become	  a	  powerful	  rival	  actor	  
in	   issues	   of	   fisheries	   governance.	   Future	   fisheries	   and	   conservation	   measures	   must	   be	  
accompanied	  by	  integrated,	  sector-­‐wide	  development	  in	  fishing	  communities	  to	  address	  the	  
root	  causes	  that	  allow	  illegal	  fishing	  to	  take	  hold.	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CHAPTER	  1: INTRODUCTION	  
1.1 The	  complexities	  of	  small-­‐scale	  fisheries	  governance	  
In	   the	   face	   of	  mounting	   pressure	   from	   human	   activities,	   global	   biodiversity	   is	   in	   a	  
state	   of	   general	   and	   steady	   decline	   (Butchart	   et	   al.	   2010).	   Whether	   or	   not	   this	   is	  
problematic	   in	   its	  own	  right	   (Rolston	  1985),	  biodiversity	   loss	   represents	  a	  growing	  
threat	  to	  our	  own	  species,	  which	  like	  all	  other	  living	  things	  fundamentally	  depends	  on	  
ecosystem	  goods	  and	  services	  to	  survive.	  In	  the	  marine	  environment,	  pressure	  from	  
overfishing	   alone	   continues	   to	   seriously	   threaten	   fish	   stocks	   and	   undermine	  
ecosystem	   functioning,	   contributing	   to	   “serious	   food	   security	   issues”	   and	  dispelling	  
the	  historical	  myth	  that	  “unfathomable”	  oceans	  are	  immune	  to	  depletion	  (Pauly	  et	  al.	  
2005;	   p.	   5).	   Managing	   marine	   capture	   fisheries	   more	   responsibly,	   to	   ensure	  
sustainability	   and	   avoid	   further	   collapse,	   has	   thus	   been	   identified	   as	   a	   priority	  
concern	  on	  the	  international	  policy	  agenda	  (Butchart	  et	  al.	  2010;	  FAO	  2011).	  
The	   ongoing	   overexploitation	   of	   marine	   resources	   is	   often	   understood	   in	   terms	   of	  
Hardin’s	   “Tragedy	   of	   the	   Commons”	   (1968),	   which	   argues	   that	   individuals	   are	  
compelled	  to	  harvest	  shared	  resources	  unsustainably,	  motivated	  entirely	  by	  economic	  
self	   interest.	   According	   to	   Hardin,	   this	   is	   because	   the	   costs	   of	   overharvesting	   are	  
shared	  between	  all	   the	  users	  of	  a	  system,	  while	   the	  benefits	  are	  not	   (Hardin	  1968).	  
This	  asymmetry	  means	  that	  individual	  users	  cannot	  be	  expected	  to	  conserve	  shared	  
resources	   voluntarily,	   and	   that	   some	   form	   of	   external,	   institutional	   regulation	   is	  
required	  instead	  (Dietz	  et	  al.	  2003).	  	  
In	  the	  marine	  environment,	  like	  most	  other	  shared	  resource	  systems,	  regulating	  use	  
of	  the	  commons	  has	  largely	  been	  perceived	  as	  the	  role	  of	  state	  governments,	  who	  set	  
and	  enforce	   limits	  on	  what	  they	  determine	  to	  be	  optimum,	  yet	  sustainable,	   levels	  of	  
harvest	   (Allison	   2001;	   Kuperan	   &	   Sutinen	   1998).	   These	   levels	   are	   usually	  
considerably	   lower	   than	   what	   individual	   fishers	   would	   choose	   for	   themselves,	  
however,	  and	  strong	  incentives	  for	  overharvesting	  remain	  (Kuperan	  &	  Sutinen	  1998).	  
For	   most	   of	   the	   last	   century,	   strong	   and	   effective	   management	   strategies	   by	   state	  
institutions	  have	  been	  considered	  essential	  for	  countering	  these	  temptations	  (Allison	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2001;	  Kooiman	  &	  Bavinck	  2005).	  More	  recently,	  however,	  it	  has	  been	  recognized	  that	  
a	  range	  of	  other	  actors—including	  markets,	  communities,	  and	  civil	  society—are	  also	  
responsible	   for	   governing	   the	   exploitation	   of	   marine	   resources	   and	   ensuring	  
compliance	   (Kooiman	  et	  al.	  2008;	  Kooiman	  &	  Bavinck	  2005).	  There	  have	   thus	  been	  
calls	   for	   a	   shift	   from	   centralized	  management	   to	   interactive,	  more	  holistic	   forms	  of	  
governance	  (FAO	  2008;	  Kooiman	  &	  Bavinck	  2005).	  
New	  approaches	  for	  the	  small-­‐scale	  sector	  
For	   most	   of	   the	   20th	   century,	   global	   fisheries	   management	   has	   mostly	   followed	   a	  
model	  of	  “expensive	  enforcement	  capabilities	  and	  scientific	  advice”	  (Allison	  2001;	  p.	  
940).	   This	   approach	   has	   been	   rooted	   in	   ‘rationalist’	   theories	   of	   compliance,	   which	  
understand	  compliance	  behaviour	  primarily	  in	  terms	  of	  economic	  costs	  and	  benefits	  
(Becker	  1974).	  Attempts	   to	   improve	   fisheries	   compliance	  have	   thus	   largely	   focused	  
on	  deterring	  illegal	  activity	  by	  investing	  in	  law	  enforcement,	  and	  thereby	  increasing	  
penalties	  for	  would-­‐be	  offenders	  (Kuperan	  &	  Sutinen	  1998).	  Originally	  developed	  to	  
control	   industrial	   fishing	   fleets	   in	   the	  northern	  hemisphere,	   this	  approach	  has	  been	  
widely	  exported	  to	  the	  developing	  world,	  where	  similar	  deterrence-­‐based	  strategies	  
have	  been	  put	  in	  place	  to	  manage	  small-­‐scale	  fisheries	  (Allison	  2001;	  Berkes	  2003).	  In	  
recent	  decades,	  however,	   these	  strategies	  have	  been	   increasingly	  criticised	  as	  being	  
inappropriate	   for	   the	   small-­‐scale	   sector,	  which	  differs	   from	   the	   industrial	   fleet	   in	   a	  
number	   of	   important	   ways,	   and	   thus	   requires	   alternative	   forms	   of	   management	  
(Allison	  &	  Ellis	  2001;	  Berkes	  2003;	  Kuperan	  &	  Sutinen	  1998).	  
While	   a	   single	   definition	   of	   small-­‐scale	   fishers	   has	   not	   been	   agreed	   upon,	   there	   is	  
general	  consensus	  that	  the	  term	  refers	  to	  fishers	  who	  operate	  from	  or	  near	  the	  shore,	  
using	   relatively	   inexpensive	   gear	   and	   technology	   (FAO	   2005).	   The	   term	   thus	  
encompasses	   a	   wide	   spectrum	   of	   fishing	   activities,	   from	   subsistence	   harvesting	   to	  
running	   small	   commercial	   ventures,	   which	   all	   differ	   markedly	   from	   industrialized	  
modern	   fisheries	   operations	   (Berkes	   2003;	   FAO	   2008).	   Most	   small-­‐scale	   fishers	  
around	  the	  world	  are	  considered	  poor	  and	  marginalized,	  relying	  on	  fishing	  as	  a	  core	  
livelihood	  strategy	  (Allison	  &	  Ellis	  2001;	  Béné	  2003;	  FAO	  2005).	  This	  reliance	  means	  
that	   social	   and	  ecological	  processes	   are	  more	   closely	   intertwined	   in	   the	   small-­‐scale	  
	   3	  
sector1	  than	   in	   commercial	   fisheries,	   and	   thus	   that	   governing	   it	   effectively	   requires	  
understanding	   fishers’	   behaviour	   in	   addition	   to	   important	   biological	   aspects	   like	  
breeding	  behaviour	  and	  population	  dynamics,	  which	  have	  historically	  received	  much	  
greater	  attention	   (Charles	  1995).	  Furthermore,	   small-­‐scale	   fishers	   typically	   target	  a	  
range	  of	  near-­‐shore	  resources	  instead	  of	  focusing	  on	  just	  one	  species,	  making	  it	  more	  
difficult	  to	  limit	  overharvesting	  with	  catch	  limits,	  access	  controls,	  and	  other	  standard	  
measures	   applied	   to	   regulate	   large,	   single-­‐stock	   commercial	   fisheries	   (FAO	   2005,	  
2008;	  see	  Table	  1).	  Being	  both	  socially	  and	  ecologically	  complex,	  small-­‐scale	  fishery	  
systems	   thus	  pose	  challenges	   to	  older,	  more	  rigid	  management	  strategies	   that	  have	  
perceived	   fisheries	   as	   “precise,	   predictable	   and	   permanent,”	   or	   running	   like	  
“clockwork”	  (Garcia	  and	  Charles	  2008;	  p.	  505).	  
Back	  to	  the	  drawing	  board	  
While	   modern-­‐day	   fisheries	   regulations	   have	   largely	   overlooked	   the	   social	   and	  
ecological	   complexities	   of	   the	   small-­‐scale	   sector,	   fishing	   communities	   around	   the	  
world	   have	   historically	   developed	   management	   practices	   of	   their	   own	   to	   curb	  
overexploitation	   (Berkes	  et	  al.	  2000;	   Johannes	  et	  al.	  2000).	   In	   contrast	   to	   top-­‐down	  
systems	   of	   control,	   these	   traditional	   or	   customary	   governance	   strategies	   evolved	  
within	  the	  very	  fishery	  systems	  they	  sought	  to	  manage,	  frequently	  imbuing	  them	  with	  
greater	   sensitivity	   to	   local	   dynamics—both	   with	   regards	   to	   fishers	   and	   marine	  
resources—than	   centralized	   science-­‐based	   management	   is	   currently	   capable	   of	  
(Berkes	  2003;	  Johannes	  et	  al.	  2000).	  Customary	  practices	  are	  also	  often	  perceived	  as	  
being	  more	   legitimate	   than	   state	   rules	   among	   small-­‐scale	   fishers,	   which	   influences	  
their	   compliance	  behaviour	   in	   important	  ways	   (Gezelius	  &	  Hauck	  2011;	  Kuperan	  &	  
Sutinen	   1998).	   This	   is	   because	   compliance	   decisions	   are	   motivated	   by	   “norms,	  
morality,	   legitimacy,	  and	  social	  and	  cultural	   influences,”	   in	  addition	  to	  rational	  cost-­‐
benefit	   analyses	   (Hauck	  2008;	  p.	   636).	  As	   such,	   governance	   strategies	  developed	   in	  
situ,	  with	  input	  from	  fishers	  themselves,	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  attract	  normative	  support	  
than	  those	  imposed	  from	  outside	  (Hatcher	  et	  al.	  2000;	  Kuperan	  &	  Sutinen	  1998).	  	  
The	   majority	   of	   these	   customary	   practices	   have	   been	   eroded	   or	   lost	   over	   the	   last	  
century,	   replaced	   instead	   by	   centralized	   systems	   of	   scientific	   stock	   assessment,	  
single-­‐species	  quotas,	  and	  enforcement	  through	  monitoring,	  control,	  and	  surveillance	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 	  The	   terms	   “small-­‐scale	   sector”	   and	   “small	   scale	   fisheries”	   are	   used	   interchangeably	   in	   this	  
dissertation	  and	  can	  be	  taken	  to	  mean	  the	  same	  thing.	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(MCS)	   (Berkes	   2003;	   Kuperan	   &	   Sutinen	   1998;	   Sowman	   2011).	   However,	   there	   is	  
growing	  recognition	  that	  conventional	  strategies	  are	  ill	  equipped	  to	  solve	  persistent	  
‘crises’	  in	  global	  capture	  fisheries—particularly	  in	  the	  small-­‐scale	  sector	  (FAO	  2008;	  
Kooiman	   &	   Bavinck	   2005).	   New	   approaches	   to	   fisheries	   governance,	   which	  
incorporate	   some	   of	   the	   nuance	   and	   flexibility	   of	   customary	   practices	   alongside	  
newer	   experiments	   with	   interactive,	   participatory	   forms	   of	   management,	   are	   thus	  
being	   sought	   (Berkes	   2003;	   Kooiman	   &	   Bavinck	   2005).	   These	   approaches	   all	  
emphasize	  the	  importance	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  social	  justice	  objectives	  when	  dealing	  
with	  small-­‐scale	  fisheries,	  and	  seek	  to	  address	  historical	   imbalances	  that	  prioritized	  
industrial	  fishing	  at	  their	  expense	  (Allison	  2001;	  FAO	  2008).	  Broadening	  the	  scope	  of	  
fisheries	  science	  to	  include	  input	  from	  previously	  overlooked	  actors	  and	  disciplines,	  
they	  also	  stress	  the	  importance	  of	  dialogue,	  inclusiveness,	  and	  adaptability	  in	  decision	  
making,	  recognizing	  that	  governments—and,	  by	  implication,	  fisheries	  scientists—are	  
not	   the	   only	   actors	   capable	   of	   attending	   to	   problems	   and	   opportunities	   in	   society	  
(Kooiman	  &	  Bavinck	  2005).	  
Small-­‐scale	  fisheries	  governance	  in	  South	  Africa:	  A	  new	  tune?	  
In	   June	   2012,	   the	   South	   African	   government	   adopted	   a	   brand	   new	   policy	   for	  
managing	   the	   country’s	   small-­‐scale	   fishing	   sector	   (DAFF	   2012a).	   The	   product	   of	   a	  
prolonged	  and	  difficult	  consultation	  process,	  the	  policy	  is	  the	  latest	  attempt	  of	  many	  
to	   bring	   equity	   to	   marine	   capture	   fisheries	   in	   South	   Africa,	   which	   were	   managed	  
exclusively	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  white	  people	  during	  apartheid	  (van	  Sittert	  et	  al.	  2006).	  
Ever	   since	   the	   demise	   of	   that	   inimical	   system	   of	   white	   supremacy,	   concerted	  
transformation	   efforts—aimed	   at	   addressing	   the	   apartheid	   legacy	   of	   stark	  
inequality—have	  been	  ongoing	  in	  the	  fisheries	  sector	  (Isaacs	  2011;	  van	  Sittert	  et	  al.	  
2006).	  Despite	  being	  successful	  in	  certain	  regards,	  however,	  these	  efforts	  have	  largely	  
failed	  to	  bring	  meaningful	  change	  to	  marginalized	  fishing	  communities	  (Isaacs	  2006).	  
In	   part,	   this	   has	   been	   considered	   to	   reflect	   a	   continued	   adherence	   to	   conventional	  
management	  strategies	  by	  the	  national	  fisheries	  authority	  (Isaacs	  2011;	  Raemaekers	  
2009;	   Sowman	   et	   al.	   2011a).	   To	   this	   end,	   the	   new	   small-­‐scale	   fisheries	   policy	  
(henceforth	   ‘the	   SSF	   policy’)—premised	   on	   ideals	   of	   participatory	   governance,	  
preferential	   access	   to	  marine	   resources	   for	   small-­‐scale	   fishers,	   human	   rights,	   social	  
justice,	  and	  sustainability—has	  been	  hailed	  as	  an	  important,	  albeit	  long	  overdue,	  shift	  
in	  thinking	  (Sowman	  2011).	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However,	  despite	  the	  progressive	  aims	  of	  the	  SSF	  policy—reviewed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  
the	   following	   section—important	   questions	   remain	   about	   how	   it	   is	   to	   be	  
implemented	  (DAFF	  2012b).	  Among	  other	  challenges,	  it	  faces	  the	  spectre	  of	  rampant	  
illegal	   harvesting	   in	   coastal	   communities,	   which	   has	   proliferated	   in	   the	   last	   two	  
decades	  as	  transformation	  efforts	  have	  stumbled	  (Hauck	  &	  Kroese	  2006;	  Raemaekers	  
et	  al.	  2011).	   Curbing	   poaching2	  is	   a	   key	   objective	   of	   the	   SSF	   policy,	  which	   seeks	   to	  
instil	  a	  sense	  of	  resource	  custodianship	  in	  fishing	  communities	  to	  gain	  assistance	  with	  
state	   compliance	   efforts,	  which	   have	   largely	   failed	   thus	   far	   (DAFF	   2012b;	   Hauck	  &	  
Kroese	   2006).	   Yet	   poaching,	   particularly	   of	   high-­‐value	   species	   like	  west	   coast	   rock	  
lobster	  (Jasus	  lalandii)	  and	  abalone,	  has	  assumed	  important	  social	  and	  economic	  roles	  
in	  the	  very	  communities	  in	  which	  the	  SSF	  Policy	  will	  be	  implemented,	  and	  removing	  
its	  influence	  is	  not	  likely	  to	  be	  straightforward.	  	  
Making	  this	  point	  this	  is	  a	  main	  aim	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  which	  seeks	  to	  illustrate	  the	  
added	  complexity	  that	  entrenched	  illegal	  fishing	  activities	  pose	  to	  both	  implementing	  
the	   SSF	   policy	   and	   reigning	   in	   overexploitation.	   This	   is	   based	   on	   an	   in-­‐depth	   case	  
study	  of	  abalone	  poaching	  in	  the	  Cape	  Town	  fishing	  community	  of	  Hangberg,	  in	  Hout	  
Bay.	   Before	   proceeding,	   however,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   expand	   on	   the	   historical	   and	  
theoretical	   background	   to	   this	   study.	   The	   literature	   review	   that	   follows	   explores	  
themes	   pertaining	   to	   small-­‐scale	   fisheries	   governance,	   many	   of	   which	   have	   been	  
touched	  on	  already;	  fisheries	  transformation	  in	  South	  Africa;	  and	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  
country’s	  powerful,	  highly	  organized	  illegal	  abalone	  fishery	  over	  the	  last	  two	  decades.	  
This	  will	   set	   the	   scene	   for	   the	   aims	  and	  objectives	  of	   this	   research	  project,	   and	   the	  
introduction	  of	  the	  case	  study	  itself.	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  The	   words	   “illegal	   fishing”	   and	   “poaching”	   are	   used	   interchangeably	   in	   this	   dissertation	   yet	   have	  
subtly	   different	   definitions.	   Strictly	   speaking,	   “illegal	   fishing”	   refers	   to	   Illegal,	   Unregulated	   and	  
Unreported	  (IUU)	  fishing,	  a	  catch-­‐all	  phrase	  originally	  developed	  to	  describe	  illegal	  fishing	  on	  the	  high	  
seas.	   “Poaching”	   usually	   refers	   to	   illegal	   fishing	   in	   inshore	   waters—including	   harvesting	   without	   a	  
permit,	   taking	  undersized	   individuals,	   harvesting	   out	   of	   season,	   and	   exceeding	  quotas—and	   is	   often	  
perceived	  as	  being	  more	  closely	  linked	  to	  poverty	  (Hauck	  2009b).	  Nevertheless,	  poaching	  is	  a	  form	  of	  
illegal	  fishing	  and	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  such	  throughout	  this	  work.	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1.2 Literature	  review	  
1.2.1 Paradigm	  shifts	  in	  fisheries	  management	  
The	  importance	  and	  neglect	  of	  small-­‐scale	  fisheries	  
An	  estimated	  90%	  of	  the	  world’s	  38	  million	  fishers	  and	  fish	  farmers	  are	  classified	  as	  
‘small-­‐scale’,	  contributing	  to	  the	  employment	  of	  at	  least	  a	  further	  100	  million	  people	  
in	  secondary	  occupations	  like	  processing	  and	  trade	  (FAO	  2005).	  Small-­‐scale	  fisheries	  
contribute	   crucially	   towards	   food	   security	   and	   poverty	   alleviation	   in	   developing	  
countries	   around	   the	  world	   (Béné	   2003;	   FAO	   2005).	   As	   a	   core	   livelihood	   strategy,	  
fishing	   can	   help	   poor	   communities	   better	   withstand	   crises	   like	   diseases,	   natural	  
disasters,	   and	   economic	   recessions,	   reducing	   their	   vulnerability	   to	   external	   shocks	  
(Allison	   &	   Ellis	   2001).	   The	   small-­‐scale	   sector	   also	   plays	   an	   indispensable	   role	  
supplying	   fish	   for	   human	   consumption,	   the	   total	   volume	   of	   which	   has	   more	   than	  
doubled	  globally	  since	  1973	  (FAO	  2005).	  
Despite	   its	   importance,	   though,	   the	   small-­‐scale	   fisheries	   sector	   has	   been	  
systematically	   overlooked	   by	   resource	  managers,	  who	   have	   tended	   to	   focus	   on	   the	  
commercial	  sector	  and	  its	  development	   instead	  (Allison	  &	  Ellis	  2001;	  Berkes	  2003).	  
This	   has	   led	   to	   inappropriate	   management	   techniques,	   developed	   to	   control	   large	  
single-­‐stock	   fisheries	   in	   the	   northern	   hemisphere,	   being	   applied	   to	   smaller,	   more	  
complex	   fisheries	   in	   the	   developing	   world	   (Allison	   2001;	   Berkes	   2003).	   These	  
techniques	  are	  usually	  classified	  into	  three	  broad	  categories:	  input	  controls,	  aimed	  at	  
curbing	   total	   fishing	   effort	   by	   limiting	   access	   to	  marine	   resources;	   output	   controls,	  
aimed	   at	   limiting	   harvests;	   and	   technical	   controls,	   aimed	   at	   regulating	   fishing	  
behaviour	   to	  account	   to	  account	   for	   important	  biological	  characteristics	  of	  different	  
target	   species,	   for	   example	   seasonal	   spawning	   patterns	   (Table	   1).	   Small-­‐scale	  
fisheries,	   however,	   are	   considered	  more	   socially	   and	   ecologically	   complex	   than	   the	  
commercial	  sector,	  and	  thus	  ill-­‐suited	  for	  the	  application	  of	  many	  of	  these	  resource-­‐
centred,	  top-­‐down,	  regulatory	  approaches	  (Berkes	  2003;	  Sowman	  2011).	  
Moving	  beyond	  management	  to	  governance	  
It	   is	   increasingly	   being	   argued	   that	   the	   small-­‐scale	   sector—and	   indeed	   fisheries	   in	  
general—cannot	   be	   managed	   by	   state	   fisheries	   departments	   alone	   (Kooiman	   &	  
Bavinck	   2005).	   Instead,	   there	   have	   been	   calls	   for	   more	   integrated	   governance	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strategies	   that	   include	   other	   key	   actors	   and	   institutions,	   for	   example	   fishing	  
communities	  themselves	  (Allison	  2001).	  This	  shift	  marks	  a	  more	  general	  trend	  in	  the	  
fields	  of	  social	  science	  and	  policymaking,	  where	  governance	  has	  become	  something	  of	  
a	  buzzword	  in	  recent	  decades	  (Kooiman	  &	  Bavinck	  2005).	  Conceptually,	  ‘governance’	  
is	   considered	   to	  be	  much	  broader	   than	   ‘management’,	  which	   is	  perceived	   to	  have	  a	  
narrower,	   more	   immediate,	   problem-­‐solving	   focus	   (Borrini-­‐Feyerabend	   2008).	   By	  
comparison,	  governance	  has	  been	  described	  as	  “taking	  a	  step	  back,”	  moving	  beyond	  
the	  pursuit	  of	  reactive,	  technical	  solutions	  to	  “considering	  longer-­‐term	  societal	  trends	  
and	   needs”	   and	   creatively	   seeking	   “opportunities”	   for	   positive	   change	   (Kooiman	   &	  
Bavinck	  2005).	  Including	  diverse	  voices	  in	  decision-­‐making	  is	  considered	  key	  to	  this	  
process	  (Kooiman	  et	  al.	  2008).	  
	  







Total	  Allowable	  Effort	  
(TAE)	  
Total	  Allowable	  Catch	  
(TAC)	  
Closed	  areas	  
Boat	  licences	   Individual	  quotas	   Closed	  seasons	  
Fishing	  rights	   Bycatch	  limits	   Gear	  restrictions	  
Vessel	  capacity	   Bag	  limits	   Size	  limits	  
	  
Accompanying	  this	  new	  focus	  on	  fisheries	  governance	  has	  been	  a	  critical	  assessment	  
of	   the	  norms	  and	  principles	  underlying	  marine	   resource	  management,	  which	   in	   the	  
past	   went	   largely	   unquestioned	   (Bavinck	   &	   Chuenpagdee	   2005).	   This	   has	   led	   to	  
increased	   emphasis	   being	   placed	   on	   ensuring	   social	   justice	   and	   respect	   for	   human	  
rights,	  as	  well	  on	  recognizing	  the	  vital	  contributions	  marine	  resources	  make	  towards	  
food	   security	   and	   coastal	   livelihoods	   (Allison	  &	  Ellis	   2001;	   FAO	  2005).	  While	   these	  
changes	  have	  had	  a	  strong	  normative	  component,	  motivated	  by	  broader	  humanistic	  
ideals	   like	   tackling	   poverty	   and	   facilitating	   socio-­‐economic	   development,	   they	   have	  
also	  been	  considered	  intrinsically	  practical:	  without	  paying	  attention	  to	  the	  struggles	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of	   impoverished	   small-­‐scale	   fishers,	   it	   is	   argued,	   attempts	   to	   manage	   fisheries	  
sustainably	   are	   unlikely	   to	   attract	   support	   from	   fishers,	   ultimately	   making	   these	  
efforts	  less	  likely	  to	  succeed	  (Gezelius	  &	  Hauck	  2011;	  Kuperan	  &	  Sutinen	  1998).	  
Compliance	  failures	  
For	  the	  most	  part,	  conventional	  fisheries	  management	  has	  turned	  a	  blind	  eye	  to	  the	  
social	  dimensions	  of	  the	  small-­‐scale	  sector,	  treating	  it	  as	  a	  simple	  system	  of	  rational,	  
law-­‐abiding	   citizens	   and	   largely	   ignoring	   important	   questions	   of	   socio-­‐economic,	  
cultural,	  political,	  and	  historical	  context	  (Berkes	  2003;	  Garcia	  &	  Charles	  2008).	  This	  
has	   contributed	   to	   a	   range	   of	   problems,	   particularly	   with	   regards	   to	   compliance	  
(Gezelius	   &	   Hauck	   2011;	   Kuperan	   &	   Sutinen	   1998).	   In	   the	   past,	   external	   factors—
mainly	   relating	   to	   the	   risk	   of	   being	   caught	   and	   the	   severity	   of	   punishment—were	  
considered	  the	  most	   important	  determinants	  of	  compliance	   in	  general,	  premised	  on	  
the	   assumption	   that	   individuals	   choose	   to	   comply	   based	   on	   personal	   cost-­‐benefit	  
assessments	   (Becker	   1974;	   Schlager	   2002).	   This	   ‘instrumentalist’	   approach,	   which	  
emphasises	  the	  role	  of	  deterrence	  in	  protecting	  resources	  from	  overexploitation,	  has	  
played	  a	  dominant	  role	  shaping	  fisheries	  management	  in	  the	  20th	  century	  (Kuperan	  &	  
Sutinen	  1998).	  
There	   are	   other	   important	   factors	   that	   influence	   compliance	   behaviour,	   however,	  
which	  narrow,	  deterrence-­‐based	  strategies	  frequently	  overlook.	  These	  include	  social	  
norms	   and	   moral	   standards,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   perceived	   legitimacy	   of	   regulatory	  
institutions	  (Kuperan	  &	  Sutinen	  1998).	  If	  fishers	  feel	  that	  regulations	  are	  unfair,	  or	  if	  
they	   do	   not	   respect	   the	   state’s	   authority	   to	   impose	   them,	   then	   they	   are	   unlikely	   to	  
engage	  in	  compliant	  behaviour	  (Gezelius	  &	  Hauck	  2011).	  This	  in	  turn	  places	  a	  greater	  
burden	   on	   law	   enforcement	   and	   deterrence	   measures,	   which	   are	   forced	   to	  
compensate	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  voluntary	  or	  normative	  support	  from	  fishers	  (Kuperan	  &	  
Sutinen	  1998).	  Yet	  this	  can	  have	  negative	  consequences:	  enforcing	  regulations	  in	  the	  
absence	  of	  normative	  support	  can	  erode	  relationships	  between	  fishers	  and	  the	  state	  
even	  further,	  and	  can	  set	  in	  motion	  cycles	  of	  rule	  breaking	  and	  punishment	  that	  are	  
difficult	  to	  break	  (Hauck	  2008;	  Hauck	  &	  Kroese	  2006).	  
Conflicting	  actors	  and	  plural	  legal	  systems	  
The	   recognition	   that	   non-­‐state	   actors	   can	   influence	   the	   outcomes	   of	   resource	  
governance	   strategies	   has	   also	   been	  used	   to	   understand	   fisheries	   conflict	   and	  non-­‐
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compliance	   (Kooiman	  &	  Bavinck	   2005).	  When	   governance	   is	   conceptualized	   as	   the	  
product	   of	   interactions	   between	  different	   actors,	   rather	   than	   the	   responsibility	   of	   a	  
singular,	  centralized	  authority,	  the	  reasons	  for	  this	  become	  clear.	  “Just	  as	  in	  a	  game	  of	  
football,”	   Kooiman	   &	   Bavinck	   (2005)	   argue,	   “the	   interactions	   between	   players	  
determine	   what	   actually	   happens,	   whether	   it	   is	   a	   goal,	   a	   fierce	   competition,	   or	   a	  
boring	  match.”	   In	   other	  words,	   individuals,	   groups,	   or	   institutions	   that	   are	   at	   odds	  
with	  one	  another	  can	  contribute	  to	  disharmony	  in	  fisheries	  management,	  potentially	  
negating	   the	   pursuit	   of	   goals	   like	   resource	   sustainability	   and	   economic	   stability	  
(Allison	   2001;	   Kooiman	   et	   al.	  2008).	   For	   example,	   criminal	   groups	   can	   completely	  
undermine	   state	  management	   efforts	  by	  paying	   fishers	   lucratively	   to	  break	   the	   law	  
(Hauck	  and	  Sweijd	  1999;	  Raemaekers	  et	  al.	  2011).	  This	  point	  will	  be	  returned	  to	  later	  
in	  this	  review.	  
One	  key	  issue	  rival	  actors	  can	  disagree	  about	  is	  their	  conception	  of	  law	  itself,	  which	  is	  
usually	   the	  ultimate	  arbitrator	  of	   fisheries	  disputes	   (Hauck	  2009a).	  While	   statutory	  
law	  officially	  prevails	  in	  the	  modern	  world,	  many	  authors	  argue	  that	  ‘alternative’	  legal	  
systems	   and	   normative	   codes	   of	   practice	   continue	   to	   permeate	   most	   realms	   of	  
society,	   despite	   their	   supposed	   ‘informal’	   status	   (von	   Benda-­‐Beckmann	   2002).	   As	  
examples,	  Vanderlinden	  (1989;	  p.	  151)	  lists	  “grammar,	  politeness,	  the	  measurement	  
of	   time,	   morality	   (and)	   fashion,”	   arguing	   that	   all	   these	   factors	   regulate	   social	  
behaviour,	  thereby	  performing	  a	  primary	  function	  of	  the	  formal	  legal	  system.	  Debates	  
about	  whether	  these	  codes	  can	  legitimately	  be	  considered	  ‘law’	  continue:	  but	  the	  fact	  
that	   they	   influence	   people’s	   behaviour	   in	   important	  ways	   cannot	   be	   disputed	   (Von	  
Benda-­‐Beckmann	   2002).	   Legal	   pluralism,	   or	   the	   recognition	   that	   multiple	   legal	   or	  
quasi-­‐legal	  systems	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  a	  single	  situation	  or	  event,	  has	  been	  accordingly	  
adopted	  as	  a	  framework	  for	  understanding	  fisheries	  conflicts	  in	  the	  developing	  world,	  
where	  local	  or	  customary	  practices	  do	  not	  always	  match	  top-­‐down	  regulations	  from	  
the	  northern	  hemisphere	  (Bavinck	  2007;	  Vanderlinden	  1989).	  Research	  in	  this	   field	  
has	  revealed	  that	  small-­‐scale	  fishers	  may	  subscribe	  to	  completely	  different	  sea	  tenure	  
systems	  to	  those	  advocated	  by	  the	  state,	  for	  example,	  contributing	  to	  discord	  between	  
different	  fisheries	  actors	  and	  ongoing	  problems	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  (Bavinck	  2007).	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New	  approaches	  to	  fisheries	  governance	  
To	   overcome	   these	   deep	   tensions	   and	   divides	   between	   fishers	   and	   the	   state,	  
proponents	   of	   a	   fresh	   approach	   to	   fisheries	   management	   advocate	   flexible,	  
participatory	   governance	   strategies	   premised	   on	   sound	   democratic	   principles	  
(Bavinck	   &	   Chuenpagdee	   2005;	   FAO	   2008).	   Co-­‐management—or	   the	   direct	  
involvement	  of	   resource	  users	   in	   key	  decision-­‐making	   and	   regulatory	  processes,	   as	  
well	  as	  implementation	  strategies	  and	  compliance—is	  a	  cornerstone	  of	  this	  approach	  
(Berkes	  2003;	  Jentoft	  et	  al.	  1998).	  According	  to	  Jentoft	  et	  al.	  (1998),	  co-­‐management	  
is	  usually	  supported	  by	  two	  main	  arguments:	  first	  that	  fishers	  can	  contribute	  valuable	  
context-­‐specific	   information	   that	   science	   cannot	   (Berkes	  et	  al.	  2000;	   Johannes	  et	  al.	  
2000);	   and	   second	   that	   including	   input	   from	   fishers	   can	   improve	   the	   perceived	  
legitimacy	  of	  regulations,	  with	  positive	  implications	  for	  compliance	  (Gezelius	  &	  Hauck	  
2011;	  Kuperan	  &	  Sutinen	  1998).	  
A	  second	  cornerstone	  of	  proposed	  new	  governance	  strategies	  is	  taking	  an	  ecosystem-­‐
based	   approach	   to	   fisheries	   management	   (EAF),	   moving	   beyond	   the	   narrow	   20th	  
century	   paradigm	   of	   maximising	   catches	   of	   individual	   target	   species	   (Garcia	   and	  
Cochrane	   2005;	   Pikitch	   et	   al.	   2004).	   Instead,	   an	   EAF	   aims	   first	   to	   sustain	   healthy	  
marine	  ecosystems	  and	  second	  to	  support	   individual	  capture	   fisheries	  (Pikitch	  et	  al.	  
2004).	  Fishing	  practices	  that	  degrade	  ecosystems	  or	  impact	  negatively	  on	  ecological	  
processes—as	  many	   industrial	   fisheries	   currently	   do	   today—are	   therefore	   strongly	  
discouraged	  (Garcia	  and	  Cochrane	  2005).	  	  
Through	   taking	   a	   broader	   view	   of	   conservation	   and	   fisheries	   management,	   EAF	  
strategies	   have	   helped	   weaken	   longstanding	   interdisciplinary	   barriers	   between	  
fisheries	  biologists,	  marine	  ecologists	   and	   social	   scientists	   (Hughes	  et	  al.	  2005)	  and	  
“put	   humans	   back	   into	   the	   ecosystem”	   (Berkes	   2012;	   p.	   467).	   Human	   behaviour—
and,	   in	   aggregate,	   that	   of	   societies—plays	   a	   fundamental	   role	   in	   determining	   the	  
status	  of	  marine	  resources	  and	  cannot	  be	  excluded	  from	  EAF	  planning	  (Hughes	  et	  al.	  
2005;	   Berkes	   2012).	   This	   is	   true,	   of	   course,	   of	   ecosystem-­‐based	   management	   in	  
general:	   human	   activity	   has	   become	   the	   primary	   driver	   of	   ecological	   processes	   on	  
planet	   earth	   (Steffen	   et	  al.	  2011)	   and	   thus	   needs	   to	   be	   considered	  when	   designing	  
conservation	  or	  natural	  resource	  management	  strategies	  of	  any	  sort	  (Berkes	  2012).	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Fisheries	  as	  complex	  systems	  
A	   third,	   and	   closely	   linked,	   key	   element	   of	   modern-­‐day	   governance	   approaches	   is	  
treating	   fisheries	   as	   complex	   systems	   and	   paying	   attention	   to	   the	   social,	   cultural,	  
economic,	   political,	   and	   institutional	   webs	   in	   which	   they	   are	   embedded	   (Charles	  
1995;	   Mahon	   et	   al.	   2008).	   The	   behaviour	   of	   complex	   systems	   is	   influenced	   by	  
interactions	   between	   their	   constituent	   components,	   enabling	   them	   to	   dynamically	  
change	   course	   without	   outside	   influence	   (Mahon	   et	   al.	   2008).	   This	   ability,	   writes	  
Berkes	   (2003;	   p.	   10),	   gives	   rise	   to	   “attributes	   not	   observed	   in	   simple	   systems,	  
including	   nonlinearity,	   uncertainty,	   emergence	   …	   and	   self-­‐organization”.	   These	  
attributes	  represent	  a	  challenge	  to	  conventional	   fisheries	  management,	  which	  tends	  
to	   isolate	   the	   biological	   and	   economic	   aspects	   of	   individual	   fish	   stocks	   from	   the	  
broader	   fishery	   system	  within	  which	   they	   exist	   and	   treat	   them	   as	   predictable	   and	  
amenable	   to	   control	   (Berkes	   2003;	   Garcia	   and	   Charles	   2008).	   Yet	   linkages	   exist	  
between	   all	   the	   components	   of	   modern	   capture	   fisheries,	   which	   range	   from	   the	  
behaviour	  of	  individual	  fishers,	  to	  developments	  in	  fishing	  gear	  and	  technology,	  to	  the	  
adoption	  of	  new	  management	  and	  enforcement	  strategies,	  to	  macroeconomic	  trends	  
that	   influence	   globalized	   fish	   markets	   (Berkes	   2003;	   Garcia	   and	   Charles	   2008).	  
Incorporating	  this	  interconnectedness	  into	  fisheries	  models,	  without	  rendering	  them	  
too	   complex	   to	   be	   useful,	   has	   been	   identified	   as	   a	   future	   priority	   for	   fisheries	  
management	  (Charles	  1995;	  Garcia	  and	  Charles	  2008).	  
While	  certain	  aspects	  of	  systems	  thinking	  remain	  too	  abstract	  to	  be	  of	  practical	  use,	  at	  
least	   at	   present,	   its	   core	  message	   remains	   essential	   for	   understanding	   the	   complex	  
human-­‐in-­‐nature	  dynamics	  of	  fisheries,	  particularly	  in	  the	  small-­‐scale	  sector	  (Berkes	  
2003;	  Charles	  1995).	  “All	  fishery	  systems	  are	  part	  of	  higher-­‐level	  natural	  and	  human	  
systems,”	  argue	  Garcia	  &	  Charles	  (2008;	  p.	  505);	  managing	  them	  as	  if	  they	  are	  not	  is	  a	  
recipe	   for	   trouble.	   For	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	   study,	   which	   seeks	   to	   understand	   the	  
drivers	   behind	   a	   booming	   illegal	   fishery	   in	   a	   South	   African	   coastal	   community,	   a	  
systems	   thinking	   approach	   has	   thus	   been	   adopted	   as	   a	   core	   research	   framework.	  
Hilborn	  &	  Walters,	  quoted	   in	  Charles	  (1995;	  p.	  237),	  distil	   the	  rationale	  behind	  this	  
decision	  to	  a	  single	  sentence:	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"It	  is	  foolish	  to	  study	  only	  the	  prey	  in	  the	  predator-­‐prey	  system	  that	  is	  a	  developing	  
fishery;	   it	   is	   equally	   important	   to	   monitor	   and	   understand	   basic	   processes	   that	  
determine	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  predator—the	  fishermen".	  
Flexibility	  and	  adaptive	  governance	  
Recognising	   the	   complex	   dynamics	   of	   fisheries	   systems,	   leaders	   in	   the	   fisheries	  
governance	   field	   have	   stressed	   the	   importance	   of	   developing	   ‘flexible’	  mechanisms	  
that	  can	  adapt	  to	  uncertainty	  and	  change	  (Folke	  et	  al.	  2005;	  Garcia	  and	  Charles	  2007;	  
Mahon	   et	   al.	  2008).	   Advocates	   of	   this	   “radically	   different	   approach”	   (Mahon	   et	   al.	  
2008;	   p.	   104)	   emphasize	   the	   need	   to	   move	   beyond	   old	   paradigms	   of	   centralized	  
control	  to	  embrace	  concepts	  of	   learning	  and	  self-­‐organization,	  arguing	  that	  fisheries	  
systems	   are	   far	   too	   unpredictable	   for	   the	   imposition	   of	   stable,	   rigid	   management	  
strategies.	   Their	   recommendations	   of	   decentralising	   management	   responsibilities,	  
empowering	   stakeholders,	   and	   developing	   coordinated,	   inter-­‐sector	   approaches	   all	  
link	   back	   to	   key	   themes	   in	   the	   governance	   literature,	   such	   as	   fostering	   co-­‐
management	  and	  increased	  participation	  between	  diverse	  actors	  (Garcia	  and	  Charles	  
2007).	   These	   broad	   themes	   will	   be	   returned	   to	   in	   the	   next	   section	   of	   this	   review,	  
which	   traces	   the	   history	   of	   small-­‐scale	   fisheries	   management	   in	   South	   Africa	   and	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1.2.2 Post-­‐apartheid	  fisheries	  reform	  in	  South	  Africa	  
Global	   themes	   in	   small-­‐scale	   fisheries	   governance	   have	   been	   vividly	   illustrated	   in	  
South	  Africa,	  where	   approximately	   110	   geographically	   distinct	   fishing	   communities	  
have	   been	   identified,	   thought	   to	   correspond	   to	   more	   than	   100	   000	   individuals	  
(Sowman	   et	   al.	  2011b).	   Their	   activities	   range	   from	   harvesting	   for	   consumption	   to	  
running	   limited	  commercial	  ventures	   (Clark	  et	  al.	  2002).	   In	  keeping	  with	   the	  global	  
picture,	  the	  majority	  of	  these	  fishers	  are	  poor:	  just	  half	  are	  thought	  to	  have	  access	  to	  
wage	   employment	   of	   any	   kind,	  with	   a	   similar	   proportion	   considered	   food-­‐insecure	  
(Clark	  et	  al.	  2002).	  What	  sets	  them	  apart	  is	  their	  unique	  historical	  context,	  which	  saw	  
the	   creation	  of	   an	  entire	   class	  of	  marginalized	   fishers	  along	   racial	   lines	  during,	   and	  
indeed	  before,	  the	  years	  of	  apartheid.	  	  
Historical	  injustice	  and	  transformation	  
Small-­‐scale	  fishers	  have	  been	  marginalized	  for	  centuries	  in	  South	  Africa.	  The	  onset	  of	  
industrial	   fishing	   at	   the	   turn	   of	   the	   20th	   century	   had	   negative	   consequences	   for	  
traditional	  fishers	  in	  the	  Western	  Cape3,	  who	  began	  competing	  with	  emerging	  export	  
fisheries	  for	  resources	  and	  labour	  (van	  Sittert	  2003).	  This	  led	  to	  so-­‐called	  ‘coloured’	  
fishers4,	  who	  had	  previously	  played	  a	  dominant	  role	  in	  the	  sector,	  being	  increasingly	  
excluded	   from	  marine	  resources	  (Isaacs	  2011).	  Discriminatory	  apartheid	   legislation	  
from	   the	   1940s	   onwards	   made	   matters	   worse	   for	   fishers	   classified	   as	   ‘non-­‐white’	  
under	   apartheid,	   systematically	   eroding	   their	   rights	   to	   own	   land	   and	   property,	  
denying	  them	  access	  to	  marine	  resources,	  and	  effectively	  reducing	  their	  role	  to	  one	  of	  
providing	  cheap	  labour	  for	  white-­‐owned	  fishing	  companies	  (Sowman	  et	  al.	  2011a).	  
Apartheid	   ended	   in	   1994,	   when	   Nelson	   Mandela	   took	   office	   as	   South	   Africa’s	   first	  
democratically	   elected	   president.	   The	   fisheries	   sector,	   after	   decades	   of	   racial	  
inequality,	   was	   targeted	   for	   urgent	   reform.	   Also	   known	   as	   ‘transformation’,	   this	  
process	   entailed	   broadening	   access	   to	   marine	   resources,	   opening	   the	   commercial	  
sector	  to	  those	  whom	  apartheid	  excluded,	  and	  addressing	  past	  injustices	  (van	  Sittert	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Formerly	  the	  Cape	  Province,	  the	  epicenter	  of	  South	  Africa’s	  early	  marine	  capture	  fisheries.	  
4	  In	   South	   Africa,	   the	   term	   ‘coloured’	   refers	   to	   a	   diverse	   group	   of	   people—descended	   largely	   from	  
slaves,	  indigenous	  Khoisan	  groups,	  and	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  other	  African	  peoples—who	  were	  assimilated	  
into	  colonial	  society	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  Being	  also	  partly	  descended	  from	  European	  
settlers,	   coloureds	   are	   popularly	   regarded	   as	   being	   of	   ‘mixed’	   race,	   and	   occupied	   an	   indeterminate	  
status	   in	   the	  South	  African	  racial	  hierarchy	  during	  apartheid,	  distinct	   from	  the	  historically	  dominant	  
‘white’	   or	   European	  minority,	   ‘Indians’,	   and	   the	   numerically	   predominant	   ‘black’	   African	   population	  
(adapted	  from	  van	  Sittert	  et	  al.	  2006).	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et	  al.	  2006).	  	  In	  1998	  the	  Marine	  Living	  Resources	  Act	  (MLRA)	  was	  passed,	  becoming	  
the	  central	  piece	  of	  legislation	  controlling	  fisheries	  management	  in	  South	  Africa.	  The	  
MLRA	  attempted	  a	  delicate	  balancing	  act,	  prioritizing	  transformation	  and	  equity	  yet	  
emphasising	   the	   need	   to	   protect	   resources	   and	  maintain	   economic	   stability	   (Isaacs	  
2012;	   van	   Sittert	   et	   al.	   2006).	   The	   practical	   difficulty	   of	   achieving	   these	   three	  
objectives	   in	   tandem	   has	   remained	   a	   central	   theme	   in	   South	   African	   fisheries	   and	  
conservation	  management	  ever	  since.	  
Transformation	   of	   the	   commercial	   sector	   under	   the	  MLRA	   took	   place	   in	   two	  ways:	  
externally,	   by	   reallocating	   fishing	   rights	   to	   formerly	   excluded	   racial	   groups,	   and	  
internally,	  by	  restructuring	  large	  fishing	  companies	  to	  ensure	  their	  representation	  in	  
senior	  management	  positions	  (van	  Sittert	  et	  al.	  2006).	  The	  rate	  of	  reform	  was	  rapid:	  
between	  1994	  and	  2004	  the	  number	  of	  commercial	  rights	  holders	  exploded	  from	  300	  
to	  more	  than	  5	  800,	  with	  the	  proportion	  of	  ownership	  by	  historically	  disadvantaged	  
individuals	  swelling	  from	  almost	  nothing	  to	  around	  62%	  (Branch	  and	  Clark	  2006).	  In	  
addition,	   the	   MLRA	   led	   to	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   new	   subsistence	   sector,	   which	  
acknowledged	  the	  historical	  rights	  of	  this	  group	  of	  fishers	  for	  the	  first	  time	  (Sowman	  
2006).	  	  
A	  troubled	  transformation	  process	  
Despite	   looking	   impressive	  on	  paper,	  however,	   fisheries	  reform	  in	  South	  Africa	  was	  
fraught	   with	   difficulties.	   Flaws	   in	   the	   rights	   allocation	   process	   meant	   that	   many	  
newcomers	   to	   the	   fishing	   industry	   received	   permits	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   legitimate	  
fishers,	   creating	   a	   new	   black	   fishing	   elite	   without	   addressing	   original	   problems	   of	  
exclusion	  (Isaacs	  2006).	  The	  issuing	  of	  short-­‐term	  quotas,	  valid	  for	  just	  one	  year	  at	  a	  
time,	  also	  discouraged	  investment	  by	  new	  rights	  holders,	  and	  many	  simply	  sold	  their	  
rights	   back	   to	   white-­‐owned	   companies	   for	   lucrative	   pay-­‐outs	   (Kleinschmidt	   et	   al.	  
2003).	  This	  made	  a	  small	  number	  of	  ‘paper	  quota’	  holders	  very	  wealthy,	  but	  entirely	  
negated	   the	   government’s	   broader	   goal	   of	   transformation	   (Isaacs	   et	   al.	   2007).	  
Meanwhile,	   the	   fisheries	  authority	  was	  overwhelmed	  by	  applications	  and	  unable	   to	  
process	  them	  effectively.	  This	   led	  to	  prolonged	  delays	  and	  a	  series	  of	   legal	  disputes,	  
plunging	  the	  sector	  into	  a	  state	  of	  crisis	  (Kleinschmidt	  et	  al.	  2003).	  Fishers	  dependent	  
on	  the	  sea	  for	  food	  and	  income	  suffered	  reduced	  catches	  and	  increased	  hardships	  as	  a	  
result	  (Isaacs	  2006).	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Further	   problems	   were	   encountered	   in	   the	   subsistence	   sector.	   Shortly	   after	   its	  
inception,	  the	  new	  democratic	  South	  African	  government	  appointed	  a	  specialist	  task	  
team,	   the	  Subsistence	  Fisheries	  Task	  Group	  (STFG),	   to	  advise	  on	   the	  sector’s	   future	  
management	   (Harris	   et	   al.	   2002).	   The	   SFTG’s	   job	   included	   defining	   ‘subsistence	  
fishing’	  and	  recommending	  a	  list	  of	  species	  suitable	  for	  the	  newly	  created	  sector.	  The	  
definition	   they	   produced	  was	   highly	   restrictive,	   though,	   and	   effectively	  meant	   that	  
only	  poor,	  vulnerable,	  and	  food-­‐insecure	  fishers	  could	  qualify	  for	  subsistence	  permits	  
(Isaacs	  2011).	  Their	  selection	  of	  suitable	  resources,	  meanwhile,	  was	  constrained	  by	  
conservation	   and	   economic	   objectives,	   resulting	   in	   a	   list	   that	   omitted	   historically	  
important,	  commercially	  valuable	  species	  like	  abalone	  and	  rock	  lobster	  (Isaacs	  2011).	  
This	  would	  prove	  to	  have	  profound	  consequences	  for	  fisheries	  management	  in	  South	  
Africa	  later	  on.	  
Recognising	  that	  many	  small-­‐scale	   fishers	  were	  not	  eligible	   for	  subsistence	  permits,	  
the	   SFTG	   also	   called	   for	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   new	   ‘limited	   commercial’	   sector,	   to	  
accommodate	   fishers	   at	   the	   lower	   end	   of	   the	   commercial	   spectrum	   (Harris	   et	   al.	  
2002).	   This	   was	   done	   in	   2002,	   when	   the	   fisheries	   department	   opened	   a	   new	  
application	   process	   for	   medium-­‐term	   fishing	   rights	   (Sowman	   et	   al.	   2011a).	   In	  
contrast	  to	  the	  subsistence	  sector,	  limited	  commercial	  permits	  were	  primarily	  seen	  as	  
a	  tool	  for	  economic	  upliftment,	  aimed	  at	  giving	  small-­‐scale	  fishers	  access	  to	  valuable	  
export	   markets	   (Isaacs	   2006).	   In	   practice	   this	   caused	   confusion,	   however,	   as	  
communities	   that	   had	   been	   gearing	   up	   to	   receive	   subsistence	   permits	   had	   to	   shift	  
focus	   and	   establish	   commercial	   businesses	   instead	   (Isaacs	   2006).	   The	   small	   size	   of	  
the	   quotas	   awarded,	  meanwhile,	  made	   them	   economically	   unviable	   in	  many	   cases,	  
leading	   once	   again	   to	   many	   being	   sold	   back	   to	   large,	   established	   companies	   for	  
lucrative	  sums	  (Sowman	  2006).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  concerns	  about	  the	  depleted	  status	  
of	   key	   linefish	   stocks—historically	   and	   culturally	   the	  most	   important	   sub-­‐sector	   of	  
small-­‐scale	  fisheries	  in	  South	  Africa—meant	  that	  far	  fewer	  rights	  were	  allocated	  than	  
had	  initially	  been	  expected	  (Kleinschmidt	  et	  al.	  2003).	  
Illegal	  fishing	  on	  the	  rise	  
South	   Africa’s	   slow	   and	   troubled	   reform	   process	   caused	   widespread	   frustration	  
among	  small-­‐scale	   fishers,	  many	  of	  whom	  expected	   to	   receive	   fishing	   rights	   shortly	  
after	  the	  fall	  of	  apartheid	  (Isaacs	  2011).	  The	  fisheries	  authority	  was	  unable	  to	  effect	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this	  change,	  however,	  caught	  between	  the	  conflicting	  objectives	  of	  broadening	  access,	  
protecting	   resources,	   and	   meeting	   the	   demands	   of	   a	   powerful	   export-­‐orientated	  
fishing	   industry	   (van	   Sittert	   et	   al.	   2006).	   A	   sheer	   lack	   of	   institutional	   capacity	  
compounded	  the	  problem,	  contributing	  to	  crippling	  delays	  in	  processing	  applications	  
and	   issuing	   rights	   (Kleinschmidt	   et	   al.	   2003).	   The	   state’s	   failure	   to	   translate	   the	  
progressive	   goals	   of	   the	   MLRA	   into	   action	   weakened	   its	   legitimacy	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	  
many	  fishers,	  and	  ‘protest	  fishing’—or	  openly	  fishing	  without	  valid	  permits	  as	  a	  form	  
of	  political	  action—flourished	  as	  a	  result	  (Hauck	  &	  Kroese	  2006).	  
In	  response	   to	  rising	   levels	  of	   illegal	   fishing	   the	  South	  African	  government	   invested	  
heavily	   in	   law	  enforcement,	   seeking	   to	   improve	   compliance	  by	  punishing	  offenders	  
more	  thoroughly	  (Hauck	  &	  Kroese	  2006).	  It	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  this	  approach	  may	  
have	   had	   the	   opposite	   effect,	   however,	   fuelling	   resentment	   in	   fishing	   communities	  
and	   deepening	   the	   divide	   between	   resource	   users	   and	   managers	   (Hauck	   2008).	  
Fishers	  continue	  to	  question	  the	  state’s	  authority	  to	  enforce	  regulations	  that	  they	  do	  
not	   agree	   with,	   and	   they	   generally	   feel	   little	   moral	   obligation,	   or	   indeed	   social	  
pressure,	   to	   comply	   with	   rules	   (Hauck	   2008;	   Hauck	   &	   Kroese	   2006).	   This	   has	  
contributed	  to	  cycles	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  and	  punishment	  that	  continue	  to	  this	  day.	  	  
The	  progressive	  new	  small-­‐scale	  fisheries	  policy	  
Growing	  dissatisfaction	  among	  excluded	  fishers	  also	  led	  to	  increasingly	  vocal	  protests	  
and	  strong	   lobbying,	   culminating	   in	  a	  highly	  publicized	  class-­‐action	   suit	   against	   the	  
Minister	   of	   the	  Department	   of	   Environmental	   Affairs	   and	   Tourism	   (DEAT)	   in	   2004	  
(Isaacs	  2011).	  The	  Equality	  Court,	  which	   arbitrated	   the	   case,	   ruled	   in	   favour	  of	   the	  
fishers,	   demanding	   that	   the	   South	   African	   government	   draft	   a	   new	   policy	   for	  
managing	   the	   small-­‐scale	   fishing	   sector—and	   that	   a	   system	   of	   interim	   relief	  
measures,	   granting	   fishers	   temporary	   access	   to	   marine	   resources,	   be	   put	   in	   place	  
until	  the	  policy	  was	  finalized	  (Sowman	  2011).	  
The	   new	   policy	   was	   formally	   adopted	   in	   June	   2012,	   following	   a	   long	   and	   difficult	  
consultation	  process	  involving	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  stakeholders	  (DAFF	  2012a).	  Hailed	  as	  
an	   important	   “shift	   in	   perspective”	   for	   the	   small-­‐scale	   sector,	   the	   policy	   embodies	  
many	   key	   principles	   from	   the	   emerging	   governance	   literature	   (Sowman	   2011;	   p.	  
303).	  It	  also	  squarely	  emphasises	  the	  importance	  of	  addressing	  historical	  imbalances	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in	  South	  African	  fisheries	  sector,	  prioritizing	  the	  unique	  needs	  of	  small-­‐scale	   fishers	  
for	  the	  first	  time	  (DAFF	  2012a).	  
A	  key	  guiding	  principle	  of	  the	  new	  SSF	  policy	  (DAFF	  2012a)	  is	  to	  “adopt	  an	  integrated	  
and	  holistic	  approach	  …	  based	  on	  human	  rights	  principles”	  (p.	  23).	  This	  approach	  is	  
underlined	  by	  a	  need	  to	  contribute	  to	  “alleviation	  of	  poverty,	  food	  security,	  and	  local	  
socio-­‐economic	  development,”	  recognising	  the	  central	  role	  of	  small-­‐scale	  fisheries	  in	  
supporting	   coastal	   livelihoods	   (p.	   23).	   The	   policy	   thus	   has	   a	   strong	   focus	   on	   social	  
justice,	   linked	   to	   fulfilling	   imperatives	   embodied	   in	   South	   Africa’s	   progressive,	  
humanistic	  Constitution	  (Isaacs	  2011)	  
Drawing	   lessons	   from	   the	   co-­‐management	   literature,	   the	   policy	   is	   premised	   on	  
promoting	  “effective	  participation	  in	  policy	  development,	  management,	  and	  decision-­‐
making”	   (p.	   15).	   Acknowledging	   the	   complex	   nature	   of	   fisheries	   systems,	   it	  
emphasises	  the	  “interdependency”	  of	  social,	  cultural,	  economic,	  and	  ecological	  factors	  
(p.	  15).	  The	  policy	  adopts	  a	  similarly	  holistic	  view	  of	  marine	  resources,	  stating	  that	  an	  
ecosystem-­‐based	   approach	   is	   “central”	   to	   fisheries	   management	   (p.	   4).	   There	   are	  
traces	  of	  legal	  pluralism,	  meanwhile,	  in	  the	  demand	  for	  the	  state	  to	  “recognise	  rights	  
guaranteed	   by	   custom	   and	   law”	   (p.	   14)	   (all	   DAFF	   2012a).	   The	   policy	   is	   thus	  
remarkably	   in	   tune	   with	   recent	   developments	   in	   the	   global	   fisheries	   governance	  
literature,	  providing	  an	  important	  opportunity	  to	  put	  many	  of	  its	  core	  principles	  into	  
practice	  in	  South	  Africa	  (Sowman	  et	  al.	  2011b).	  
Cognisant	  of	   the	   specific	  demands	  of	  managing	   fisheries	   in	  a	  South	  African	  context,	  
where	   previous	   post-­‐apartheid	   transformation	   efforts	   have	   overlooked	   bona	   fide	  
small-­‐scale	  fishers,	  the	  policy	  pays	  particular	  attention	  to	  developing	  mechanisms	  to	  
identify	   legitimate	   fishers	  and	   fishing	  communities	  (DAFF	  2012a).	  Linked	  to	   this	  an	  
emphasis	  on	  allocating	   community	  quotas,	   granting	   communities	   themselves	  shared	  
responsibility	   for	   issuing	   access	   rights	   (Sowman	  2011).	   Finally—and	   crucially—the	  
policy	  seeks	  to	  bring	  the	  historic	  marginalisation	  of	  small-­‐scale	   fishers	  to	  an	  end	  by	  
prioritising	   their	   interests	   within	   the	   fisheries	   sector	   as	   a	   whole,	   granting	   them	  
preferential	  access	  to	  nearshore	  resources	  in	  strategic	  areas	  (DAFF	  2012a).	  
Despite	   its	  highly	  progressive	  wording,	  however,	   the	  new	  policy	   is	  yet	   to	  be	   tested,	  
and	   many	   questions	   remain	   about	   its	   implementation	   (Sowman	   2011).	   An	   official	  
plain-­‐language	   summary	   is	   frank	   about	   some	   of	   the	   “practical	   challenges”	   involved	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with	   translating	   the	   policy	   into	   action:	   capacity	   constraints,	   developing	   support	  
structures	  for	  co-­‐management,	  agreeing	  on	  selection	  criteria	  for	  the	  identification	  of	  
legitimate	   small-­‐scale	   fishers,	   and	   implementing	   multi-­‐species	   quotas	   without	  
compromising	   existing	   single-­‐species	  management	   protocols	   (DAFF	  2012b;	   p.	   3).	   A	  
final	   key	   challenge	   identified	   in	   the	   document	   is	   “enforcing	   compliance”	   (DAFF	  
2012b;	  p.	  3).	  Understanding	  the	  practical	  challenges	  involved	  with	  implementing	  the	  
new	  SSF	  policy	  in	  the	  light	  of	  these	  constraints	  is	  a	  core	  focus	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  As	  
the	  following	  section	  of	  this	  review	  will	  illustrate,	  South	  Africa’s	  ongoing	  and	  rampant	  
abalone	  poaching	  problem	  is	  likely	  to	  present	  one	  significant	  obstacle.	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1.2.3 Abalone	  poaching	  in	  the	  Western	  Cape	  
Background	  
Of	   the	   five	   abalone	   species	   found	   in	   South	   African	   waters,	   just	   one,	   the	   endemic	  
Haliotis	   midae,	   is	   commercially	   exploited	   (Steinberg	   2005).	   A	   large,	   slow-­‐moving	  
grazing	   mollusc,	   H.	   midae	   reaches	   sexual	   maturity	   after	   seven	   years5.	   It	   occupies	  
shallow	   inshore	  waters	   from	  Cape	  Columbine	  on	   the	   country’s	  west	   coast	   as	   far	   as	  
Port	   St	   Johns	   in	   the	   Eastern	   Cape	   (Figure	   1),	   with	   greatest	   densities	   occurring	   in	  
waters	   less	   than	   five	   meters	   deep.	   Taken	   together,	   these	   two	   biological	  
characteristics—slow	   growth	   and	   relative	   ease	   of	   access—render	   H.	   midae	  
particularly	   vulnerable	   to	   over-­‐exploitation,	   a	   threat	   compounded	   by	   the	  
extraordinarily	  high	  value	  of	  abalone	  products	  in	  the	  Far	  East.	  
South	  Africa’s	  commercial	  abalone	  fishery	  began	  near	  Gansbaai,	  on	  the	  south	  coast	  of	  
the	  Western	  Cape,	   in	  the	  late	  1940s	  (Hauck	  2009b).	   It	  was	  initially	  run	  on	  an	  open-­‐
access	   basis,	  with	   teams	   of	   divers	  working	   from	   small	   boats	   fitted	  with	   surface-­‐air	  
‘hookah’	  equipment	  (Sauer	  et	  al.	  2003).	  Shore-­‐based	  harvesting	  also	  took	  place	  at	  low	  
tide,	  as	  indeed	  it	  had	  for	  centuries	  throughout	  the	  biogeographic	  range	  of	  the	  abalone	  
resource	  (Hauck	  1997).	  Licenses	  were	  required	  from	  1954	  onwards,	  but	  other	  than	  
size	   limits	   no	   harvest	   restrictions	   applied.	   This	   lack	   of	   regulation,	   coupled	   with	  
booming	   demand	   in	   key	   importer	   countries	   like	   Japan,	   allowed	   catches	   to	   rise	   to	  
unsustainable	   levels,	  peaking	  at	  2	  800	  tons	   in	  1965	  before	  falling	   into	  rapid	  decline	  
(Sauer	  et	  al.	  2003).	  
Alarmed	   at	   the	   prospect	   of	   resource	   depletion,	   fisheries	   managers	   imposed	   catch	  
regulations	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  1968	  (see	  Table	  2	  for	  a	  timeline).	  The	  total	  quota	  was	  
steadily	   reduced	   until	   the	   early	   1970s,	  when	   annual	   catches	   stabilized	   around	   700	  
tons.	   In	  the	  early	  1980s	  this	  figure	  decreased	  slightly,	  to	  around	  615	  tons,	  yet	  there	  
were	  no	  indications	  of	  significant	  long-­‐term	  declines	  (Raemaekers	  et	  al.	  2011).	  From	  
1986	  onwards	  the	  commercial	  fishery	  was	  subdivided	  into	  seven	  fishing	  zones,	  with	  
each	  allocated	  its	  own	  Total	  Allowable	  Catch	  (TAC)	  based	  on	  stock	  assessments	  and	  
previous	  yields	  (Tarr	  2000;	  see	  Figure	  1).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  This	  figure	  applies	  to	  the	  western	  parts	  of	  the	  country,	  where	  the	  water	  is	  colder	  and	  abalone	  is	  most	  
abundant.	   In	   the	   warmer	   waters	   of	   the	   Eastern	   Cape,	   however,	   it	   is	   believed	   that	   abalone	   mature	  
earlier	  (Wood	  &	  Buxton	  1996).	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Until	   the	   early	   1990s,	   in	   a	   long	   period	   of	   relative	   stability,	   these	   management	  
interventions	   appeared	   to	   be	  working	  well.	   Harvests	  were	   steady	   and	   divers	  were	  
reporting	  improved	  catch-­‐per-­‐unit-­‐effort,	  with	  the	  prospect	  of	  increased	  TACs	  in	  the	  
future	   attracting	   new	   entrants	   to	   the	   fishery	   (Tarr	   2000).	   Co-­‐operation	   between	  
resource	  managers	  and	  a	  responsible	  core	  of	  rights	  holders,	  in	  other	  words,	  was	  seen	  
to	  have	  put	  the	  abalone	  fishery	  back	  on	  track.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  1:	  Map	  of	  South	  Africa	  and	  the	  Western	  Cape,	  showing	  the	  biogeographic	  range	  
of	   abalone	   (Haliotis	  midae)	   and	   the	   extent	   of	   the	   commercial	   abalone	   fishery.	   Since	  
1986	   the	   commercial	   fishery	   has	   been	   managed	   in	   seven	   separate	   zones	   (A	   –	   G	   on	  
map).	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The	  other	  side	  of	  the	  coin	  
Although	   tighter	   control	   brought	   a	   sense	   of	   optimism	   to	   the	   abalone	   fishery,	   its	  
benefits	  were	  not	  shared	  equally	  among	  different	  resource	  users.	  Of	   the	  14	  abalone	  
processing	  factories	  operating	  in	  1968,	  just	  six—the	  largest—were	  awarded	  permits	  
when	   catch	   regulations	  were	   first	   put	   in	   place	   (Sauer	   et	  al.	  2003).	   This	  meant	   that	  
many	  smaller	  operators	  were	  excluded	  from	  the	  most	  profitable	  sector	  of	  the	  fishery,	  
and	   had	   to	   settle	   for	   low-­‐paying	   diving	   and	   processing	   jobs	  with	   other	   companies	  
instead.	   In	   1982	   the	   Abalone	   Divers	   Association	   was	   formed,	   and	   divers	   began	  
receiving	   their	   own	   small	   percentage	   of	   the	   annual	   TAC	   (Sauer	   et	   al.	   2003).	  
Nevertheless,	   they	  were	   legally	   required	   to	   deliver	   abalone	   to	   specified	   processing	  
factories,	   and	   thus	   unable	   to	   process	   and	   market	   their	   catch	   for	   greater	   profits	  
themselves	  (Sauer	  et	  al.	  2003).	  
In	  the	  early	  1990s,	  five	  white-­‐owned	  companies	  held	  commercial	  abalone	  rights,	  with	  
52	  divers—mostly	  coloured	  individuals—employed	  on	  a	  seasonal	  basis	  (Sauer	  et	  al.	  
2003).	  Fishing	  communities	  living	  immediately	  adjacent	  to	  the	  resource,	  for	  example	  
in	  Hawston,	   Hermanus,	   and	   Gansbaai,	  were	   thus	   granted	  minimal	   formal	   access	   to	  
abalone,	  despite	  their	  long	  history	  of	  dependency	  on,	  and	  exploitation	  of,	  near-­‐shore	  
marine	   resources.	   Transformation	   of	   the	   abalone	   fishery	   began	   in	   1998,	  when	   236	  
traditional	  abalone	  fishers	  received	  subsistence	  quotas	  representing	  10%	  of	  the	  TAC	  
(Raemaekers	  et	  al.	  2011).	  This	   followed	  the	   formal	  recognition,	   for	   the	   first	   time,	  of	  
the	   traditional	   rights	   of	   subsistence	   fishers	   by	   the	   Marine	   Living	   Resources	   Act	  
(Isaacs	   2011).	   The	   high	   value	   of	   abalone	   made	   it	   an	   anomaly	   in	   the	   subsistence	  
sector,	   which	   was	   primarily	   based	   on	   low-­‐value	   species	   (Harris	   et	   al.	   2002).	   The	  
subsistence	   abalone	   fishery	   proved	   difficult	   to	   manage	   and	   was	   closed	   in	   2001	  
(Raemaekers	  et	  al.	  2011).	  	  It	  was	  replaced	  by	  a	  system	  of	  limited	  commercial	  rights	  in	  
the	  2001/2002	  season,	  with	  232	  previously	  disadvantaged	  divers	  allocated	  a	  shared	  
quota	  of	  nearly	  75	  tons	  (DEAT	  2002).	  
Like	   in	   other	   fisheries	   sectors,	   transformation	   of	   the	   abalone	   industry	  was	   fraught	  
with	  difficulties.	  Established	  rights	  holders	  resisted	  efforts	   to	  broaden	  access,	  as	  no	  
corresponding	  increases	  in	  TAC	  had	  been	  made:	  this	  meant,	  inevitably,	  that	  the	  size	  of	  
individual	  quota	  allocations	  would	  shrink	  (Sauer	  et	  al.	  2003).	  To	  make	  matters	  worse,	  
the	  TAC	  began	  to	  plummet	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  onwards,	  in	  response	  to	  increased	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Table	  2:	  Key	  events	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  South	  Africa’s	  legal	  and	  illegal	  abalone	  fisheries	  







1949*	   Commercial	  abalone	  fishery	  begins	  near	  Hermanus	  
1954	   First	  commercial	  licences	  established;	  no	  catch	  limits	  
1965	   Annual	  commercial	  harvest	  peaks	  at	  2800	  tons	  
1968	   First	  commercial	  catch	  limits	  established	  
1972	   Annual	  commercial	  harvest	  stabilizes	  at	  700	  tons	  
1983	   Recreational	  licenses	  established	  















1990*	   Southward	  migration	  of	  WCRL	  into	  Zones	  A	  &	  B;	  abalone	  recruitment	  failure	  
1994	   Annual	  recreational	  harvest	  peaks	  at	  750	  tons	  
1994	   Apartheid	  ends	  
1994*	   The	  'Abalone	  Wars'	  begin	  on	  Overberg	  coast	  
1998	   Marine	  Living	  Resources	  Act	  adopted	  
	  










1999	   Start	  of	  Operation	  Neptune	  
2001	   Subsistence	  rights	  replaced	  with	  'limited	  commercial'	  rights	  
2003	   Environmental	  Court	  established	  in	  Hermanus	  
	   ‘Limited	  commercial'	  sector	  merged	  with	  commercial	  sector	  
	   Long-­‐term	  abalone	  commercial	  rights	  granted	  
	   MARINES	  established	  by	  Overberg	  Municipality	  
	   New	  Abalone	  Policy	  adopted	  
	   Overberg	  Municipality	  takes	  over	  compliance	  responsibility	  from	  MCM	  
	   Closure	  of	  recreational	  fishery	  
2004	   Abalone	  Protection	  Plan	  adopted	  	  
	   Start	  of	  Operation	  Trident	  
	   Table	  Mountain	  National	  Park	  proclaimed	  
2005	   Operation	  Neptune	  ends	  
	  
Operation	  Trident	  ends	  
2006	   Environmental	  Court	  closes	  
	  
MARINES	  disband	  
2007	   H.	  midae	  listed	  on	  CITES	  Appendix	  III	  
2008	   Commercial	  fishery	  closed	  in	  October;	  partially	  re-­‐opened	  in	  November	  
	   2010	   H.	  midae	  withdrawn	  from	  CITES	  Appendix	  III	  
	   2011	   Experimental	  commercial	  fishery	  opened	  in	  False	  Bay	  
	   2012	   New	  Policy	  for	  the	  Small	  Scale	  Fisheries	  Sector	  adopted	  by	  DAFF	  
	   2013	   First	  long-­‐term	  commercial	  abalone	  rights	  due	  to	  expire	  
	  
*	  	  Approximate	  dates	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poaching	   and	   the	   southward	   intrusion	   of	   rock	   lobsters	   into	   the	   highly	   productive	  
fishery	   zones	   C	   and	   D,	   which	   caused	   widespread	   recruitment	   failure6	  (Tarr	   2000).	  
Fewer	   abalone	   were	   thus	   being	   shared	   between	   more	   and	   more	   rights	   holders,	   a	  
problem	   which	   rapidly	   worsened	   over	   time.	   To	   illustrate,	   the	   average	   size	   of	   a	  
commercial	   quota	   allocation	   was	   cut	   from	   120	   tons	   to	   just	   5.2	   tons	   when	   limited	  
commercial	   permits	   were	   introduced	   in	   2002.	   By	   2007,	   immediately	   before	   the	  
closure	  of	   the	  commercial	   fishery,	   the	   size	  of	   this	  average	   individual	  allocation	  was	  
less	  than	  250	  kg;	  it	  has	  not	  been	  increased	  since	  (Raemaekers	  et	  al.	  2011).	  
In	   a	   harsh	   microcosm	   of	   the	   broader	   transformation	   picture,	   fisheries	   authorities	  
were	   thus	   faced	   with	   the	   conundrum	   of	   broadening	   access	   to	   the	   abalone	   fishery	  
while	   stocks	  were	   in	   rapid	  decline	   (Raemaekers	  et	  al.	  2011).	  One	  consequence	  was	  
that	   not	   everybody	   who	   applied	   for	   permits	   received	   them,	   stoking	   anger	   among	  
small-­‐scale	   fishers	   who	   felt	   they	   had	   historic	   claims	   to	   the	   resource	   (Hauck	   and	  
Sweijd	  1999).	  This	  was	  exacerbated	  by	  a	  cumbersome	  rights	  allocation	  process	  that	  
frequently	  benefited	  community	  elites	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  legitimate	  fishermen	  (Isaacs	  
2006).	   When	   the	   price	   of	   abalone	   increased	   and	   international	   criminal	   syndicates	  
began	   offering	   lucrative	   prices	   for	   illegal	   harvests,	   many	   coastal	   residents—
particularly	   in	   the	   region	   between	   Kleinmond	   and	   Gansbaai	   on	   the	   south	   coast—
turned	   to	  poaching	   as	   a	   form	  of	   income	   (Steinberg	  2005).	   The	   reform	  process	  was	  
crippled,	  henceforth,	  by	  the	  evolution	  of	  a	  powerful	  criminal	  economy	  that	  continues	  
to	  operate	  to	  this	  day.	  
The	  rise	  of	  syndicated	  poaching	  
The	  long	  period	  of	  stability	  in	  the	  commercial	  abalone	  fishery	  came	  to	  an	  end	  in	  the	  
early	   1990s,	   when	   a	   dramatic	   upsurge	   in	   illegal	   harvesting	   began	   negatively	  
impacting	   legal	   catches	   for	   the	   first	   time	  (Tarr	  2000).	  Whilst	  abalone	  poaching	  was	  
not	  a	  new	  phenomenon—it	  had	  been	  taking	  place,	  informally	  and	  at	  a	  low	  level,	  since	  
quotas	  were	  first	  established—the	  start	  of	  the	  decade	  witnessed	  its	  emergence	  on	  a	  
far	   bigger	   scale	   than	   before.	   According	   to	   Steinberg	   (2005),	   this	   shift	   could	   be	  
attributed	  to	  four	  main	  factors.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Rock	  lobsters	  began	  decimating	  sea	  urchin	  populations,	  which	  juvenile	  abalone	  formerly	  relied	  on	  for	  
shelter.	  The	  breakdown	  of	  this	  commensal	  relationship	  made	  abalone	  recruits	  much	  more	  vulnerable	  
to	  predation	  (Tarr	  2000)	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First,	  the	  South	  African	  rand	  depreciated	  in	  value,	  falling	  steadily	  from	  three	  units	  to	  
the	   US	   dollar	   in	   1992	   to	   13	   units	   nine	   years	   later.	   This	   benefitted	   local	   abalone	  
exporters,	  both	  legal	  and	  illegal,	  who	  were	  able	  to	  earn	  proportionally	  more	  for	  their	  
product	   in	   rand	   terms.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   economic	   growth	   in	   China	   and	   other	  
importing	  countries	  like	  Taiwan	  boosted	  demand,	  causing	  prices	  to	  rise.	  By	  the	  mid-­‐
1990s,	   abalone	  was	   reported	   to	   fetch	  more	   than	   US$65	   /	   kg	   on	   the	   Chinese	   black	  
market,	  equivalent	  to	  approximately	  R300	  /	  kg	  at	  the	  time7.	  
Second,	  a	  sophisticated	  network	  of	  Chinese	  criminal	  syndicates,	  collectively	  known	  as	  
Triad	  gangs,	  was	  already	  in	  existence	  in	  South	  Africa	  (Gastrow	  2001).	  Engaging	  in	  a	  
range	  of	  illicit	  activities	  from	  drug	  smuggling	  to	  human	  trafficking,	  they	  played	  a	  key	  
role	   in	   organizing	   the	   illegal	   abalone	   trade	   when	   the	   street	   value	   of	   the	   abalone	  
resource	  increased	  (Steinberg	  2005).	  
Third,	  the	  lifting	  of	  economic	  sanctions	  after	  the	  end	  of	  apartheid,	  and	  the	  reinsertion	  
of	  South	  Africa	  into	  the	  global	  economy,	  made	  it	  easier	  for	  criminal	  groups	  to	  conduct	  
operations	   in	   the	   country;	   more	   lenient	   border	   controls	   also	   made	   it	   easier	   for	  
poached	   abalone	   to	   leave	   South	   Africa.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   greater	   volumes	   of	  
contraband	   were	   able	   to	   enter	   the	   country—including	   the	   drugs	   methaqualone	  
(‘mandrax’)	  and	  crystal	  methamphetamine	  (‘tik’),	  which	  Triad	  groups	  are	  understood	  
to	  have	  bartered	  for	  abalone	  with	  local	  gangs	  from	  the	  Cape	  Flats8	  (Steinberg	  2005).	  
Finally,	   and	   crucially,	   frustration	   and	   disappointment	   at	   the	   slow	   pace	   of	   fisheries	  
reform,	   coupled	   with	   a	   more	   general	   sense	   of	   political	   disillusionment,	   led	   to	  
coloured	  fishing	  communities	  in	  the	  Western	  Cape	  responded	  positively	  to	  the	  arrival	  
of	  foreign	  abalone	  syndicates,	  who	  simultaneously	  offered	  money	  and	  an	  opportunity	  
to	   defy	   the	   government	   (Hauck	   and	   Sweijd	   1999;	   Steinberg	   2005).	   Together	   these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  This	  figure	  has	  not	  been	  adjusted	  for	  inflation.	  In	  today’s	  terms,	  with	  an	  average	  annual	  inflation	  rate	  
of	  5.9%	  since	  1995,	  it	  represents	  approximately	  R840	  /	  kg.	  
8	  During	  Apartheid,	  coloured	  people	  where	   forcibly	  removed	  from	  inner	  Cape	  Town	  suburbs	   in	  their	  
thousands,	  and	  relocated	  to	  a	  vast,	  barren	  expanse	  of	  land	  to	  the	  east	  of	  the	  city,	  which	  became	  known	  
as	   the	   Cape	   Flats.	   This	   was	   to	   enforce	   the	   Group	   Areas	   Act,	   a	   piece	   of	   legislation	   that	   forbade	   the	  
existence	   of	   racially	   mixed	   neighbourhoods.	   One	   consequence	   of	   these	   forced	   removals	   was	   the	  
emergence	  of	  thousands	  of	  small	  street	  gangs	  in	  newly	  established	  coloured	  suburbs	  like	  Hanover	  Park	  
and	  Manenberg,	  partly	   in	   response	   to	   the	  breakdown	  of	   social	  or	  kinship	  bonds	   that	  had	  previously	  
existed	  in	  coloured	  communities.	  Over	  time,	  and	  particularly	  with	  the	  markedly	  increased	  influx	  of	  the	  
global	  drug	  trade	  in	  the	  1990s,	  many	  of	  these	  gangs	  coalesced	  to	  form	  powerful	  criminal	  groups.	  They	  
continue	   to	   play	   a	   central	   role	   in	   the	   criminal	   economy	   of	   the	  Western	   Cape	   (taken	   from	   Steinberg	  
2004).	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factors	  constituted	  a	   ‘perfect	  storm’,	  and	  abalone	  poaching	  took	  off	  on	  a	  scale	  never	  
witnessed	  before.	  
Crisis	  management	  	  
Rampant	  poaching	  by	  large	  teams	  of	  divers,	  working	  from	  the	  shore	  or	  off	  inflatable	  
rubber	  ducks,	   began	   rapidly	  depleting	   the	   abalone	   resource	  on	   the	  Overberg	   coast,	  
where	   it	  had	   formerly	  been	  most	  abundant	   (Hauck	  and	  Sweijd	  1999).	  The	  problem	  
was	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  ‘lobster	  effect’	  in	  Zones	  C	  and	  D,	  which	  caused	  comprehensive	  
recruitment	   failure	   (Tarr	   2000).	   Fearing	   stock	   collapse,	   fisheries	   authorities	   did	   a	  
number	   of	   things.	   The	   first	   was	   aggressively	   curbing	   legal	   fishing,	   trimming	   the	  
commercial	   TAC	   by	   more	   than	   85%	   between	   1995	   and	   2006,	   and	   closing	   the	  
recreational	   fishery	   in	   2003	   (Raemaekers	   et	   al.	   2011).	   Having	   failed	   to	   halt	   the	  
decline,	   they	   then	   took	   the	   highly	   controversial	   decision	   to	   shut	   down	   the	   entire	  
commercial	   fishery	   in	  2007,	   arguing	   that	   abalone	  were	  on	   the	  brink	  of	   commercial	  
extinction.	  Rights	  holders	  were	  infuriated,	  claiming	  they	  had	  been	  unfairly	  punished	  
for	  the	  behaviour	  of	  criminals.	  The	  ban	  was	  effectively	  withdrawn	  one	  season	   later,	  
but	  with	  a	  much	  smaller	  TAC	  of	  about	  150	  tons—representing	  an	  average	  individual	  
quota	  of	  just	  250	  kg—in	  place	  (Raemaekers	  et	  al.	  2011).	  
In	  parallel,	  a	  number	  of	  strategies	  were	  developed	  to	  combat	  poaching	  by	  improving	  
law	  enforcement	   (Hauck	  &	  Kroese	  2006).	   In	  1999	  Marine	  and	  Coastal	  Management	  
(MCM),	   the	   national	   fisheries	   authority9,	   established	   Operation	   Neptune,	   a	   joint	  
venture	  with	  the	  South	  African	  Police	  Service	  (SAPS),	  on	  the	  Overberg	  coast	  (for	  a	  list	  
of	  the	  enforcement	  bodies	  responsible	  for	  tackling	  abalone	  poaching	  see	  Table	  3).	  Its	  
main	  focus	  was	  preventing	  poachers	  from	  entering	  the	  water;	  efforts	  were	  also	  made	  
to	   arrest	   and	   prosecute	   known	   offenders	   (Hauck	   2009b).	   Operation	   Neptune	   ran	  
intermittently	  until	  2005,	  when	  it	  was	  absorbed	  back	  into	  MCM.	  
In	   2003	   the	   Overstrand	   Municipality	   took	   over	   responsibility	   for	   enforcing	  
compliance	   in	   its	   waters—where	   abalone	   poaching	  was	  most	   serious—from	  MCM.	  
Their	   first	   project	   was	   establishing	   a	   special	   task	   force	   called	   the	   MARINEs	  
(Management	  Action	   for	  Resources	  of	   Inshore	  and	  Nearshore	  Environments)	  which	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Marine	   and	   Coastal	  Management,	   responsible	   for	  managing	   fisheries	   and	   the	  marine	   environment,	  
was	   formerly	   a	   branch	  of	   the	  Department	   of	  Environmental	  Affairs	   and	  Tourism	   (DEAT).	   In	  2009	   it	  
was	   transferred	   to	   the	   Department	   of	   Agriculture,	   Forestry,	   and	   Fisheries	   (DAFF),	   where	   it	   is	   now	  
known	   simply	   as	   the	   Fisheries	   Branch.	   Many	   fishers	   continue	   to	   refer	   to	   the	   fisheries	   authority	   as	  
MCM.	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among	  other	   activities	   conducted	  24-­‐hour	  patrols,	  monitored	   slipways,	   liaised	  with	  
local	   schools	   and	   communities,	   and	   co-­‐operated	   with	   other	   anti-­‐poaching	   groups	  
(Hauck	  2009b).	  	  
In	  the	  same	  year	  a	  dedicated	  environmental	  court	  was	  set	  up	  in	  Hermanus	  to	  handle	  
poaching	   cases,	   which	   the	   mainstream	   justice	   system	   had	   struggled	   to	   deal	   with	  
effectively	  (Snijman	  2005).	  In	  its	  first	  18	  months	  of	  operation	  the	  court	  processed	  a	  
long	   backlog	   of	   cases,	   achieving	   a	   prosecution	   rate	   of	   75%	   (Hauck	   2009b).	   By	  
comparison,	   the	   prosecution	   rate	   in	   mainstream	   courts	   was	   estimated	   at	   10%	  
(Snijman	   2005).	   Despite	   its	   clear	   successes,	   however,	   the	   Department	   of	   Justice	  
closed	  the	  environmental	  court	  in	  2006,	  citing	  budgetary	  constraints.	  
	  
Table	  3:	  Institutions	  responsible	  for	  tackling	  abalone	  poaching	  on	  the	  Cape	  Peninsula	  
Acronym	  in	  text	   Full	  Title	  
DAFF	   Fisheries	   Branch:	   Department	   of	   Agriculture,	   Forestry	   &	  
Fisheries	  
MCM	   Marine	   and	   Coastal	   Management:	   Department	   of	  
Environmental	  Affairs	  &	  Tourism	  
SANParks	   South	  African	  National	  Parks	  Board	  
SAPS	   Water	  Wing:	  South	  African	  Police	  Service	  
	  
A	  further	  attempt	  to	  strengthen	  law	  enforcement	  was	  the	  launch	  of	  Operation	  Trident	  
in	  2004,	  which	  formed	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  ‘Abalone	  Protection	  Plan’.	  One	  spin-­‐off	  of	  this	  
project	   was	   securing	   substantial	   funding	   for	   the	   MARINES;	   however	   they	   were	  
disbanded	  two	  years	  later,	  and	  amalgamated	  back	  into	  MCM	  (Hauck	  2009b).	  This	  also	  
saw	  the	  end	  of	  Operation	  Trident.	  
Besides	   policing	   the	   abalone	   resource,	   authorities	   also	  made	   efforts	   to	   address	   the	  
root	   causes	   of	   poaching	  with	   a	   new	  abalone	  policy,	   adopted	   in	   2003	   (DEAT	  2003).	  
This	  policy	   established	  parameters	   for	   the	  allocation	  of	   long-­‐term	   (10	  year)	   fishing	  
rights,	  and	  proposed	  a	  new	  management	  plan	  for	  curbing	  overfishing.	  This	  included	  
setting	   up	   co-­‐management	   structures	   and	   establishing	   a	   Territorial	   User	   Rights	  
Fishery	  (TURF)	  for	  rights	  holders,	  aimed	  at	  encouraging	  custodianship	  in	  the	  fishery	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and	   thus	   improving	   its	   long-­‐term	   viability.	   The	   recreational	   fishery	   was	   also	  
suspended,	  in	  order	  to	  reserve	  abalone	  exclusively	  for	  the	  commercial	  sector.	  	  
Despite	   these	   progressive	  measures,	   the	   new	   policy	   proved	   difficult	   to	   implement.	  
Problems	  included	  an	  ineffective	  TURF	  system,	  which	  allowed	  rights	  holders	  to	  fish	  in	  
zones	   other	   than	   their	   own	   and	   thereby	   undermined	   resource	   custodianship;	   a	  
flawed	   co-­‐management	   process,	   with	   limited	   opportunities	   for	   stakeholders	   to	  
participate	   in	  decision	  making;	  and	  notably	   the	  unilateral	  decision	  by	  MCM	  to	  close	  
the	   commercial	   fishery	   in	   2007,	   which	   completely	   alienated	   rights	   holders	   (Hauck	  
2009b).	  Rights	  holders	  were	  also	  not	  equipped	  to	  deter	  armed	  poaching	  syndicates,	  
who	  continued	  to	  act	  with	   impunity	  (Raemaekers	  et	  al.	  2011).	   Individual	  quotas	   for	  
rights	   holders	   remained	   small,	   prompting	   anger	   at	   the	   government	   and	   further	   co-­‐
operation	   with	   poaching	   syndicates	   (Hauck	   2009b).	   Finally,	   and	   perhaps	   most	  
importantly,	   the	   underlying	   conditions	   of	   poverty	   and	   unemployment	   in	   coastal	  
fishing	   communities	  had	  not	   been	   adequately	   addressed,	  meaning	   strong	   economic	  
incentives	   for	   poaching	   remained	   (Hauck	   &	   Sweijd	   1999;	   Hauck	   &	   Kroese	   2006;	  
Isaacs	   2011).	  What	   had	   been	   initially	   been	   lauded	   as	   a	   bold	   step	   towards	   tackling	  
abalone	  poaching	  holistically	  thus	  resulted,	  ultimately,	  in	  little	  change,	  with	  little	  link-­‐
through	  between	  policy	  interventions	  at	  government	  level	  and	  compliance	  behaviour	  
on	  the	  ground.	  
At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   illegal	   abalone	   fishery	   continued	   evolving	   from	   its	   informal,	  
politically	  motivated	  roots	  into	  “a	  highly	  organised	  fishery	  dominated	  by	  a	   lucrative	  
illicit	   international	   trade”	   (Hauck	   2009b;	   p.	   133).	   With	   the	   root	   socio-­‐economic	  
drivers	   of	   poaching	   remaining	   intact,	   the	   fishery	   expanded	   as	   organized	   criminal	  
groups	   continued	   exploiting	   the	   opportunity	   to	   supply	   the	   booming	   abalone	   black	  
market	  (Steinberg	  2005;	  Hauck	  2009).	  Commenting	  on	  this,	  Hauck	  (2009)	  described	  
a	  sense	  of	  a	  “missed	  opportunity”	  among	  participants	  in	  her	  study,	  who	  felt	  that	  the	  
chance	  to	  put	  the	  abalone	  fishery	  on	  a	  “radically	  different	  path”	  had	  passed	  (p.	  134).	  	  
Having	  met	  with	   little	   success	   in	   its	  war	   on	   abalone	   poaching,	   fisheries	   authorities	  
made	   two	   final	   attempts	   to	   protect	   the	   resource.	   The	   first	   was	   establishing	   new	  
Marine	   Protected	   Areas	   (MPAs)	   on	   the	   Cape	   Peninsula	   and	   on	   Bird	   Island	   in	   Port	  
Elizabeth,	  where	   illegal	   harvesting	  was	   rampant.	   	  Dyer	   Island,	   near	  Gaansbaai,	  was	  
also	   closed	   to	   commercial	   fishing.	   Law	   enforcement	   in	   these	   areas	   remained	   poor,	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though,	   severely	   hampering	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   these	  measures	   (Raemaekers	  et	  al.	  
2011).	  The	  second	  strategy	  was	  listing	  H.	  midae	  on	  Appendix	  III	  of	  CITES	  (Convention	  
on	  International	  Trade	  in	  Endangered	  Species	  of	  Wild	  Fauna	  and	  Flora),	  a	  voluntary	  
international	  agreement	  aimed	  at	  restricting	  the	  trade	  of	  rare	  or	  threatened	  species.	  
This	  required	  all	   legal	  abalone	  exports	   leaving	  South	  Africa	  to	  be	  accompanied	  by	  a	  
CITES	   permit	   (Raemaekers	   et	   al.	  2011).	   	   It	   was	   hoped	   that	   regulatory	   controls	   in	  
importer	  countries,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  neighbouring	  Southern	  African	  states	  through	  which	  
abalone	  was	   known	   to	   be	   smuggled,	  would	   tighten	   as	   a	   result.	   This	   didn’t	   happen,	  
though:	   after	   encountering	   a	   series	   of	   logistical	   obstacles	   the	   CITES	   listing	   was	  
withdrawn	   in	  May	   2010	   (Raemaekers	   et	  al.	  2011).	   Yet	   again,	   in	   other	  words,	   real-­‐
world	  difficulties	   impeded	  the	  successful	   implementation	  of	  well-­‐intentioned	  rescue	  
plans	  for	  the	  threatened	  abalone	  resource.	  
Current	  state	  of	  affairs	  
Since	  2010,	   little	  has	  changed	   in	  South	  Africa’s	  abalone	   fishery	   from	  a	  management	  
perspective.	   An	   annual	   quota	   of	   150	   tons	   continues	   to	   be	   issued,	   shared	   between	  
Zones	   A,	   B,	   E,	   F,	   and	   G	   (Figure	   1).	   Zones	   C	   and	  D	   have	   been	   closed	   to	   commercial	  
fishing	  since	  2006,	  although	  poaching	  has	  continued	  on	  a	  prolific	  scale.	  Rights	  holders	  
from	   these	   areas—situated	   adjacent	   to	   the	   towns	   of	   Hermanus	   and	   Hawston	  
respectfully—have	   permission	   to	   harvest	   in	   zones	   that	   have	   remained	   open	   (Serge	  
Raemaekers,	  pers.	  com.).	   In	   2011,	  DAFF	  opened	   an	   experimental	   abalone	   fishery	   in	  
False	   Bay,	   expanding	   the	   geographic	   range	   of	   Zone	   E	   to	   compensate	   for	   quota	  
reductions	   elsewhere	   (Angus	  McKenzie,	   DAFF;	   pers.	   com.).	   Zones	   E–G,	   which	   were	  
formerly	   considered	  peripheral	   to	   the	   abalone	   fishery,	   now	   contribute	   one	   third	   of	  
the	  total	  TAC	  (Angus	  McKenzie,	  DAFF;	  pers.	  com.).	  	  
In	   parallel	   to	   the	   westwards	   shift	   in	   legal	   fishing	   effort,	   poaching	   activity	   in	   these	  
zones	  has	  also	  increased.	  Poaching	  groups	  from	  South	  Africa’s	  south	  and	  east	  coasts	  
have	   started	   targeting	   reefs	   surrounding	   the	   Cape	   Peninsula;	   local	   poachers	   have	  
reportedly	   become	  more	   organized	   and	   begun	   operating	   on	   a	   bigger	   scale	   as	   well	  
(Serge	  Raemaekers,	  pers.	  com.).	  It	  is	  alleged	  that	  the	  fishing	  community	  of	  Hangberg,	  
situated	   in	  Hout	   Bay,	   has	   become	   a	   ‘hub’	   for	   abalone	   poaching	   operations	   by	   both	  
foreign	  and	  local	  groups.	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1.3 Research	  aims	  and	  objectives	  
1.3.1 Aims	  
This	   study	  aims	   to	  profile	   the	  human	  dimensions	  of	  abalone	  poaching	   in	  Hangberg,	  
about	   which	   very	   little	   is	   currently	   known10.	   By	   revealing	   the	   scale	   and	   extent	   of	  
current	   poaching	   activities	   in	   the	   community;	   exploring	   its	   socio-­‐economic	   drivers	  
and	   impacts;	   and	   investigating	   relationships	   between	   different	   components	   of	   the	  
illegal	   fishery	   system,	   it	   is	   hoped	   that	   this	   work	   will	   contribute	   to	   better	  
understanding	   of	   what	   is	   simultaneously	   a	   pressing	   conservation	   and	   fisheries	  
management	  issue.	  
According	  to	  systems	  thinking,	  abalone	  poaching	  in	  Hangberg	  cannot	  be	  understood	  
in	   isolation	   from	   its	   broader	   socio-­‐economic,	   cultural,	   political,	   and	   institutional	  
contexts	   (Charles	   1995).	   A	   systems	   approach	   thus	   constitutes	   the	   core	   research	  
framework	   of	   this	   study,	   which	   aims	   to	   profile	   the	   illegal	   fishery	   holistically—and	  
from	  multiple	  perspectives—by	  using	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  research	  methods.	  It	  is	  hoped	  
that	   this	   will	   result	   in	   a	   comprehensive	   picture	   of	   a	   highly	   complex	   governance	  
problem,	   and	   thus	   aid	   the	   development	   of	   more	   appropriate	   and	   effective	  
management	  strategies	  in	  the	  future.	  	  
It	   is	   important	   to	   note,	   however,	   that	   this	   research	   does	   not	   aim	   to	   present	   novel	  
solutions	  to	  syndicated	  abalone	  poaching	  in	  South	  Africa,	  which	  more	  than	  a	  decade	  
of	   compliance	   initiatives	   have	   failed	   to	   bring	   to	   an	   end.	   Rather,	   it	   seeks	   to	   draw	  
lessons	   from	   a	   case	   study	   of	   the	   abalone	   fishery	   to	   inform	   efforts	   to	   govern	   small-­‐
scale	  fisheries—as	  well	  as	  other	  shared	  natural	  resources—more	  successfully	  in	  the	  
future.	  Abalone	  poaching	  in	  Hangberg	  is	  thus	  a	  lens	  with	  which	  to	  investigate	  broader	  
themes	  in	  fisheries	  and	  conservation	  management.	  
Time	   constraints—this	   entire	   research	   project	   is	   limited	   to	   just	   six	  months—mean	  
that	   fully	   characterizing	   the	   different	   facets	   of	   the	   illegal	   abalone	   fishery	   is	   not	  
possible.	  Instead,	  this	  study	  presents	  a	  general	  overview	  of	  the	  human	  dimensions	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  The	  illegal	  rock	  lobster	  fishery	  in	  Hangberg	  has	  been	  studied	  in	  depth	  (Hauck	  2009b)	  and	  abalone	  
poaching	  has	  received	  attention	  elsewhere	  in	  South	  Africa	  (Hauck	  and	  Sweijd	  1999;	  Raemaekers	  2009;	  
Raemaekers	  and	  Britz	  2009).	  This	  research	  is	  thus	  entirely	  new.	  Previous	  work	  has	  been	  drawn	  on	  for	  
verification	  and	  context.	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the	  fishery	  system,	  bringing	   its	  key	  features	  to	  attention	  and	  highlighting	   important	  
themes	  for	  further	  research	  and	  discussion.	  	  
Besides	  profiling	  the	  illegal	  fishery	  in	  Hangberg,	  this	  research	  project	  has	  a	  secondary	  
aim.	  The	  new	  SSF	  policy,	   officially	   adopted	   in	   June	  2012,	   is	   yet	   to	  be	   implemented,	  
and	   questions	   remain	   about	   how	   to	   translate	   its	   noble	   objectives	   into	   meaningful	  
action.	   By	   revealing	   some	   of	   the	   challenges	   abalone	   poaching	   will	   pose	   to	   the	  
implementation	  of	  any	   community-­‐oriented	   fisheries	  policy,	   this	  study	  aims	  to	  offer	  
the	  process	   a	  much-­‐needed	   reality	   check:	   not	   to	   dismiss	   its	   validity,	   but	   to	   try	   and	  
ensure	   that	   its	   implementation	   strategies	   are	   grounded	   in	   reality.	   Unless	   the	   real-­‐
world	   complexities	   of	   small-­‐scale	   fishing	   communities	   are	   properly	   understood,	  
attempts	   to	   bring	   about	   lasting	   change	   are	   likely	   to	   fail.	   Small-­‐scale	   fisheries	  
governance,	  specifically	  relating	  to	  implementing	  the	  new	  SSF	  policy	  in	  South	  Africa,	  
is	  thus	  the	  framework	  of	  analysis	  with	  which	  the	  profile	  of	  Hangberg’s	  illegal	  abalone	  
fishery	  will	  be	  interpreted.	  
1.3.2 Objectives	  
The	  aims	  of	  this	  dissertation	  are	  to	  profile	  the	  human	  dimensions	  of	  abalone	  poaching	  
in	  Hangberg,	  and	  to	  explore	  its	  implications	  for	  implementing	  South	  Africa’s	  new	  SSF	  
policy.	   Four	   objectives	   were	   identified	   to	   help	   achieve	   these	   broader	   goals.	   These	  
were:	  
1. Situating	  Hangberg	  within	  the	  larger	  context	  of	  small-­‐scale	  fisheries	  governance,	  
both	  internationally	  and	  in	  South	  Africa;	  	  
2. Reviewing	  the	  evolution	  of	  syndicated	  abalone	  poaching	  in	  South	  Africa;	  	  
3. Profiling	  the	  human	  dimensions	  of	  abalone	  poaching	  in	  Hangberg	  by:	  	  
3.1. Investigating	  its	  historical	  development;	  	  
3.2. Revealing	  its	  current	  structure,	  scale,	  and	  methods	  of	  operation;	  	  
3.3. Exploring	  its	  main	  social	  and	  economic	  drivers;	  and	  
3.4. Characterizing	  its	  social	  and	  economic	  impacts	  in	  the	  community;	  and	  
4. Drawing	  lessons	  from	  this	  profile	  to	  inform	  implementation	  strategies	  for	  the	  new	  
SSF	  policy,	  as	  well	  as	  recommend	  further	  research.	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1.4 Dissertation	  format	  
Chapter	  1	  has	  introduced	  the	  broad	  theoretical	  background	  to	  this	  study,	  illustrating	  
how	  effective	   small-­‐scale	   fisheries	   governance	   requires	   different	   approaches	   to	   the	  
commercial	   sector.	   The	   importance	   of	   adopting	   a	   systemic	   approach	   to	   fisheries	  
management,	   incorporating	   socio-­‐economic,	   cultural,	   political,	   and	   institutional	  
factors	  into	  decision-­‐making	  in	  addition	  to	  contributions	  from	  conventional	  fisheries	  
science,	  was	  highlighted	  as	  particularly	  important.	  Key	  concepts	  from	  the	  governance	  
and	   compliance	   literature	   were	   introduced	   as	   frameworks	   for	   understanding	  
fisheries	  management,	  as	  well	  as	  legal	  pluralist	  perspectives	  of	  fisheries	  conflict.	  
A	   historic	   overview	   of	   post-­‐apartheid	   fisheries	   reform	   in	   South	   Africa	   followed,	  
revealing	   some	   of	   the	   challenges	   fisheries	   and	   conservation	   managers	   have	   faced	  
since	  the	  end	  of	  apartheid.	  It	  was	  shown	  how	  the	  government’s	  laudable	  ambition	  of	  
broadening	  access	  to	  marine	  resources	  has	  been	  constrained	  by	  its	  need	  to	  maintain	  
economic	  stability	  and	  long-­‐term	  sustainability,	   leading	  to	  the	  expectations	  of	  many	  
historically	   disadvantaged	   small-­‐scale	   fishers	   not	   being	   fulfilled.	   The	   links	   between	  
their	  frustration	  and	  non-­‐compliance	  were	  most	  evident	  in	  the	  abalone	  fishery,	  where	  
high	  demand	  and	  the	  arrival	  of	  powerful	  criminal	  syndicates	  resulted	  in	  an	  explosion	  
of	  illegal	  fishing	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	  onwards.	  	  
In	  Chapter	  2,	  an	   in-­‐depth	  case	  study	  of	  abalone	  poaching	   in	  Hangberg	   is	  presented,	  
which	  uses	  a	  systems	  thinking	  approach	  to	  try	  and	  understand	  the	  multiple	  drivers	  
and	  impacts	  of	  the	  illegal	  fishery.	  
Chapter	  3	  draws	  conclusions	  and	  gives	  recommendations	  for	  improved	  management	  
strategies	  in	  the	  future,	  as	  well	  as	  further	  research.	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CHAPTER	  2: PROFILING	  ABALONE	  POACHING	  IN	  
HANGBERG	  
2.1 Background:	  A	  new	  abalone	  poaching	  hot	  spot?	  	  
“Because	   of	   depleted	   stocks	   and	   police	   clampdowns	   in	   the	   area,	   some	   poaching	  
syndicates	  from	  Hermanus	  and	  Arniston	  are	  believed	  to	  have	  moved	  their	  operations	  to	  
the	  West	  Coast	  …	  ”	  	  (Cape	  Times,	  November	  2003)	  
*	  
“Police	  say	  abalone	  poaching	  around	  Hout	  Bay	  and	  Llandudno	  is	  becoming	  ‘worse	  than	  
Hawston	  and	  Onrus’	  …	  ”	  	  (Cape	  Times,	  November	  2010)	  
*	  
“A	   sting	   operation	   involving	   law	   enforcement	   officers	   following	   a	   gang	   of	   suspected	  
perlemoen	  poachers	  from	  Robben	  Island	  to	  Hout	  Bay	  led	  to	  violent	  clashes	  in	  Hangberg	  
yesterday,	  with	  live	  ammunition	  fired	  …	  ”	  	  (Cape	  Times,	  March	  2012)	  
Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  last	  decade,	  a	  small	  fishing	  community	  on	  the	  Cape	  Peninsula	  
has	   joined	   the	   likes	   of	   Hawston,	   Hermanus,	   and	   Gansbaai—all	   infamous	   abalone	  
poaching	   towns	   on	   South	   Africa’s	   south	   coast—in	  making	   newspaper	   headlines.	   In	  
the	   process,	   Hangberg—situated	   in	   the	   popular	   tourist	   suburb	   of	   Hout	   Bay	   (see	  
Figure	   2)—has	   developed	   notoriety	   for	   being	   a	   new	   abalone	   poaching	   “hot	   spot”.	  
Previous	   research	   has	   documented	   the	   existence	   of	   an	   entrenched	   informal	   rock	  
lobster	   fishery	   in	   the	   community,	   which	   has	   attracted	   the	   attention	   of	   law	  
enforcement	  officials	   for	  decades	  (Hauck	  2009b).	  However,	   the	  newer	  phenomenon	  
of	   abalone	   poaching	   has	   not	   yet	   received	   serious	   attention	   from	   academic	  
researchers.	  
Key	  concepts	   relating	   to	   small-­‐scale	   fisheries	  governance—both	   internationally	  and	  
in	   a	   South	   African	   context—were	   introduced	   in	   Chapter	   1.	   In	   particular,	   the	  
importance	   of	   adopting	   new	   approaches	   for	   managing	   the	   small-­‐scale	   sector	   was	  
highlighted.	  In	  South	  Africa,	  following	  years	  of	  troubled	  attempts	  to	  transform	  marine	  
fisheries	  since	  the	  end	  of	  apartheid,	  some	  of	  these	  approaches	  have	  been	  adopted	  for	  
the	  first	  time	  in	  the	  new	  SSF	  policy.	  Communities	  like	  Hangberg	  are	  precisely	  where	  
the	  new	  policy	  will	  have	  to	  be	  tested.	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Hangberg:	  A	  brief	  history	  
Situated	  above	  Hout	  Bay	  harbour	  on	  the	  Cape	  Peninsula,	  the	  Hangberg	  community—
zoned	  ‘coloured’	  under	  the	  apartheid	  Group	  Areas	  Act	  of	  1950—has	  been	  involved	  in	  
fishing	   for	   centuries.	   Stone	   age	   deposits	   in	   the	   bay	   indicate	   that	   humans	   were	  
catching	  a	  variety	  of	  species	  using	  handlines,	  spears,	  and	  fish	  traps	  as	  long	  as	  2	  000	  
years	   ago	   (Gibbs	   n.d.).	   From	   1667	   onwards,	   Dutch	   farmers	   settled	   in	   the	   valley,	  
fishing	   from	   small	   boats	   and	  with	   trek	   nets	   to	   feed	   their	   labourers	   and	   barter	   for	  
grain	  (Gibbs	  n.d.).	  
	  
	  
Figure	  2:	  Map	  of	   the	  Cape	  Peninsula	   in	  Cape	  Town,	   South	  Africa,	   showing	   the	   fishing	  
community	  of	  Hangberg	  inset.	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The	  first	  formal	  fishery	  in	  Hout	  Bay	  was	  based	  on	  dried	  snoek,	  which	  was	  exported	  to	  
Mauritius	   in	  exchange	  for	  sugar	  from	  the	  early	  19th	  century	  onwards	  (Gibbs	  n.d.).	  A	  
rock	   lobster	   fishery	  developed	  shortly	  after,	  with	  a	  system	  of	  customary	  user	  rights	  
evolving	  among	  early	  Hangberg	  fishers	  who	  targeted	  the	  resource	  (van	  Sittert	  1994).	  
Industrialization	   followed	   in	   1903,	   when	   the	   Hout	   Bay	   Canning	   Company	   set	   up	   a	  
factory	  on	  board	  an	  old	  wooden	  ship.	  It	  operated	  until	  1914,	  supplying	  the	  European	  
market,	  but	  then	  exploded	  after	  a	  gas	  leak,	  killing	  seven	  men	  (Gibbs	  n.d.)	  .	  	  
The	   emergence	   of	   a	   lucrative	   export	   market	   for	   rock	   lobster	   had	   important	  
implications	   for	   fishers	   in	  Hangberg,	  who	  began	   to	  be	  systematically	  excluded	   from	  
accessing	   the	   resource	   (van	   Sittert	   1994).	   Previously	   considered	   ‘poor	  man’s	   food’	  
and	   used	   as	   bait	   for	   linefishing,	   rock	   lobster	   became	   a	   focal	   point	   of	   fisheries	  
development	  in	  Hout	  Bay,	  which	  saw	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  harbour	  in	  1937	  and	  fish	  
processing	  factories	  in	  the	  1950s.	  Pressure	  from	  industry	  led	  to	  fisheries	  authorities	  
creating	   rock	   lobster	   ‘sanctuaries’	   from	  1927	   onwards;	   one	   such	   no-­‐take	   zone	  was	  
established	  at	  Karbonkelberg,	  where	  the	  Hangberg	  community	  traditionally	  fished,	  in	  
1934	  (van	  Sittert	  1993).	  	  
Despite	   facing	   increasing	   opposition	   from	   the	   government,	   traditional	   fishing	  
continued	   in	  Hangberg,	  often	  on	  an	   illegal	  basis	   (van	  Sittert	  1994).	  The	  community	  
consequently	   developed	   a	   reputation	   as	   a	   problem	  area	   among	   fisheries	  managers,	  
with	   the	   perception	   that	   high	   levels	   of	   illegal	   fishing	   were	   depleting	   important	  
resources	  like	  rock	  lobster	  (Hauck	  2009b;	  Sowman	  et	  al.	  2011a).	  	  
In	   2004	   the	   Table	  Mountain	   National	   Park	  MPA	  was	   proclaimed,	   partly	   to	   combat	  
abalone	  poaching	  on	  the	  Cape	  Peninsula	  (Raemaekers	  et	  al.	  2011).	  A	  no-­‐take	  zone—
one	  of	  six	  on	  the	  peninsula—was	  superimposed	  over	  the	  original	  Karbonkelberg	  rock	  
lobster	   sanctuary	   (Figure	   2),	   angering	   traditional	   fishers	   who	   were	   not	   consulted	  
during	   the	  process	   (Hauck	  2009b;	  Sowman	  et	  al.	  2011a).	  The	  perceived	   injustice	  of	  
this	   no-­‐take	   zone	   remains	   a	   point	   of	   contention	   in	   Hangberg	   today,	   and	   has	   been	  
argued	  to	  contribute	  to	  ongoing	  problems	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  (Hauck	  2009b).	  
Poverty,	  unemployment,	  and	  poor	  service	  delivery	  
Other	  than	  fishing,	  few	  opportunities	  for	  employment	  exist	  in	  Hangberg	  (Raemaekers	  
et	  al.	  2010).	  Unemployment	   is	  high,	  with	  monthly	   incomes	  well	   below	   the	  Western	  
Cape	   average	   (Kapembe	   et	   al.	   2007).	   The	   primary	   and	   high	   schools	   are	   both	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overcrowded,	  serving	  children	  from	  Imizamo	  Yethu—a	  predominantly	  black	  informal	  
settlement	   on	   the	   other	   side	   of	   the	   Hout	   Bay	   valley—as	   well	   as	   Hangberg	   (Tefre	  
2010).	   Fewer	   than	   12%	   of	   respondents	   in	   a	   2010	   survey	   of	   local	   fishers	   had	  
completed	   matric;	   none	   had	   received	   tertiary	   education	   (Raemaekers	   et	   al.	  2010).	  
Drug	  abuse	  is	  rife	  and	  on	  the	  rise,	  with	  the	  spread	  of	  tik	  in	  particular	  contributing	  to	  a	  
range	  of	   social	  problems	   including	  child	  abuse,	  petty	   crime,	   and	  prostitution	   (Tefre	  
2010).	  
In	   the	   1950s	   fishing	   companies	   erected	   council	   flats	   in	   Hangberg	   to	   house	   their	  
employees	  (Fieuw	  2011).	  These	  became	  overcrowded	  in	  the	  1970s,	  when	  the	  fishing	  
industry	  boomed,	  leading	  first	  to	  the	  proliferation	  of	  backyard	  dwellings	  and	  later,	  in	  
the	  1990s,	  to	  the	  development	  of	  an	  informal	  settlement	  that	  spilled	  over	  the	  slopes	  
above	  the	  council	  flats	  (Fieuw	  2011;	  Raemaekers	  et	  al.	  2010).	  Recently,	  this	  informal	  
settlement	  grabbed	  headlines	  after	  violent	  clashes	  erupted	  with	  police,	  who	  had	  been	  
tasked	  with	  evicting	  residents	  from	  an	  area	  zoned	  as	  a	  firebreak	  (Cape	  Times,	  March	  
2012).	  	  
Recent	  research	  by	  Witte	   (2010)	  has	  revealed	   that	   fewer	   than	   individuals	  150	  hold	  
fishing	  quotas	   in	   the	   community,	  out	  of	   a	   total	  population	  of	  more	   than	  5	  500.	  The	  
majority	   of	   these	   rights	   holders—approximately	   85—hold	   interim	   relief	   permits,	  
which	   they	  mainly	  use	   to	   catch	   rock	   lobster	   (Donovan	  van	  der	  Heyden,	  pers.	   com).	  
Five	  individuals	  hold	  long-­‐term	  rock	  lobster	  rights	  (Witte	  2010).	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2.2 Methodology	  
2.2.1 Introduction:	  Lifting	  the	  curtain	  on	  a	  hidden	  fishery	   	  
Investigating	   abalone	   poaching	   in	   Hangberg—an	   illegal	   activity	   that	   is	   deliberately	  
kept	  hidden	  from	  outside	  view—required	  the	  sensitive	  application	  of	  a	  broad	  range	  
of	   research	   methods.	   At	   times	   it	   was	   necessary	   to	   employ	   creative	   approaches	   in	  
order	   to	   facilitate	   access	   or	   gather	   information.	   Methodological	   approaches	   from	  
previous	  studies	  of	  fisheries	  non-­‐compliance	  in	  South	  Africa	  (e.g.	  Hauck	  1997,	  Hauck	  
2009b,	   Raemaekers	   2009)	   provided	   an	   invaluable	   template	   for	   designing	   and	  
executing	  the	  research	  strategies	  outlined	  below.	  	  
Ethnographic	   techniques 11 ,	   including	   extensive	   interviews	   and	   participant	  
observation,	   formed	   the	   basis	   of	   this	   study,	   accompanied	   by	   covert	   surveillance,	  
secondary	   data	   sources,	   and	   some	   elementary	   biological	   fieldwork.	   These	  methods	  
were	  selected	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  developing	  a	  holistic	  profile	  of	  the	  human	  dimensions	  
of	  Hangberg’s	  illegal	  abalone	  fishery,	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  it	  as	  fully	  as	  possible	  in	  
its	  real-­‐world	  context.	  
Different	   methodological	   approaches	   were	   combined	   using	   a	   process	   of	  
‘triangulation’,	   commonly	  used	   in	  social	  science	  research	   to	   improve	  both	   the	  value	  
and	  validity	  of	  results	  (Jick	  1979).	  Triangulation	  involves	  using	  multiple	  strategies	  to	  
answer	   the	   same	   set	   of	   questions,	   and	   is	   thus	   useful	   for	   investigating	   phenomena	  
from	   different	   angles	   and	   “deepening	   and	   widening	   one’s	   understanding”	   of	   them	  
(Olsen	  2004;	   p.	   1).	   Triangulation	   can	   also	   be	  used	   to	   cross-­‐check	   information	   from	  
different	   sources,	   and	   thus	   reduces	   the	   risk	   of	   drawing	   false	   conclusions	   from	  
unreliable	  data	  (Jick	  1979).	  Finally,	   triangulation	  allows	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  
research	   methods	   to	   be	   combined,	   thus	   bridging	   historical	   divides	   in	   the	   social	  
sciences	   and	   enabling	   greater	   inter-­‐disciplinarity	   (Olsen	   2004).	   Nevertheless,	  
qualitative	  research	  methods	  formed	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  study.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  To	   some,	   the	   term	   ‘ethnography’	   has	   been	   tainted	   by	   its	   association	   to	   colonial-­‐era	   anthropology,	  
which	   documented	   foreign	   cultures	   under	   a	   set	   of	   imperialist,	   racist	   assumptions.	   However,	  
ethnographic	   research	  remains	   integral	   to	  much	  social	   research	   today.	   	   	  According	   to	  Emerson	  et	  al.	  
(1995;	   p.	   1),	   ethnography	   comprises	   two	   core	   activities:	   “First-­‐hand	   participation	   in	   some	   initially	  
unfamiliar	   social	   world,”	   and	   “the	   production	   of	   written	   accounts	   of	   that	   world,”	   based	   on	   such	  
participation.	  This	  definition	  has	  been	  adopted	  for	  this	  study.	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Conducting	   research	   of	   this	   nature	   required	   input	   from	   experts	   in	   different	  
disciplines,	  and	  experienced	  criminal	   researchers,	   crime	  novelists,	  and	   investigative	  
journalists	  were	  consulted	   for	  advice	  regarding	   fieldwork	   techniques,	  as	  well	  as	   for	  
their	  insight	  into	  the	  illegal	  abalone	  fishery	  (Table	  4).	  	  
2.2.2 Methods	  used	  
Interviews	  and	  participant	  observation	  
Interviews	  were	   conducted	   between	  August	   2012	   and	   January	   2013.	   Consultations	  
were	  held	  with	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  stakeholders,	  including	  abalone	  poachers,	  members	  of	  
the	  broader	  Hangberg	  community,	  law	  enforcement	  officials,	  conservation	  managers,	  
and	  investigative	  journalists	  (see	  full	  list	  in	  Table	  4).	  These	  individuals	  were	  selected	  
for	   their	   different	   perspectives	   on	   abalone	   poaching	   in	   Hangberg,	   in	   order	   to	  
understand	   it	   as	   holistically	   as	   possible.	   In	   addition,	   an	   informal	   weekend	   trip	   to	  
Hawston	  was	  conducted	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  insight	  into	  the	  illegal	  abalone	  fishery	  on	  the	  
Overberg	   coast,	   and	   to	   shed	   light	   on	   poaching	   behaviour	   in	   Hangberg	   after	   early	  
fieldwork	  revealed	  links	  between	  poachers	  in	  the	  two	  communities.	  Interviews	  with	  
two	  self-­‐confessed	  poachers	  were	  conducted	  there,	  as	  well	  as	  with	  two	  non-­‐poaching	  
residents.	  
Sampling	  process	  
Throughout	   this	   study,	   a	   snowball	   approach	   was	   used	   to	   both	   identify	   and	   be	  
introduced	  to	  new	  participants.	  This	  method,	  which	  entails	  being	  ‘referred	  on’	  to	  key	  
individuals	   by	   existing	   contacts,	   is	   considered	   particularly	   useful	   for	   investigating	  
clandestine	  groups,	  who	  are	   typically	  mistrustful	  of	  outsiders	   (Biernacki	  &	  Waldorf	  
1981).	   It	   is	   also	   helpful	   for	   identifying	   key	   individuals	   who	   may	   not	   have	   been	  
considered	   during	   initial	   planning	   (Biernacki	  &	  Waldorf	   1981).	   In	  Hangberg,	   a	   few	  
key	  informants	  acted	  as	  ‘gatekeepers’12	  to	  the	  community,	  providing	  introductions	  to	  
poachers	   along	   with	   assurances	   of	   my	   credibility.	   Their	   assistance	   proved	   vital:	  
without	   it,	   it	   is	   unlikely	   that	   poaching	   groups	   could	   have	   been	   accessed	   at	   all.	  
Gatekeepers	   were	   identified	   with	   the	   help	   of	   researchers	   at	   the	   Environmental	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  This	  term	  is	  commonly	  used	  in	  criminological	  research	  to	  refer	  to	  individuals	  who	  facilitate	  access	  to	  
clandestine	   groups	   (Noakes	   and	   Wincup	   2004).	   It	   has	   been	   adopted	   here	   with	   no	   negative	  
connotations.	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Evaluation	  Unit	  (EEU)	  who	  had	  previously	  conducted	  studies	   in	  the	  community13.	  A	  
radio	   journalist	   who	   had	   covered	   recent	   unrest	   in	   Hangberg	   also	   helped	   establish	  
early	  contacts.	  Finally,	   I	  made	  use	  of	  my	  own	  contacts	   in	   the	  Hangberg	  community,	  
established	  while	  living	  in	  Hout	  Bay	  as	  a	  teenager.	  	  
To	   a	   lesser	   degree,	   gatekeepers	   were	   also	   necessary	   for	   gaining	   access	   to	   law	  
enforcement	   officials	   and	   conservation	   managers.	   In	   most	   cases,	   this	   access	   was	  
formally	  arranged	  through	  the	  EEU.	  
Interviews	  
A	  formal,	  structured	   format	  was	  seldom	  followed	  during	   interviews:	   it	  was	   felt	   that	  
this	   would	   limit	   responses	   by	   participants	   and	   inhibit	   the	   development	   of	   trust.	  
Instead,	   unstructured	   interviews	   were	   preferred,	   which	   allowed	   questions	   and	  
responses	  to	  unfold	  more	  naturally	  as	  conversations	  proceeded.	  To	  direct	  the	  process	  
of	   probing	   the	   clandestine	   fishery,	   however,	   key	   themes	   were	   identified	   prior	   to	  
heading	   into	   the	   field	   each	   time,	   usually	   based	   on	   information	   from	   previous	  
interviews.	  Relevant	  questions	  were	  thus	  consciously	  and	  continuously	  worked	  into	  
otherwise	  unstructured	  interviews	  and	  discussions.	  	  	  
Hangberg	  fieldwork	  	  
In	  Hangberg,	   the	  majority	  of	   interviews	  took	  place	  with	  one	  group	  of	  self-­‐confessed	  
poachers	   in	   particular,	   with	   whom	   rapport	   and	   trust	   had	   been	   established	   during	  
early	  encounters.	  Repeated	  visits—more	   than	  30	   in	   total,	   corresponding	   to	  over	  80	  
hours	   spent	   in	   the	   community—made	   it	   possible	   to	   re-­‐check	   facts,	   clarify	  
uncertainties,	  and	  follow	  up	  on	  leads.	  In	  this	  way,	  knowledge	  of	  the	  illegal	  fishery	  was	  
built	  up	  slowly	  and	  iteratively.	  More	  direct	  or	  conventional	  approaches,	  for	  example	  
holding	   formal	   meetings	   or	   distributing	   questionnaires,	   are	   unlikely	   to	   have	   been	  
nearly	  as	  effective	  for	  a	  study	  of	  this	  nature.	  More	  than	  100	  individuals	  were	  engaged	  
with	   in	   total;	   approximately	   25	   gave	   substantial	   interviews	   or	   participated	  
meaningfully	  in	  group	  discussions	  (Table	  4).	  	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  The	  EEU	  is	  housed	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  Environmental	  and	  Geographical	  Sciences	  at	  the	  University	  
of	  Cape	  Town.	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Table	  4:	  List	  of	  individuals	  interviewed	  during	  this	  study	  
Organisation,	  institution	  or	  population	  group	   Number	  of	  individuals	  
interviewed	  
Hangberg	  residents:	   	  
Illegal	  abalone	  fishers	   	  
• Middlemen	   1	  
• Boat	  owners	   3	  
• Divers	   4	  
• Skippers	   2	  
• Bootsmanne	   4	  
• Carriers	   5	  
Non-­‐poaching	  residents	   6	  
Subtotal	   25	  (>	  100)*	  
	   	  
Hawston	  residents:	   	  
Illegal	  abalone	  fishers	   2	  
Non-­‐poaching	  residents	   2	  
	  
Department	  of	  Agriculture,	  Forestry	  &	  Fisheries	  (DAFF):	  
Chief	  Directorate:	  Monitoring	  Control	  &	  Surveillance	   	  
• Fisheries	  Patrol	  Vessels	   1	  
• Compliance	   1	  
• Special	  Investigations	   1	  
Chief	  Directorate:	  Research,	  Antarctica	  &	  Islands	   	  
• Inshore	  resources	   2	  
	   	  
South	  African	  Police	  Services	  (SAPS):	   	  
Water	  Wing	   3	  
	   	  
South	  African	  National	  Parks	  (SANParks):	   	  
Table	  Mountain	  National	  Park,	  Marine	  Section	   1	  
	   	  
National	  Prosecuting	  Authority	  (NPA):	   	  
Senior	  Prosecutor,	  Cape	  Town	  Magistrate’s	  Court	   1	  
	   	  
Other:	   	  
Recreational	  dive	  operator,	  Hout	  Bay	  harbour	   1	  
Investigative	  journalists	   3	  
Criminal	  researcher	   1	  
Cape	  Town	  abalone	  poacher	  from	  the	  1970’s	   1	  
Small	  scale	  fisheries	  researchers	   2	  
Researcher,	  TRAFFIC	   1	  
	   	  
Total	  	   48	  
*	  More	  than	  100	  individuals	  in	  Hangberg	  were	  engaged	  with	  in	  total.	  About	  25	  gave	  substantive	  interviews.	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To	   put	   participants	   at	   ease,	   notes	   were	   seldom	   taken	   during	   fieldwork,	   and	   were	  
usually	  only	  written	  up	  upon	  leaving	  the	  field.	  For	  similar	  reasons,	  it	  was	  not	  feasible	  
to	  capture	   interviews	  with	  audio	  recording	  devices:	  most	  participants	  were	  wary	  of	  
their	  statements	  being	  distributed	  or	  used	  against	  them	  in	  the	  future.	  There	  are	  thus	  
no	   official	   transcripts	   of	   interviews	   conducted	   during	   this	   study.	   Quotations	   that	  
appear	   in	   the	   report	   were	   transcribed	   from	   memory;	   these	   have	   all	   been	  
anonymously	   attributed.	   The	  main	   disadvantage	   of	   this	   approach	   is	   that	   important	  
details	  may	  have	  been	  lost	  on	  occasion,	  as	  there	  were	  limits	  on	  the	  sheer	  volume	  of	  
information	  that	  could	  be	  accurately	  retained	  after	  an	  afternoon	  in	  the	  field.	  Allied	  to	  
this	  was	  a	  risk	  of	  reconstructing	  statements	  inaccurately,	  or	  subtly	  changing	  people’s	  
words.	   However,	   it	   was	   felt	   that	   these	   quotations—even	   in	   accidentally	   altered	  
form—provided	   rich	   insights	   into	   the	   illegal	   abalone	   fishery	   that	   reported	   speech	  
would	  not	  have	  been	  capable	  of,	   and	   they	  have	   thus	  been	   included	  here.	  To	  reduce	  
the	   likelihood	  of	   committing	   errors,	   only	  quotations	   that	  were	   vividly	   remembered	  
and	  transcribed	  immediately	  after	  fieldwork	  were	  used.	  
Interviews	  were	  conducted	  telephonically	  on	  certain	  occasions.	  Text	  messages	  were	  
also	   occasionally	   used	   for	   checking	   facts	   with	   participants	   while	   writing	   up	   field	  
notes	  at	  home.	  
Participant	  observation	  
Interviews	   in	   Hangberg	   were	   accompanied	   by	   extensive	   participant	   observation,	  
broadly	   aimed	   at	   getting	   an	   “inside	   view”	   (Emerson	   et	   al.	  1995;	   p.	   3)	   of	   the	   lives,	  
attitudes,	   and	   activities	   of	   poachers	   in	   the	   community.	   This	   took	   place	   continually	  
during	  interviews,	  as	  well	  as	  at	  local	  football	  matches—many	  poachers	  played	  for	  or	  
supported	   one	   particular	   team,	   which	   turned	   out	   to	   be	   funded	   by	   a	   prominent	  
poaching	   ‘kingpin’—and	   on	   hikes	   to	   a	   remote	   launch	   site	   used	   during	   poaching	  
operations.	  
Covert	  surveillance	  	  
In	   addition	   to	   direct	   engagement	  with	   abalone	   poachers	   in	   Hangberg,	  more	   covert	  
approaches	  were	  also	  used.	  These	   included	  observing	  boat	   launches	   from	  Hout	  Bay	  
harbour,	   and	   conducting	   repeated	   snap	   surveys	   of	   poaching	   vessels	   parked	   in	  
Hangberg	   and	   moored	   in	   Hout	   Bay	   harbour,	   in	   order	   to	   estimate	   the	   size	   of	   the	  
abalone	  poaching	  fleet	  and	  monitor	  poaching	  activity.	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Secondary	  data	  sources	  
In	   addition	   to	   primary	   research	   conducted	   in	   Hangberg	   and	   with	   other	   key	  
stakeholders,	   a	  wide	   range	  of	   secondary	   sources	  was	   consulted	   to	   gain	   insight	   into	  
the	   illegal	   abalone	   fishery.	   A	  wealth	   of	   existing	   academic	   literature	   about	   fisheries	  
issues	   in	   Hangberg,	   mostly	   compiled	   by	   researchers	   from	   the	   EEU,	   proved	  
particularly	  useful	   for	  developing	  a	  picture	  of	   the	  community	  during	  early	  stages	  of	  
this	  project	  (e.g.	  Hauck	  2009b;	  Raemaekers	  et	  al.	  2010;	  Witte	  2010)	  
Newspaper	  articles	  
Newspaper	  articles	  describing	  both	  abalone	  poaching	  and	  anti-­‐poaching	  operations	  
in	   South	   Africa,	   dating	   back	   to	   the	   mid-­‐1990s,	   were	   collected	   online	   using	   Google	  
News	  and	  Sabinet’s	  SA	  Media	  database.	  After	  general	  searches	  returned	  hundreds	  of	  
articles,	   narrower,	   more	   systematic	   searches	   were	   conducted	   to	   select	   articles	  
relating	  to	  three	  key	  themes.	  These	  were:	  	  
• Abalone	  poaching	  nationwide,	  focusing	  on	  the	  arrests	  and	  trials	  of	  syndicates	  
linked	  to	  Chinese	  Triad	  groups;	  
• Poaching-­‐related	  violence	  in	  Hawston	  during	  the	  2000s;	  and	  
• Recent	  poaching	  activity	  in	  Hangberg,	  as	  well	  as	  at	  Robben	  Island,	  Cape	  Point,	  
and	  other	  locations	  known	  to	  be	  targeted	  by	  groups	  in	  the	  community.	  
These	   themes	   were	   chosen	   to	   develop	   background	   understanding	   of	   abalone	  
poaching	   in	  South	  Africa,	   to	   track	   the	  co-­‐evolution	  of	  poaching	  syndicates	  and	  anti-­‐
poaching	  operations	  over	  the	  last	  two	  decades,	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  social	  impacts	  of	  
abalone	   poaching	   in	   coastal	   communities,	   and	   to	   contextualize	   current	   poaching	  
operations	  in	  Hangberg.	  Articles	  were	  also	  used	  as	  starting	  points	  for	  conversations	  
with	  poachers,	  and	  as	  reference	  material	  to	  compare	  with	  data	  gathered	  in	  the	  field.	  
Court	  documents	  
Legal	   reports	   describing	   criminal	   trials	   of	   abalone	   poaching	   groups	   in	   the	   Eastern	  
Cape	  were	  accessed	  using	  the	  Juta	  Law	  database.	  These	  were	  used	  to	  gain	  insight	  into	  
the	  inner	  workings	  of	  poaching	  syndicates	  elsewhere	  in	  South	  Africa,	  which	  shed	  light	  
on	   poaching	   activities	   in	   Hangberg.	   Of	   particular	   interest	   were	   the	   links	   between	  
divers,	  local	  middlemen,	  and	  larger	  syndicates.	  These	  documents	  are	  not	  cited	  in	  this	  
report,	  but	  helped	  contextualize	  the	  research	  and	  develop	  a	  broad	  understanding	  of	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the	  illicit	  abalone	  trade.	  This	  made	  it	  easier	  to	  interpret	  partial	  information	  obtained	  
from	   interviews	   and	   appeared	   to	   encourage	   participants	   to	   trust	  me,	   based	   on	  my	  
knowledge	  of	  aspects	  of	  the	  illegal	  abalone	  fishery	  that	  are	  usually	  kept	  secret.	  
Measurements	  and	  observations	  of	  discarded	  abalone	  shells	  
Early	  in	  this	  study	  it	  was	  revealed	  that	  poaching	  groups	  in	  Hangberg	  used	  a	  remote	  
drop-­‐off	  point	  to	  offload	  their	  illegal	  harvests,	  with	  the	  majority	  employing	  assistants	  
to	   shuck	   their	   catch	   (or	   remove	   abalone	   flesh	   from	   the	   shell)	   as	   soon	   as	   it	   came	  
ashore.	  It	  was	  thus	  possible	  to	  observe,	  and	  on	  two	  occasions	  to	  measure,	  batches	  of	  
freshly	   discarded	   abalone	   shells	   during	   fieldwork.	   This	   provided	   insight	   into	   the	  
behaviour	  of	  poaching	  groups	  and	  gave	  rough	   indications	  of	   the	  size	  distribution	  of	  
abalone	  that	  divers	  were	  targeting.	  Local	  sensitivities	  prevented	  me	  from	  measuring	  
shells	  more	  frequently;	  nevertheless	  the	  breadths	  of	  approximately	  100	  fresh	  shells	  
were	  recorded	  on	  two	  separate	  occasions	  with	  the	  help	  of	  local	  assistants	  (Figure	  3).	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  3:	  Measuring	  freshly	  shucked	  abalone	  shells	  near	  Hangberg,	  Hout	  Bay,	  with	  the	  
help	  of	  two	  local	  research	  assistants.	  The	  abalone	  flesh	  pictured	  (held	  by	  the	  assistant	  
wearing	  red)	  was	  discovered	  amidst	  discarded	  shells,	  having	  presumably	  been	  
misplaced	  by	  carriers	  the	  evening	  before.	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2.2.3 Ethical	  considerations	  
A	   number	   of	   important	   ethical	   considerations	   presented	   themselves	   during	   this	  
study.	  First,	  it	  was	  essential	  to	  protect	  the	  confidentiality	  of	  participants,	  the	  majority	  
of	  whom	  were	  poachers	  and	  thus	  vulnerable	  to	  prosecution	  for	  their	  illegal	  activities.	  
These	  participants	  were	  repeatedly	  assured	  of	  their	  privacy	  throughout	  the	  research	  
process,	  and	  further	  put	  at	  ease	  by	  the	  absence	  of	  audio	  recording	  devices—or	  overt	  
note	  taking—in	  the	  field.	  Where	  direct	  quotations	  have	  been	  used	  in	  this	  study,	  they	  
have	  been	  presented	  anonymously.	  
A	  related	  issue	  was	  the	  need	  to	  maintain	  clear	  boundaries	  between	  different	  groups	  
of	  participants.	  Early	  on	  in	  the	  research	  process	  I	  discovered	  that	  poachers	  and	  anti-­‐
poaching	  groups	  invested	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  effort	  into	  monitoring	  each	  other’s	  activities.	  
Crossing	   repeatedly	   between	   these	   two	   camps	   thus	   carried	   risks	   of	   inadvertently	  
divulging	   sensitive	   information	   to	   either	   side,	   which	   would	   have	   entirely	  
compromised	  the	   integrity	  of	   this	  research14.	   It	  was	   imperative	  not	   to	  contribute	   to	  
poachers	  being	  arrested—and	  equally	  imperative	  not	  to	  assist	  them	  in	  their	  activities.	  
This	   delicate	   balance	  was	   achieved	   by	   firmly	   refusing	   requests	   for	   information,	   by	  
maintaining	  distance	  from	  both	  poaching	  and	  anti-­‐poaching	  operations,	  and	  by	  taking	  
utmost	  case	  to	  prevent	  my	  field	  notes	  from	  falling	  into	  anybody	  else’s	  hands.	  
Second,	  my	  duty	  to	  report	  illegal	  activities	  was	  called	  into	  question.	  While	  no	  abalone	  
poaching	  activity	  was	  directly	  witnessed	  during	  this	  study,	  participants	  occasionally	  
revealed	   details	   of	   planned	   operations	   in	   advance.	   This	   show	   of	   trust	   was	   treated	  
with	   utmost	   confidentiality	   and	   respect.	   Other	   times,	   transactions	   involving	   large	  
sums	   of	   money	   were	   witnessed	   following	   successful	   dives.	   Boat	   owners	   were	  
overheard	  planning	  upgrades	  and	  repairs	  to	  their	  vessels.	  On	  at	  least	  five	  occasions,	  
poachers	  reported	  violent	  confrontations	  with	  outside	  poaching	  groups	  or	  members	  
of	   the	   community.	   Less	   seriously,	   marijuana	   smoking	   was	   observed	   on	   an	   almost	  
daily	   basis.	  None	   of	   these	   transgressions	  were	   reported	   to	   the	   police.	   The	   decision	  
was	   also	   taken	   to	   omit	   certain	   sensitive	   details	   from	   this	   report,	   to	   avoid	  
compromising	  the	  safety	  and	  privacy	  of	  participants.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  It	   also	   raised	   suspicion	   among	   poachers	   and	   law	   enforcement	   officials	   that	   I	   was	   working	   as	   an	  
informant	  for	  ‘the	  other	  side’.	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A	  final	  issue,	  similar	  to	  difficulties	  encountered	  by	  Hauck	  (2008)	  while	  investigating	  
Hangberg’s	  informal	  rock	  lobster	  fishery,	  involved	  unfairly	  raising	  the	  expectations	  of	  
participants.	   Many	   poachers	   expressed	   hope	   that	   this	   study	   would	   result	   in	   them	  
receiving	  formal	  abalone	  permits,	  and	  repeatedly	  urged	  the	  researcher	  to	  argue	  their	  
case	  to	  the	  fisheries	  authorities15.	  It	  was	  explained	  that,	  while	  this	  research	  aimed	  to	  
help	   small-­‐scale	   fishers	   in	   the	   long	   run	   by	   contributing	   to	   the	   effective	  
implementation	  of	  the	  SSF	  policy,	  their	  wishes	  for	  abalone	  rights	  would	  probably	  not	  
be	  fulfilled.	  	  
2.2.4 Limitations	  
Language	  and	  culture	  
All	  abalone	  poachers	  encountered	  during	  this	  study,	  as	  well	  as	  most	  members	  of	  the	  
broader	  Hangberg	  community,	  spoke	  kaapse	  Afrikaans	  as	   their	   first	   language16.	  The	  
majority	  could	  also	  speak	  English,	  and	  would	  often	  switch	  between	  the	  two	  languages	  
during	   conversations.	   By	   comparison,	   I	   speak	   English	   as	   a	   first	   language	   and	  
Afrikaans	   as	   a	   second.	   Despite	   being	   relatively	   proficient	   in	   Afrikaans,	   it	   was	  
sometimes	   difficult	   to	   follow	   group	   discussions,	   which	   were	   often	   lively	   and	   filled	  
with	  banter.	  This	  was	   less	  of	  an	  obstacle	  during	  one-­‐on-­‐one	  conversations,	   as	  most	  
participants	  were	  happy	  to	  explain	  themselves	  in	  English	  if	  asked	  to	  do	  so.	  
Many	   conversations	  were	   started	   in	  Afrikaans	   in	   order	   to	   establish	   rapport,	   before	  
shifting	  to	  English	  later.	  The	  bilingual	  abilities	  of	  most	  participants	  meant	  that	  there	  
was	  never	  an	  urgent	  need	  for	  translators.	  On	  some	  occasions	  participants	  translated	  
for	  one	  another,	  as	  some	  spoke	  English	  better	  than	  others.	  As	  a	  result,	  language	  was	  
seldom	  a	  significant	  barrier	  to	  communication	  during	  fieldwork.	  
Indirectly,	  however,	  language	  may	  have	  prevented	  me	  from	  gaining	  deeper	  access	  to	  
the	  community.	  Language	  is	  essential	  for	  establishing	  rapport;	  it	  is	  more	  than	  simply	  
a	  medium	  for	  communicating	  facts.	  Undoubtedly,	  not	  being	  fluent	  in	  Afrikaans	  slowed	  
the	  development	  of	  personal	  relationships	  during	  this	  study,	  which	  may	  in	  turn	  have	  
limited	   the	   degree	   to	  which	   poaching	   groups	   could	   be	   infiltrated.	   This	  was	   linked,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Certain	   individuals	   attempted	   to	  manipulate	   the	   research	   process	   to	   this	   end,	   presenting	   false	   or	  
skewed	  information	  to	  cast	  themselves—and	  Hangberg’s	  abalone	  poachers	  in	  general—in	  a	  favourable	  
light.	  
16	  Kaapse	   Afrikaans	   is	   a	   regional	   dialect	   rich	   in	   colloquialisms	   and	   idiomatic	   expressions,	   spoken	  
widely	  throughout	  the	  Western	  Cape.	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more	   broadly,	   to	   substantial	   cultural	   differences	   between	   us,	   reflecting	   in	   no	   small	  
part	   the	  ongoing	  division	  of	  South	  African	  society	  along	  racial	   lines.	  This	   frequently	  
made	   fieldwork	   uncomfortable,	   and	   entailed	   a	   rapid	   and	   occasionally	   bewildering	  
process	  of	  ‘re-­‐socialization’—or	  learning	  the	  social	  rules	  and	  norms	  of	  an	  unfamiliar	  
group	   of	   people	   (Emerson	   et	   al.	   1995)—for	   this	   researcher,	   who	   was	   raised	   as	   a	  
middle-­‐class,	  white	  South	  African.	  
On	   the	   other	   hand,	   being	   foreign	   to	   the	   Hangberg	   community	   may	   have	   carried	  
certain	  advantages.	  As	  I	  was	  largely	  unaccustomed	  to	  the	  world	  of	  coloured	  fishers,	  so	  
too	  were	  they	  to	  mine.	  Frequently	  they	  appeared	  to	  assume	  a	  kind	  of	  naiveté	  on	  my	  
behalf,	  divulging	  important	  information	  without	  realizing	  they	  had	  done	  so.	  	  
Timeframe	  
Earning	   the	   trust	   of	   abalone	   poachers—a	   highly	   guarded	   and	   suspicious	   group	   of	  
individuals—was	  not	  easy	  during	  this	  study.	  Effectively	  having	  just	  four	  months	  to	  do	  
so	   presented	   a	   significant	   added	   constraint.	   While	   existing	   research	   relationships	  
between	   UCT	   and	   key	   individuals	   in	   the	   community	   helped	   facilitate	   early	   access,	  
developing	   and	   maintaining	   rapport	   with	   poachers	   proved	   to	   be	   a	   slow,	   ongoing	  
process.	   Towards	   the	   end	   of	   this	   study,	   it	   became	  difficult	   to	   balance	   this	   need	   for	  
continued	   engagement	   with	   the	   demands	   of	   writing	   up	   a	   dissertation,	   and	   certain	  
relationships	   that	   had	   tentatively	   been	   established	   began	   to	  wane.	   To	   remedy	   this,	  
attempts	  were	  made	  to	  remain	  in	  weekly	  cellphone	  contact	  with	  key	  participants,	  and	  
to	   visit	   the	   community	   as	   frequently	   as	   possible.	   To	   give	   closure	   to	   the	   project,	  
meanwhile,	  a	  feedback	  session	  was	  arranged	  to	  report	  the	  main	  findings	  of	  this	  study	  
to	  members	  of	  the	  community17.	  Finally,	  a	  conscious	  decision	  was	  made	  early	  in	  the	  
research	  process	  to	   focus	  on	  the	  human	  dimensions	  of	   the	   illegal	   fishery	  and	  not	  to	  
characterize	  its	  impacts	  on	  abalone	  resources,	  as	  had	  initially	  been	  planned.	  
Personal	  safety	  
On	  some	  occasions,	  concerns	  for	  my	  personal	  safety	  prevented	  me	  from	  investigating	  
aspects	  of	  the	  Hangberg	  abalone	  fishery	  more	  fully.	  In	  particular,	  the	  activities	  of	  local	  
middlemen—who	   purchase	   poached	   abalone	   from	   divers	   and	   sell	   it	   on	   to	   outside	  
groups,	   while	   running	   small	   poaching	   syndicates	   of	   their	   own—were	   largely	   left	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Two	  feedback	  sessions	  were	  arranged,	  but	  cancelled	  due	  to	  poor	  attendance.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  going	  to	  
print,	  efforts	  to	  arrange	  a	  third	  session	  have	  been	  unsuccessful.	  	  
	   47	  
unexplored.	  Middlemen	  and	  their	  clients	  are	  powerful	  players	  in	  a	  lucrative	  criminal	  
economy;	  they	  are	  capable	  of	  taking	  violent	  steps	  to	  protect	  their	  interests.	  More	  time	  
in	  the	  field	  may	  make	  it	  possible	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  these	  groups	  in	  the	  future;	  in	  this	  
study,	   however,	   their	   operations	   have	   mostly	   been	   pieced	   together	   using	   second-­‐
hand	   information,	   and	   from	   the	   testimonies	   of	   two	   former	   middlemen	   living	   in	  
Hangberg18.	  	  
Despite	  these	  limitations,	  however,	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  learn	  a	  great	  deal	  about	  abalone	  
poaching	   in	   Hangberg	   during	   this	   study.	   Findings	   from	  my	  multi-­‐method	   research	  
strategy	  appear	  in	  the	  following	  section.	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  In	  mid-­‐January,	  right	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  study,	  contact	  was	  made	  with	  two	  additional	  individuals	  who	  
used	   to	  work	   as	   abalone	  middlemen	   in	   the	   1990s	   and	   early	   2000s,	   respectfully.	   Their	   stories	  were	  
incorporated	  where	   possible;	   however	   time	   constraints	   precluded	   restructuring	   this	   dissertation	   to	  
include	  them	  in	  full.	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2.3 Findings	  
Based	  on	  four	  months	  of	  fieldwork,	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  develop	  a	  fairly	  comprehensive	  
profile	  of	   the	  human	  dimensions	  of	  abalone	  poaching	   in	  Hangberg,	   including	  details	  
about	   its	   participants,	   historical	   development,	   current	   structure	   and	   scale,	  modus	  
operandi,	   and	  main	   socio-­‐economic	   drivers	   and	   impacts.	   The	   nature	   of	  conflict	   and	  
cooperation	  between	  poaching	  groups	  was	  also	  probed,	  as	  well	  as	  perceptions	  of	  law	  
enforcement	  success.	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  bear	  the	  sensitive	  nature	  of	  this	  research	  in	  mind	  while	  reading	  this	  
section.	  It	  was	  not	  always	  possible	  to	  sift	  robust	  facts	  from	  looser	  perceptions	  during	  
interviews,	  and	  some	  findings	  thus	  remain	  anecdotal.	  Attempts	  were	  made	  to	  cross-­‐
check	   information	  with	  multiple	   sources	  wherever	   possible,	   but	   the	   secrecy	   of	   the	  
illegal	   abalone	   fishery	   made	   this	   difficult	   on	   occasion.	   Similarly,	   quantitative	  
estimates	  of	  the	  size	  and	  scale	  of	  the	  fishery	  are	  necessarily	  tentative.	  Nevertheless,	  
perceptions,	  anecdotes,	  and	  tentative	  estimates	  have	  been	  included,	  because	  they	  still	  
offer	  valuable	  insight	  into	  a	  highly	  clandestine	  illegal	  fishery.	  	  
2.3.1 Fisher	  profile	  
With	   the	   exception	   of	   two	   white	   accomplices	   from	   outside	   Hangberg,	   all	   abalone	  
poachers	  encountered	  during	  this	  study	  were	  coloured	  men.	  Their	  ages	  ranged	  from	  
16	  to	  older	  than	  50,	  with	  the	  majority	  appearing	  to	  be	  in	  their	  twenties.	  The	  men,	  who	  
spoke	  a	  rapid	  blend	  of	  kaapse	  Afrikaans	  and	  English,	  appeared	   to	  regard	  me	  with	  a	  
mixture	   of	   curiosity,	   amusement,	   and	   suspicion.	   Not	   once	   were	   any	   of	   them	  
aggressive	   or	   threatening;	   the	   worst	   treatment	   I	   received	   in	   the	   field	   was	   being	  
ridiculed	   or	   ignored.	   Many	   participants	   adopted	   a	   somewhat	   intimidating	   persona	  
during	  early	  encounters,	  but	  relaxed	  in	  subsequent	  visits	  and	  became	  friendlier.	  
Few	   poachers	   claimed	   to	   be	   formally	   employed,	   and	   because	   most	   poaching	  
operations	   take	  place	  at	  night	   it	  was	  usually	  easy	   to	   locate	   the	  men	  during	  daytime	  
visits	   to	   Hangberg,	   gathered	   at	   a	   number	   of	   regular	   ‘hangouts’.	   The	   home	   of	   one	  
participant,	  a	  middle-­‐aged	  skipper	  who	  piloted	  poaching	  vessels	  for	  a	   living,	  proved	  
to	   be	   one	   such	  meeting	   point	   during	   this	   study,	   and	  many	   self-­‐confessed	   poachers	  
were	  encountered	  there	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  A	  revolving	  cast	  of	  perhaps	  30	  individuals	  
in	  total—allied	  to	  three	  of	  the	  five	  main	  poaching	  groups	  in	  the	  community—would	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visit	   over	   the	   course	   of	   an	   afternoon	   to	   socialize,	   smoke	   marijuana,	   and	   plan	  
upcoming	  dives.	  Observations	  revealed	  that	  other	  poaching	  groups	  gathered	  like	  this	  
elsewhere	  in	  Hangberg;	  however	  I	  was	  unable	  to	  gain	  meaningful	  access	  to	  them.	  	  
Compared	   to	   their	   contemporaries	   in	   the	   community,	   many	   poachers	   displayed	  
conspicuous	   signs	   of	   wealth,	   including	   expensive	   sunglasses,	   branded	   shoes,	   and	  
shiny	   wristwatches.	   At	   times	   these	   status	   symbols	   could	   appear	   incongruous,	  
accompanied	   by	   a	   torn	   pair	   of	   jeans	   or	   a	   broken	   cellphone.	   Wealthier	   poachers	  
revealed	   no	   such	   contradictions,	   however,	   driving	   fast	   cars	   and	  wearing	   clothes	   in	  
good	   repair.	   These	   individuals	   were	   also	   noticeably	   fatter	   than	   many	   of	   their	  
compatriots,	   in	   all	   likelihood	   reflecting	   their	   greater	   ability	   to	   eat	   well.	   As	   a	   low-­‐
ranking	  abalone	  carrier	  commented:	  
“Those	   guys	   don’t	   need	   to	   worry	   about	   buying	   bread—they’re	   eating	   KFC	  
every	  day!”	  
Poachers	   and	   non-­‐poachers	   alike	   in	   the	   community	   commonly	  wore	   jewellery	   like	  
necklaces	   and	   earrings;	  most	   had	   heavily	   tattooed	   arms	   and	   torsos;	   and	   a	   smaller	  
number	   had	   had	   their	   upper	   front	   teeth	   removed.	   In	   this	   way	   their	   appearance	  
clearly	  referenced	  Cape	  gang	  culture—but	  many	  hastened	  to	  explain	  that	  they	  were	  
not	   gangsters,	   and	   indeed	   that	   serious	   gangsterism	   had	   been	   “chased	   out”	   of	   the	  
community	  more	  than	  a	  decade	  ago.	  Rastafarian	  culture	  was	  also	  visibly	  prominent	  in	  
the	   community,	  with	  many	   individuals	  wearing	   dreadlocks	   or	   the	   iconic	   colours	   of	  
red,	  yellow,	  and	  green.	  These	  biographical	  details	  are	  not	  trivial:	  it	  emerged	  later	  that	  
there	   were	   important	   links	   between	   poaching	   behaviour	   and	   cultural	   identity	   in	  
Hangberg.	  This	  point	  will	  be	  returned	  to	  in	  the	  discussion.	  
The	  poaching	  hierarchy	  
Poachers	  were	  discovered	  to	  perform	  different	  roles—and	  earn	  different	  profits—in	  
the	   illegal	   abalone	   fishery	   (Figure	   4).	   At	   the	   bottom	   of	   the	   scale	   were	   carriers,	  
runners,	  and	  spotters,	  usually	  youths	  who	  worked	  in	  small	  teams	  for	  older	  poachers.	  
Deck	   assistants,	   or	   bootsmanne,	   were	   next,	   followed	   by	   skippers	   who	   piloted	  
poaching	   vessels.	   Divers	   tended	   to	   have	   even	   greater	   status,	   although	   this	   varied	  
according	  to	  their	  age	  and	  experience.	  A	  small	  group	  of	  boat	  owners	  and	  middlemen	  
occupied	  the	  upper	  echelons	  of	  the	  Hangberg	  abalone	  poaching	  hierarchy,	  controlling	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large	   parts	   of	   the	   fishery	   and	   earning	   the	   greatest	   profits.	   A	   more	   thorough	  
explanation	  of	  these	  roles	  will	  follow	  in	  the	  section	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  fishery.	  
Involvement	  in	  other	  fisheries	  
Most	  poachers	  interviewed	  claimed	  to	  have	  backgrounds	  in	  other	  fisheries,	  or	  to	  have	  
worked	   aboard	   commercial	   fishing	   vessels	   in	   Hout	   Bay.	   A	   smaller	   number	   had	  
worked	  in	  fish	  factories	  in	  the	  harbour;	  they	  complained	  that	  the	  pay	  was	  very	  low.	  At	  
least	   three	   poachers	   held	   interim	   relief	   permits	   for	   rock	   lobster	   and	   linefish,	  
appearing	  to	  focus	  mainly	  on	  the	  former.	  One	  individual	  had	  been	  granted	  long-­‐term	  
rock	   lobster	   fishing	   rights,	   owning	   and	   legally	   operating	   rigid-­‐hulled	   ski	   boats	   in	  
addition—allegedly—to	   conducting	   abalone	   poaching	   activities.	   Aside	   from	   legal	  
fishing	  rights,	  many	  abalone	  poachers	  also	  claimed	  current	  or	  previous	  involvement	  
in	   Hangberg’s	   illegal	   rock	   lobster	   fishery,	   which	   continues	   to	   operate	   despite	   the	  
emergence	  of	  the	  more	  lucrative	  abalone	  fishery	  in	  recent	  years.	  	  
Certain	   poachers	   attempted	   to	   portray	   themselves	   as	   poor	   fishermen	   during	  
interviews,	   despite	   actually	   earning	   substantial	   profits	   from	   the	   illegal	   abalone	  
fishery.	  This	  was	  more	  common	  during	  earlier	  phases	  of	  fieldwork,	  presumably	  due	  
to	  poachers	  considered	  me	  to	  be	  more	  naïve,	  and	  thus	  vulnerable	  to	  deception.	  The	  
most	   extreme	   example	   of	   this	   was	   when	   a	   local	   middleman,	   quite	   possibly	   the	  
wealthiest	  individual	  in	  the	  entire	  Hangberg	  abalone	  economy,	  claimed	  that	  poaching	  
would	  cease	  altogether	  if	  each	  diver	  was	  granted	  an	  annual	  quota	  of	  “say	  150	  kilos—
just	   enough	   for	   people	   like	   us	   to	   survive.”	   As	   was	   discovered	   later,	   this	   quantity	  
represents	   just	   two	   or	   three	   night’s	   work	   for	   a	   skilled	   diver.	   Nevertheless,	   many	  
individuals	  lower	  down	  in	  the	  poaching	  hierarchy	  appeared	  to	  be	  genuinely	  poor.	  	  
A	   number	   of	   wealthier	   participants	   appeared	   to	   adopt	   strategic	   language	   during	  
interviews,	   for	   example	   by	   referring	   to	   themselves	   as	   “impoverished	   nearshore	  
fishers”	  or	  making	  reference	  to	  their	  “ancestral	  rights”.	  The	  perceived	  injustice	  of	  the	  
government	   treating	   “marginalized”	   fishers	   as	   criminals,	   while	   allocating	   generous	  
quotas	   to	   big	   commercial	   companies	   who	   “raped	   the	   seas”,	   was	   also	   frequently	  
commented	  on.	  At	   times	   it	  sounded	  as	   if	  participants	  were	  reading	  phrases	  directly	  
from	   a	   co-­‐management	   handbook,	   probably	   reflecting	   prior	   attendance	   at	  
developmental	  fisheries	  workshops	  and	  meetings.	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Many	  participants	  resented	  being	  regarded	  as	  criminals,	  arguing	  that	  they	  had	  been	  
forced	   into	   abalone	   poaching	   by	   a	   lack	   of	   alternative	   opportunities.	   In	  making	   this	  
point,	  poachers	  frequently	  distanced	  themselves	  from	  “real	  criminals”,	  taking	  pride	  in	  
the	   fact	   that	   they	   hadn’t	   targeted	   other	   illicit	   forms	   of	   income	   themselves.	   As	   a	  
prominent	  diver	  and	  boat	  owner	  said:	  
“We	  don’t	  break	  into	  white	  people’s	  houses—that’s	  idiots	  who	  do	  that	  kind	  of	  
stuff.”	  
By	   comparison,	   many	   poachers	   referred	   to	   themselves	   as	   fishermen	   first	   and	  
foremost,	   claiming	   that	   they	  were	   “men	  of	   the	   sea”	   and	   that	   the	   state	  had	   failed	   to	  
recognize	   their	   rights.	   Negative	   perceptions	   of	   poaching	   by	   the	   public	   were	  
unwarranted,	   they	   argued,	   and	   based	   on	   a	   lack	   of	   information.	   Feeling	  
misunderstood,	  many	  poachers	  thus	  appeared	  to	  regard	  this	  study	  as	  an	  opportunity	  
to	   have	   their	   story	   told	   properly,	   revealing	   sensitive	   information	   that	   could,	   under	  
different	  circumstances,	  have	  gotten	  them	  into	  trouble:	  
“Poaching	   is	   not	   like	   what	   people	   say—that’s	   their	   view,	   man	   …	   they	   are	  
standing	  on	  that	  side	  and	  they	  are	  judging,	  you	  see?	  They’re	  not	  living	  here,	  to	  
see	  what	  really	  happens.”	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2.3.2 Historical	  development	  
Participants	   claimed	   that	   individuals	   in	   Hangberg	   have	   harvested	   abalone	   for	  
decades,	   but	   only	   began	   taking	   large	   quantities—and	   earning	   substantial	   profits—
after	  establishing	  links	  with	  Chinese	  export	  syndicates	  in	  the	  early	  2000s.	  While	  the	  
precise	   date	   is	   unclear,	   independent	   estimates	   offered	   by	   poachers,	   community	  
members,	   and	   law	   enforcement	   officials	   agreed	   this	   took	  place	   between	  10	   and	  15	  
years	  ago.	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  testimony	  of	  a	  local	  poacher	  with	  a	  long	  history	  
of	  involvement	  in	  the	  abalone	  fishery,	  who	  claimed	  Chinese	  buyers	  first	  made	  contact	  
with	  Hangberg	  in	  “about	  2001”.	  Prior	  to	  this,	  participants	  explained,	  small	  quantities	  
of	  poached	  abalone	  were	  sold	  locally	  for	  culinary	  use,	  and	  occasionally	  to	  buyers	  from	  
Chinese	  restaurants	  in	  the	  city:	  
“Abalone	  poaching	  is	  not	  new;	   it’s	  been	  happening	  here	  forever	  …	  now	  there	  
are	  just	  more	  people	  and	  bigger	  buyers	  involved.”	  
This	   early	   abalone	  poaching	   appears	   to	   have	   taken	  place	   on	   a	   sporadic	   and	   ad-­‐hoc	  
basis,	  however,	  and	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  fishers	  formerly	  placed	  little	  value	  on	  the	  
resource.	  One	  participant,	  a	  diver	  and	  boat	  owner,	  chastised	  older	  generations	  in	  the	  
community	  for	  failing	  to	  recognize	  how	  lucrative	  the	  illegal	  abalone	  market	  was:	  
“We	   thought	   crayfish	   (rock	   lobster)	  was	   the	   fucking	   diamond	  …	   our	   people	  
were	  fucking	  stupid,	  we	  didn’t	  know	  anything!”	  
A	  white	  individual	  who	  currently	  works	  with	  poachers	  in	  the	  community	  claimed	  to	  
have	  “shown	  local	  guys	  the	  ropes”	  on	  board	  rubber	  ducks	  in	  about	  2004.	  According	  to	  
him,	   poaching	   operations	   had	   previously	   been	   restricted	   to	   diving	   from	   the	   shore,	  
mainly	   targeting	   reefs	   between	   Hout	   Bay	   and	   Oudekraal	   (see	   Figure	   2).	   A	   senior	  
SANParks	  official	  reported	  a	  similar	  story,	  claiming	  to	  have	  first	  encountered	  abalone	  
poaching	  vessels	  in	  Hangberg	  sometime	  after	  2003.	  These	  first	  vessels,	  he	  said,	  were	  
“owned	  and	  operated	  by	  outsiders”,	   but	  had	   local	   divers	   on	  board.	   Poachers	   in	   the	  
community	   also	   mentioned	   the	   key	   role	   white	   poachers	   played	   in	   the	   early	  
development	  of	  the	  fishery:	  
“We	  didn’t	  have	  a	  boat	  at	  that	  time,	  but	  this	  white	  guy	  did	  have	  a	  boat,	  so	  me	  
and	   three	   other	   guys,	   we’d	   go	   dive	   with	   him,	   you	   see?	   And	   so	   we’d	   make	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money.	  He	  didn’t	  charge	  us	  much	  to	  work	  on	  his	  boat	  and	  what-­‐what	  …	  and	  so	  
later	  we	  started	  buying	  our	  own	  boats.”	  
Since	  then,	  a	  highly	  organized	  boat-­‐based	  fishery	  has	  developed	  in	  Hangberg,	  with	  at	  
least	  five	  main	  local	  poaching	  groups	  currently	  owning	  and	  operating	  fleets	  of	  rubber	  
ducks.	  A	  number	  of	  outsiders	  continue	  to	  work	  with	  local	  poachers—but	  only	  if	  they	  
have	   been	   given	   permission	   to	   do	   so	   by	   local	   groups.	   Interviews	   with	   law	  
enforcement	   officials	   revealed	   that	   Hangberg	   is	   considered	   a	   “hub”	   for	   abalone	  
poaching	  on	  the	  Cape	  Peninsula,	  with	  residents	  thought	  to	  “welcome”	  outside	  groups	  
into	   the	   community	   and	   charge	   them	   “tax”.	   As	   will	   be	   discussed	   later	   on,	   this	  
allegation	  is	  partially	  accurate,	  but	  omits	  certain	  key	  details.	  
In	   interviews,	   officials	   from	   DAFF	   and	   the	   SAPS	   alleged	   that	   outside	   syndicates	  
launched	  the	  illegal	  abalone	  fishery	  in	  Hangberg	  by	  loaning	  locals	  money	  to	  purchase	  
boats	   and	  equipment.	   Poachers	   in	   the	   community	  mostly	  denied	   this,	   claiming	   that	  
local	  groups	  established	  themselves—without	  assistance—by	  saving	  and	  re-­‐investing	  
profits	   earned	   from	   diving.	   The	   truth	   is	   likely	   to	   lie	   somewhere	   in	   between.	   An	  
informant	  who	  previously	  worked	  as	  a	  middleman	  for	  poached	  abalone,	  purchasing	  
the	  product	   from	  divers	  and	  selling	   it	  on	   to	   syndicates	  outside	  Hout	  Bay,	  explained	  
how	   he	   would	   be	   able	   to	   access	   start-­‐up	   funding	   from	   his	   Chinese	   contacts	   if	   he	  
wanted	   to	   “re-­‐enter	   the	   game,”	   requesting	   a	   sum	   of	   “maybe	   R500	   000	   in	   cash”	   to	  
begin	   supplying	   abalone	   again.	   A	   self-­‐confessed	   abalone	   and	   rock	   lobster	   poacher	  
from	  the	  1970s,	  meanwhile,	  who	  claimed	  to	  have	  worked	  around	  Hout	  Bay	  without	  
any	  assistance	  from	  local	  residents	  until	  the	  early	  1990s,	  alleged	  that	  the	  first	  abalone	  
middleman	   in	   Hangberg	   had	   requested	   equipment	   from	   his	   buyers	   so	   as	   to	   equip	  
local	  divers.	  	  
Other	   participants	   described	   a	   process	   of	   rapid	   internal	   growth	   in	   the	   fishery,	  
independent	   of	   direct	   outside	   intervention.	   A	   boat	   owner	   in	   his	   mid-­‐twenties	  
attributed	  his	  rise	  to	  what	  is	  currently	  a	  prominent	  position	  in	  the	  Hangberg	  abalone	  
poaching	   hierarchy	   to	   “working	   hard”	   as	   a	   diver—including	   diving	   for	   groups	   in	  
Hermanus	  and	  Gaansbaai—before	  teaming	  up	  with	  two	  local	  poachers	  to	  purchase	  a	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rubber	   duck	   of	   his	   own19 .	   Owning	   a	   boat	   enabled	   his	   group	   to	   start	   earning	  
significantly	  greater	  profits,	  which	  they	  re-­‐invested:	  after	  less	  than	  five	  years,	  the	  size	  
of	  their	  fleet	  has	  grown	  to	  four.	  
Most	  participants	  agreed	  that	  abalone	  poaching	  only	  “took	  off”	  in	  Hangberg	  in	  about	  
2007,	   after	   the	   potential	   rewards	   it	   offered	   became	   widely	   apparent.	   Instead	   of	  
expanding	   suddenly,	   however,	   the	   fishery	   appears	   to	   have	   followed	   a	   snowball	  
trajectory,	  attracting	  more	  individuals	  the	  larger	  it	  grew.	  Interviews	  revealed	  that	  this	  
process	   was	   partially	   driven	   by	   migration	   from	   Hangberg’s	   illegal	   lobster	   fishery,	  
which	   pre-­‐dates	   abalone	   poaching	   but	   is	   said	   to	   offer	   lower	   profits.	   A	   number	   of	  
participants	  thus	  claimed	  to	  have	  switched	  from	  lobster	  poaching	  to	  abalone	  in	  recent	  
years;	  others	  continue	  to	  work	  in	  both	  fisheries	  on	  a	  part-­‐time	  basis	  
It	   is	   interesting	   to	   note	   the	   entwined	   trajectories	   of	  Hangberg’s	   illegal	   abalone	   and	  
rock	  lobster	  fisheries.	  Lobster	  poaching	  came	  first,	  featuring	  loosely	  organized	  teams	  
of	   fishers	   operating	   small	   wooden	   rowboats	   in	   the	   Karbonkelberg	   MPA.	   Abalone	  
poaching	   followed	   later,	   and	  may	   initially	   have	   been	   organized	   along	   similar	   lines.	  
Interviews	   revealed	   that	   certain	   abalone	   middlemen	   handled	   shipments	   of	   illegal	  
rock	  lobster	  too;	  many	  carriers	  also	  claimed	  to	  work	  in	  both	  fisheries.	  Now	  there	  are	  
signs	  that	  lobster	  poaching	  has	  started	  happening	  on	  a	  much	  bigger	  scale,	  through	  the	  
poorly	   monitored	   Interim	   Relief	   Permit	   system	   (Serge	   Raemaekers,	   pers.	   com.).	  
However,	   abalone	   is	   substantially	   more	   valuable:	   interviews	   revealed	   that	   illegal	  
fishers	  earn	  approximately	  R75	  /	  kg	  for	  rock	   lobster,	  as	  opposed	  to	  over	  R200	  /	  kg	  
for	  abalone.	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  He	  would	   not	   explain	  what	  motivated	   his	   decision	   to	  work	   on	   the	   Overberg	   coast	   when	   abalone	  
poaching	   had	   already	   started	   in	   Hangberg—except	   to	   say,	   “There	   was	   work	   that	   side,”	   as	   if	   the	  
question	  was	  obvious.	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2.3.3 Structure	  of	  the	  fishery	  
Abalone	  poaching	  in	  Hangberg	  operates	  according	  to	  a	  loose	  hierarchy,	  with	  a	  small	  
number	   of	   powerful	   individuals	   controlling	   large	   parts	   of	   the	   illegal	   fishery	   and	  
earning	  the	  greatest	  profits	  (Figure	  4).	  These	  individuals	  are	  either	  local	  middlemen,	  
who	  facilitate	  the	  sale	  of	  poached	  abalone	  to	  outside	  syndicates,	  or	  boat	  owners,	  who	  
own	  the	  rubber	  ducks	  used	   to	   transport	  divers	   to	  reefs	  around	   the	  Cape	  Peninsula.	  
Divers	  are	  next,	   forming	  a	  distinct	  sub-­‐unit	  of	   the	  abalone	  poaching	  economy.	  After	  
selling	  their	  catch	  to	  local	  middlemen	  for	  upwards	  of	  R200	  /	  kg,	  divers	  pay	  hire	  fees	  
to	  the	  owners	  and	  crews	  of	  the	  boats	  they	  work	  aboard,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  carriers	  that	  
return	  their	  catch	  to	  Hangberg	  from	  a	  remote	  drop-­‐off	  point	  over	  the	  mountain.	  Other	  
jobs	   in	   the	   abalone	   poaching	   economy	   include	   working	   for	   local	   middlemen	   and	  
‘spotting’	   for	   law	   enforcement	   activity	   from	   vantage	   points	   on	   mountains	   and	   at	  
harbours.	  
	  
Figure	  4:	  Structure	  of	   the	   illegal	  abalone	   fishery	   in	  Hangberg,	  with	  arrows	   indicating	  
the	   flow	   of	   payments	   through	   the	   system.	   Approximate	   fees	   and	   prices	   have	   been	  
included	  where	  known.	  The	  price	  of	  R220	  /	  kg	  paid	  by	  middlemen	  to	  divers	  represents	  
an	  average	  price	  for	  a	  mixed	  harvest	  comprising	  both	  medium	  	  (R250	  /	  kg)	  and	  large-­‐
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Before	   describing	   each	   of	   these	   jobs	   in	   more	   detail,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that,	  
despite	  the	  structure	  that	  is	  apparent	  in	  the	  Hangberg	  abalone	  fishery,	  there	  appears	  
to	   be	   no	   overarching	   system	  of	   control.	   Instead,	   the	   fishery	   seems	   to	   have	   evolved	  
into	   a	   kind	   of	   equilibrium	   state	   between	   independent	   groups.	   Whatever	   informal	  
rules	   are	   in	   place	   are	   not	   enforced	   by	   a	   central	   authority,	   but	   agreed	   upon	   and	  
adhered	   to	   by	   the	   poachers	   themselves.	   Note,	   too,	   that	   differences	   exist	   between	  
groups,	   meaning	   that	   the	   fees	   and	   procedures	   discussed	   below,	   while	   generally	  
accurate,	  are	  not	  absolute.	  	  
Local	  middlemen	  
Two	  groups	  currently	  act	  as	  middlemen	  for	  poached	  abalone	  in	  Hangberg,	  purchasing	  
the	   product	   in	   de-­‐shelled	   form	   (‘shucked’)	   from	   divers,	  weighing	   and	   packaging	   it,	  
and	  selling	  it	  on—for	  profit—to	  buyers	  outside	  Hout	  Bay.	  Both	  groups	  have	  links	  with	  
larger	  poaching	  syndicates	   that	  operate	  nationwide,	   supplying	  abalone	   for	  eventual	  
illegal	   export	   to	   the	   Far	   East.	   Local	   informants	   confirmed	   that	   Chinese	   Triads	   run	  
these	  syndicates,	  but	  were	  generally	  reluctant	  to	  divulge	  further	  details.	  
“The	   perly	   gets	   sold	   to	   the	   Chinese	   …	   we	   don’t	   want	   to	   know	   about	   their	  
business,	  and	  they	  let	  us	  get	  on	  with	  our	  business	  …”	  
Middlemen	  wield	   great	   power	  within	   the	   Hangberg	   community,	   as	   they	   effectively	  
control	   the	   abalone	  market.	  Without	   a	   link	   to	   buyers	   from	   larger	   syndicates,	   local	  
divers	   cannot	   sell	   their	   catch.	   Divers	   thus	   rely	   on	  middlemen	   to	   participate	   in	   the	  
illegal	   abalone	   economy,	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   middlemen	   take	   a	   cut	   of	   the	  money	  
earned	  selling	  their	  product	  on.	  
It	   appears	   that	   local	   middlemen	   have	   begun	   playing	   a	   more	   important	   role	   in	  
Hangberg	   in	   response	   to	   stricter	   law	   enforcement	   in	   recent	   years.	   Poachers	   claim	  
that,	   until	   approximately	   five	   years	   ago,	   buyers	   from	   “the	   other	   side	   of	   the	  
mountain”—meaning	   anywhere	   other	   than	   Hout	   Bay,	   and	   including	   Sea	   Point,	  
Milnerton,	   and	   parts	   of	   the	   Cape	   Flats—used	   to	   drive	   to	   Hangberg	   and	   purchase	  
abalone	  directly,	   before	   transporting	   it	   out	   themselves.	   The	   increased	   risk	   of	   being	  
caught	   in	   transit,	   however,	   has	   begun	   to	   deter	   this	   kind	   of	   ‘travelling	   merchant’	  
activity,	   and	   participants	   claimed	   that	  most	   buyers	  will	   now	   only	   pay	   upon	   having	  
abalone	  delivered	  to	  their	  premises.	  Abalone	  poachers	  interviewed	  during	  a	  weekend	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visit	  to	  Hawston	  repeated	  this	  story20,	  suggesting	  that	  a	  similar	  shift	  has	  taken	  place	  
elsewhere	  in	  the	  Western	  Cape.	  	  
This	  appears	  to	  have	  consolidated	  the	  position	  of	  local	  middlemen,	  who	  have	  become	  
an	   indispensible	   link	   between	   divers	   and	   the	   larger	   syndicates.	   As	   one	   poacher	  
explained:	  “You	  can’t	  just	  sell	  to	  the	  big	  buyer!	  You	  have	  to	  go	  through	  the	  local	  buyer	  
first	  …	   that’s	   how	   the	   game	  works	  now”.	  Middlemen	   are	  now	   responsible	   for	  most	  
shipments	  of	  abalone	   that	   leave	  Hout	  Bay,	  employing	   teams	  of	  henchmen	   to	  weigh,	  
package,	  store,	  and	  transport	  batches	  of	  the	  product21.	  They	  are	  also	  responsible	  for	  
bribing	   corrupt	   officials,	   which	   a	   former	   middleman	   explained	   is	   essential	   to	  
sustaining	   their	   illegal	   trade.	   He	   claimed	   that	   information	   gleaned	   from	   corrupt	  
relationships	  allowed	  middlemen	   to	  schedule	   their	  deliveries	  during	  periods	  of	   low	  
police	   activity	   and	  avoid	   roadblocks.	   In	   case	  of	   trouble,	  meanwhile,	   certain	  officials	  
could	   “make	   evidence	   disappear”—and	   even	   ensure	   that	   confiscated	   abalone	   was	  
returned	   to	   poachers	   in	  Hangberg	   before	   it	   spoiled.	   He	   further	   alleged	   that	   official	  
vehicles	   were	   used	   for	   deliveries	   on	   certain	   occasions,	   claiming	   that	   “ambulances	  
don’t	  get	  stopped	  at	  roadblocks”.	  
Besides	   smoothing	   the	   passage	   of	   poached	   abalone	   out	   of	   Hout	   Bay,	   interviews	  
revealed	   that	   these	   corrupt	   relationships	  allow	  middlemen	   to	  exercise	   control	  over	  
potential	  rivals.	  The	  same	  officials	  who	  leak	  information	  to	  poachers	  also	  act	  on	  tip-­‐
offs,	  giving	  middlemen	  a	  tool	  with	  which	  to	  piemp	  (tip	  off)	  other	  groups	  that	  attempt	  
to	  export	  abalone	  from	  the	  valley,	  and	  thus	  helping	  them	  to	  maintain	  a	  monopoly	  on	  
the	   local	  market.	  As	   the	  same	   former	  middleman,	  who	  quit	  dealing	   in	  abalone	  after	  
being	  caught	  too	  many	  times,	  explained:	  
	   “Some	  of	  us	  get	  caught,	  and	  others	  don’t—it’s	  as	  simple	  as	  that.”	  	  
Late	   in	   this	   study,	   it	  was	   alleged	   that	  middlemen	  kept	   poachers	   in	   debt	   by	   lending	  
them	  money	  or	  drugs.	  One	  source,	  an	  official	  from	  SANParks,	  was	  adamant	  that	  this	  
was	  a	  major	  driver	  of	   the	  Hangberg	  abalone	  fishery,	  claiming	  that	  many	   individuals	  
had	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  keep	  poaching,	  either	  to	  pay	  off	  their	  own	  debts	  or	  those	  accrued	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  They	  proceeded	  to	  offer	  the	  researcher	  and	  his	  assistant	  R15	  000	  to	  deliver	  a	  bakkie-­‐load	  of	  abalone	  
en	  route	  home	  to	  Cape	  Town,	  insisting	  that	  “white	  students	  never	  get	  caught.”	  The	  offer	  was	  refused.	  
21	  The	   term	   ‘henchmen’	   has	   been	   chosen	   here	   for	   its	   association	   with	   the	   assisting	   of	   criminal	  
activities,	   but	   the	   image	   it	   evokes—gangs	   of	   men,	   eager	   for	   violence—is	   potentially	   misleading	   in	  
certain	   cases.	   Storage,	   for	   example,	   appears	   often	   to	   be	   the	   job	   of	  mothers	   in	   the	   community,	   who	  
install	  freezers	  in	  their	  homes	  to	  keep	  the	  abalone	  fresh.	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by	   their	   families	  over	   the	  years.	  To	   illustrate	   this	  point	  he	   recounted	   the	   story	  of	   a	  
young	  man	  from	  the	  community	  that	  his	  team	  caught	  trying	  to	  dive	  from	  the	  shore	  on	  
four	  consecutive	  days:	  
“He	  didn’t	  have	  a	  wetsuit;	  his	  skin	  was	  blue.	  We	  kept	  asking	  him,	  ‘Why	  are	  you	  
doing	  this	  when	  we	  keep	  on	  catching	  you?’	  On	  the	   last	  day,	  he	   just	   looked	  at	  
me	  and	  said,	  ‘Meneer,	  ek	  moet	  duik.	  Ek	  moet.’”	  22	  
Boat	  owners	  
At	  least	  five	  groups	  in	  Hangberg,	  including	  both	  groups	  of	  local	  middlemen,	  own	  and	  
maintain	   small	   fleets	   of	   rubber	   ducks	   for	   accessing	   distant	   reefs	   around	   the	   Cape	  
Peninsula.	   At	   least	   three	   white	   boat	   owners	   also	   work	   with	   divers	   from	   the	  
community	   at	   present.	   There	   are	   also	   at	   least	   four	   local	   “small-­‐timers”	  who	   own	   a	  
single	  boat	  each,	  but	  are	  said	  to	  work	  infrequently.	  Boat	  owners	  charge	  divers	  a	  fee	  to	  
work	  aboard	  their	  vessels—usually	  the	  cash	  equivalent	  of	  10	  kg	  fresh	  abalone—and	  
earn	   lucrative	   profits	   as	   a	   result.	   Larger	   rubber	   ducks	   can	   accommodate	   up	   to	   8	  
divers	  at	  a	   time;	  at	  current	  prices,	   this	  can	  net	  a	  boat	  owner	  between	  R16	  000	  and	  
R20	   000	   for	   a	   single	   trip	   (calculations	   in	   Appendix	   A).	  Many	   boat	   owners	   are	   also	  
divers	  themselves,	  and	  work	  aboard	  their	  own	  vessels.	  This	  means	  they	  earn	  market	  
price	  for	  their	  own	  abalone	  in	  addition	  to	  fees	  collected	  from	  other	  divers.	  	  
Boat	  owners	  pay	   for	   fuel	   costs,	  which	  amount	   to	  approximately	  R4000	   for	  a	   return	  
trip	  to	  Robben	  Island,	  and	  maintenance.	  In	  addition,	  some	  pay	  a	  monthly	  fee	  of	  R2000	  
to	  park	   their	   vessels	   in	   the	  Hout	  Bay	  Boatyard	  when	  not	   in	  use.	  Most	   boat	   owners	  
choose	  to	  park	  their	  rubber	  ducks	  on	  trailers	  in	  the	  community,	  however,	  frequently	  
parking	   them	   directly	   outside	   their	   own	   homes.	   When	   questioned	   whether	   this	  
blatant	   behaviour	   increased	   the	   chances	   of	   boat	   owners	   being	   caught,	   participants	  
laughed.	   This	   will	   be	   returned	   to	   in	   a	   later	   section	   dealing	   with	   perceptions	   on	  
compliance.	  
Each	   boat	   owner	   runs	   a	   distinct	   poaching	   group	   comprising	   divers,	   skippers,	   and	  
bootsmanne.	  Membership	   of	   these	   groups	   appears	   to	   be	   relatively	   fluid,	  with	   some	  
poachers	   claiming	   to	   belong	   to	  more	   than	   one.	   However,	   each	   group	   has	   a	   core	   of	  
experienced	  members	  who	  plan	  poaching	  operations	  together,	  usually	  in	  conjunction	  
with	  representatives	  from	  other	  groups.	  In	  case	  of	  arrests,	  boat	  owners	  occasionally	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  “Sir,	  I	  have	  to	  dive.	  I	  have	  to.”	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pay	  fines	  on	  behalf	  of	  their	  team	  members	  to	  avoid	  having	  them	  sent	  to	  jail.	  One	  was	  
stoic	   in	   the	   face	  of	  having	   to	  pay	  R20	  000	   for	  his	  skipper,	  a	  repeat	  offender,	  during	  
this	  study:	  
“If	   I	   don’t	   pay	   the	   fine	   this	  man	  will	   go	   to	   Pollsmoor—and	   then	   he’s	   gonna	  
cry!”	  	  
According	   to	   interviews,	   rubber	   ducks	   in	   Hangberg	   are	   usually	   purchased	   second-­‐
hand.	  This	  is	  mainly	  to	  mitigate	  the	  cost	  of	  possible	  confiscations,	  which	  take	  place	  on	  
an	   ongoing,	   yet	   sporadic,	   basis.	   Local	   poachers	   were	   scornful	   of	   outside	   poaching	  
groups—particularly	   from	   Port	   Elizabeth—whom	   they	   said	   used	   expensive	  
superducks,	  and	  thus	  attracted	  greater	  attention	  from	  law	  enforcement	  officials:	  
“When	  you	  see	  a	  rubber	  duck	  that	  big	  going	  to	  sea,	  it’s	  just	  …	  fucking	  obvious,	  
man!”	  
A	  senior	  DAFF	  official	  claimed	  that	  most	  poaching	  vessels	  in	  Hangberg	  were	  “barely	  
functioning”	  and	  “cobbled	  together	  from	  random	  parts”.	  Police	  from	  the	  Water	  Wing,	  
meanwhile,	  alleged	  that	  poachers	  in	  Hangberg	  assemble	  their	  boats	  from	  stolen	  parts.	  
Observations	  in	  the	  field	  confirmed	  that	  many	  vessels	  were	  indeed	  in	  poor	  condition,	  
with	   cracked	   hulls	   and	   damaged,	   mismatched	   pairs	   of	   outboard	  motors.	   Around	   a	  
quarter,	  however,	  appeared	  to	  be	  in	  good	  repair	  and	  fully	  equipped	  with	  safety	  gear	  
like	   radios,	   flares,	   and	   life	   jackets.	   This	   turned	   out	   to	   be	   a	   strategy	   for	   avoiding	  
problems	  with	  law	  enforcement	  officials,	  who	  harass	  poachers	  for	  minor	  offences—
“Anything	  we	  can	  get	  them	  for,”	  according	  to	  one	  policeman—to	  prevent	  them	  from	  
going	   to	   sea.	   These	   mostly	   include	   checks	   for	   adherence	   with	   mandatory	   South	  
African	  Marine	  Safety	  Authority	  (SAMSA)	  regulations.	  
Nevertheless,	   most	   boats	   in	   the	   community	   appeared	   to	   be	   unlicensed.	   Interviews	  
revealed	   that	   other	   vessels	   were	   registered	   under	   the	   names	   of	   friends	   or	   family	  
members	  to	  avoid	  penalties	  in	  case	  of	  arrests.	  According	  to	  a	  senior	  prosecutor	  at	  the	  
Cape	  Town	  Regional	  Court,	   this	  made	  it	  difficult	  to	  conclusively	   link	  boat	  owners	  to	  
poaching	  activity	  in	  criminal	  trials,	  meaning	  “the	  top	  players	  in	  the	  Hangberg	  abalone	  
game	  seldom	  get	  caught”.	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Divers	  
Divers	   form	  a	   distinct	   sub-­‐unit	   of	   the	  Hangberg	   abalone	  poaching	   economy,	   selling	  
their	  catch	  to	  local	  middlemen,	  and	  paying	  a	  range	  of	  fees	  towards	  boat	  owners,	  crew,	  
carriers,	  and	  spotters	  (Figure	  4).	  Divers	  currently	  earn	  approximately	  R200	  /	  kg	  for	  
‘large’	   abalone	   (greater	   than	   115	   g)	   and	   R250	   /	   kg	   for	   ‘mediums’	   (110	   –	   115	   g).	  
Participants	  claimed	  that	  there	  was	  no	  market	  for	  abalone	  smaller	  than	  110	  g,	  which	  
they	  referred	  to	  as	  “nuggets”23.	  Skilled	  divers	  can	  harvest	  over	  100	  kg	  of	  abalone	  on	  a	  
good	  night,	  earning	  up	  to	  R25	  000	   for	   less	   than	   four	  hours	  work.	  With	  all	  expenses	  
paid,	  this	  equates	  to	  profits	  of	  nearly	  R15	  000	  (calculations	  in	  Appendix	  A).	  
Interviews	  revealed	  that	  there	  are	  currently	  at	   least	  50	  abalone	  divers	  in	  Hangberg,	  
although	  not	  all	  of	  them	  work	  on	  board	  rubber	  ducks.	  Shore-­‐based	  diving	  is	  attractive	  
because	   it	   involves	   smaller	  groups	  and	   less	   complicated	  organizational	  procedures;	  
shore	   divers	   also	   do	   not	   have	   to	   pay	   boat	   fees,	   and	   thus	   get	   to	   keep	   a	   greater	  
proportion	   of	   their	   earnings.	   However,	   shore	   diving	   is	   risky	   because	   it	   is	   more	  
difficult	   to	   escape	   if	   caught.	   It	   also	   prevents	   access	   to	   lucrative	   offshore	   reefs	   like	  
Robben	   Island,	   and	   limits	   harvests	   to	   smaller	   quantities.	   As	   a	   result,	   shore	   diving	  
appears	  to	  be	  mainly	  the	  domain	  of	  part	  time	  and	  inexperienced	  divers,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  
occasional	  activity	  for	  individuals	  who	  dive	  from	  boats.	  
Although	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  dive	  for	  abalone	  using	  just	  a	  snorkel,	  divers	  on	  board	  rubber	  
ducks	   use	   scuba.	   The	   majority	   interviewed	   during	   this	   study	   claimed	   not	   to	   have	  
received	  certified	  training,	  having	  learned	  instead	  from	  other	  divers	  in	  the	  sheltered	  
waters	  of	  Hout	  Bay	  harbour,	  or	  in	  the	  swimming	  pool	  of	  a	  wealthy	  local	  kingpin.	  
A	  skilled	  job	  
Diving	  for	  abalone	  takes	  skill	  and	  courage,	  especially	  when	  working	  at	  night.	  Dangers	  
include	   sharks,	   faulty	   equipment,	   large	   waves,	   and	   strong	   currents.	   If	   law	  
enforcement	   officials	   arrive,	   skippers	   are	   instructed	   to	   flee	   to	   avoid	   having	   their	  
vessels	  confiscated;	  divers	  may	  be	  left	  floating	  in	  the	  dark	  for	  hours	  at	  a	  time.	  	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  According	  to	  officials	  at	  DAFF,	  this	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  true:	  poachers	  on	  the	  south	  coast	  harvest	  abalone	  
much	  smaller	  than	  110	  g	  in	  large	  quantities	  (Angus	  McKenzie,	  DAFF;	  pers.	  com.).	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One	   participant	   recounted	   swimming	   ashore	   to	   Robben	   Island	   and	   spending	   three	  
days	  hiding	  there,	  dodging	  a	  search	  party:	  
“But	   it	  wasn’t	   too	  bad—we	  had	   food,	   clothes,	  entjies	   (cigarettes),	   chocolates,	  
just	  in	  case	  …	  ”	  	  	  
Good	   divers	   are	   sought	   after	   by	   poaching	   groups	   because	   they	   work	   quickly	   and	  
harvest	   large	  quantities	  of	  abalone.	  The	  best	  divers	  are	  capable	  of	  shucking	  abalone	  
underwater	  while	  they	  work,	  reducing	  the	  weight	  of	  their	  catch	  and	  enabling	  them	  to	  
fit	  more	  flesh	  in	  each	  dive	  sack.	  These	  elite	  divers	  are	  said	  to	  all	  be	  white	  men;	   it	   is	  
claimed	   they	   have	   been	   poaching	   abalone	   for	   longer	   and	   have	   thus	   been	   able	   to	  
develop	   better	   skills.	   Participants	   say	   that	   local	   coloured	   divers	   are	   improving,	  
however,	   and	   that	   a	   culture	   of	   diving	   has	   started	   to	   develop	   within	   the	   Hangberg	  
community.	  	  
Highly	  skilled	  divers	  from	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  Western	  Cape	  occasionally	  work	  aboard	  
Hangberg	  rubber	  ducks,	  paying	  the	  usual	  fees.	  One	  of	  these	  individuals,	  a	  dreadlocked	  
man	  from	  Gaansbaai,	  was	  encountered	  during	  this	  study,	  although	  he	  declined	  to	  be	  
interviewed.	   Local	  participants	   claimed	   the	  man	  would	   rent	   a	   room	  somewhere	  on	  
the	  Cape	  Flats	  for	  a	  few	  weeks	  at	  a	  time,	  commuting	  through	  to	  Hout	  Bay	  whenever	  
his	   team	  was	  working.	   A	   number	   of	   Hangberg	   divers,	   meanwhile,	   claimed	   to	   have	  
previously	   worked	   for	   poaching	   groups	   on	   the	   Overberg	   coast.	   This	   exchange	  
between	  poaching	  communities	  appears	  to	  be	  facilitated	  by	  informal	  contacts	  and	  to	  
occur	  on	  an	  individual-­‐to-­‐individual,	  ad-­‐hoc	  basis.	  
Crew	  
Each	  poaching	  vessel	  goes	  to	  sea	  with	  one	  skipper	  and	  up	  to	  two	  deck	  assistants,	  or	  
bootsmanne,	  on	  board.	  Interviews	  revealed	  that	  there	  are	  approximately	  25	  skippers	  
and	  30	  bootsmanne	  in	   the	  community	  at	  present.	  Both	  positions	  are	  paid	  by	  divers:	  
skippers	   earn	   approximately	   R20	   /	   kg	   abalone	   harvested,	   and	   bootsmanne	  
approximately	  R10	  /	  kg.	  The	  difference	   in	  pay	  reflects	  the	  greater	  skill	   that	  piloting	  
rubber	  ducks	  requires.	  During	  this	  study,	  poachers	  went	  to	  sea	  in	  gale	  force	  winds	  on	  
a	  number	  of	  occasions,	   claiming	   that	   this	  was	  safer	   for	  avoiding	  patrols.	  Navigating	  
rubber	  ducks	  in	  such	  rough	  seas,	  however—especially	  boats	  that	  are	  old,	  damaged,	  or	  
missing	   safety	   equipment,	   as	   many	   in	   Hangberg	   are—demands	   considerable	  
confidence,	  expertise,	  and	  experience.	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Bootsmanne	  help	  divers	  to	  prepare	  their	  gear	  on	  deck,	  collect	  bags	  of	  abalone	  when	  
they	  surface,	  and	  help	  them	  clamber	  back	  on	  board	  when	  they	  are	  done.	  Interviews	  
revealed	   that	   bootsmanne	  use	   colour-­‐coded	   cable	   ties	   to	   tell	   different	   divers’	   bags	  
apart.	  	  
Carriers	  
Poachers	   in	   Hangberg	   make	   use	   of	   a	   remote	   secondary	   launch	   site	   during	   their	  
operations,	  so	  that	  vessels	  can	  leave	  and	  return	  to	  Hout	  Bay	  harbour	  without	  divers	  
or	  abalone	  on	  board.	  To	  facilitate	  this,	  divers	  employ	  teams	  of	  carriers	  to	  carry	  their	  
gear	   and	   abalone	   to	   and	   from	   the	   launch	   site,	   situated	   on	   the	   far	   side	   of	   a	   nearby	  
mountain.	   Each	   diver	   employs	   up	   to	   four	   carriers	   at	   a	   time,	   paying	   a	   head	   carrier	  
between	  R20	  and	  R30	  per	   kilogram	  of	   abalone	   carried,	  which	  he	  distributes	   to	   the	  
rest	  of	  his	  team.	  Carriers	  are	  also	  responsible	  for	  shucking	  and	  cleaning	  abalone	  after	  
it	  comes	  ashore.	  Discarded	  shells	  have	  accumulated	  since	  abalone	  poaching	  took	  off	  
in	   Hangberg	   in	   the	   early	   2000s,	   resulting	   in	   large	   knee-­‐deep	  middens	   that	   can	   be	  
observed	  near	  Hangberg	  today	  (Figure	  5).	  	  
Carriers	  haul	  sacks	  of	  up	  to	  50	  kg	  at	  a	  time	  up	  a	  steep	  mountain	  slope,	  taking	  turns	  to	  
carry	   the	   load.	   The	   path	   is	   uneven	   and	   gullied	   in	   places	   by	   erosion.	   The	   work	   is	  
exhausting,	   and	   the	  pay	  moderate	  compared	   to	  other	   jobs	   in	   the	  Hangberg	  abalone	  
fishery:	  on	  a	  good	  night,	  a	  carrier	  can	  earn	  up	  to	  R1000	  for	  his	  efforts.	  However,	  this	  
still	  represents	  a	  significant	  sum	  of	  money	  for	  many	  in	  the	  community,	  and	  carriers	  
appear	  to	  compete	  with	  one	  another	  for	  work.	  	  	  
Divers	   that	   treat	   their	   carriers	   well	   are	   rewarded	   with	   loyalty.	   This	   is	   important	  
because	  most	   harvests	   are	   only	  weighed	   upon	   reaching	   Hangberg,	   with	   no	  way	   of	  
determining	  if	  abalone	  has	  been	  stolen	  en	  route.	  There	  is	  thus	  an	  incentive	  for	  divers	  
to	  pay	  their	  carriers	  well	  and	  purchase	  them	  cigarettes,	  top	  up	  their	  cell	  phone	  credit,	  
or	   tip	   them	   after	   a	   good	   night’s	   work.	   Divers	   that	   treat	   their	   carriers	   poorly,	  
meanwhile,	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  targeted	  by	  thieves.	  As	  one	  carrier	  put	  it:	  
“I	  take	  my	  own	  cable	  ties	  with	  me	  some	  nights,	  so	  I	  can	  open	  the	  bags	  and	  take	  
a	  few	  kg’s	  perly	  for	  myself,	  then	  re-­‐seal	  them	  …	  it	  helps	  me	  make	  a	  bit	  of	  extra	  
money	  on	  the	  side.”	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One	  way	  for	  divers	  to	  avoid	  being	  robbed	  is	  to	  shuck	  their	  abalone	  underwater,	  then	  
weigh	   the	   entire	   load	  with	   a	  mobile	   scale	   prior	   to	   delivering	   it	   ashore.	   This	   is	   the	  
chosen	  method	  of	  a	  white	  boat	  owner	  who	  works	  in	  Hangberg;	  he	  says	  it	  is	  the	  only	  
way	  to	  ensure	  his	  full	  catch	  arrives	  at	  his	  local	  buyer	  without	  suffering	  losses	  on	  the	  
way.	  He	  said	  that	  local	  divers	  were	  unable	  to	  shuck	  their	  catch	  below	  water,	  however,	  
because	   they	  work	   in	   large	   teams	   and	   are	   forced	   to	   compete	  with	   one	   another	   for	  
abalone	  (see	  Modus	  operandi).	  
Carrying	  large	  quantities	  of	  shucked	  abalone	  over	  the	  mountain	  can	  be	  dangerous.	  A	  
load	   of	   50	   kg,	   at	   local	   prices,	   is	  worth	  more	   than	  R10	  000.	   This	   contributed	   to	   the	  
spread	   of	   a	   phenomenon	   called	   “bush	   poaching”,	   involving	   rival	   groups	   ambushing	  
one	  another	  en	  route	  home	  from	  the	  remote	  launch	  site.	  In	  response,	  local	  middlemen	  
have	  started	  employing	  armed	  guards	  to	  escort	  carriers	  over	  the	  mountain.	  This	  will	  




Figure	   5:	   Discarded	   midden	   of	   poached	   abalone	   shells	   near	   Hangberg,	   Hout	   Bay.	  
Rowboats	  like	  the	  one	  pictured	  here	  are	  used	  to	  harvest	  rock	  lobster,	  not	  abalone.	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2.3.4 Scale	  of	  the	  fishery	  
It	   is	   difficult	   to	   accurately	   determine	   the	   size	   of	   Hangberg’s	   illegal	   abalone	   fishery	  
based	  on	  four	  months	  of	  research.	  While	  many	  poachers	  were	  happy	  to	  participate	  in	  
this	   study,	  most	  were	   reluctant	   to	   discuss	   the	   activities	   of	   other	   individuals	   in	   the	  
fishery,	  making	   it	   tricky	   to	   ascertain	   its	   overall	   extent.	   Nevertheless,	   by	   combining	  
interviews	  and	  field	  observations	  with	  other	  complementary	  sources	  it	  was	  possible	  
to	   estimate	   the	   size	   of	   certain	   ‘sectors’	   of	   the	   fishery	   with	   reasonable	   confidence.	  
These	  are	  presented	  in	  Table	  5.	  
In	   total,	   it	   appears	   that	   between	   200	   and	   300	   individuals	   are	   currently	   directly	  
involved	   in	   abalone	   poaching	   in	   Hangberg,	   with	   250	   individuals	   the	   most	   likely	  
estimate.	   This	   number	   excludes	   individuals	   in	   the	   employ	   of	   local	   middlemen—
including	  those	  responsible	  for	  guarding,	  weighing,	  packing,	  storing,	  and	  driving	  the	  
product—and	  is	  thus	  probably	  a	  conservative	  estimate.	  However,	  it	  also	  ignores	  the	  
fact	  that	  some	  individuals	  perform	  more	  than	  one	  role	  in	  the	  abalone	  economy—for	  
example	  owning	  a	  boat	   in	  addition	  to	  diving,	  or	  carrying	  as	  well	  as	  packing—which	  
may	  have	  inflated	  the	  number.	  
	  
Table	  5:	  Estimated	  sizes	  of	  different	  sectors	  of	  the	  illegal	  abalone	  fishery	  in	  Hangberg	  
Sector	  of	  fishery	   Estimated	  size	  	   Range	  
Middlemen	   2	   2	  
Boat	  owners	   8	  	   5	  –	  10	  
Divers	   60	   50	  –	  70	  
Skippers	   25	   20	  –	  30	  
Bootsmanne	   25	   20	  –	  30	  
Carriers	   130	   100	  –	  150	  
Subtotal:	  People	   250	   197	  –	  292	  
Rubber	  ducks	   28	   25	  –	  35	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Assuming	   that	   each	   abalone	   poacher	   supports	   three	   additional	   people	   with	   his	  
income,	   this	  means	   that	   the	   fishery	   directly	   contributes	   to	   the	   livelihoods	   of	   some	  
1000	   individuals	   in	   the	   Hangberg	   community.	   With	   many	   participants	   claiming	   to	  
provide	   for	   large	   extended	   families,	   however,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   this	   number	   is	   even	  
higher	  in	  reality.	  
Fishing	  effort	  
Illegal	  fishing	  effort	  varied	  substantially	  during	  this	  study,	  predominantly	  influenced	  
by	  weather	  conditions	  and	  patrol	  activity.	  Participants	  complained	  that	  the	  months	  of	  
August	   and	   September	   had	   been	   particularly	   windy,	   for	   example,	   effectively	  
preventing	   them	   from	   working	   for	   weeks	   on	   end.	   Later	   on,	   a	   small	   fleet	   of	   naval	  
vessels	  from	  Simonstown	  moored	  in	  Hout	  Bay	  for	  nearly	  a	  week,	  ostensibly	  practicing	  
tactical	  manoeuvres.	  Poachers	   in	  Hangberg	  viewed	  this	  with	  suspicion,	   thinking	   the	  
navy	  had	  been	  co-­‐opted	  into	  anti-­‐poaching	  operations,	  and	  claimed	  to	  be	  hesitant	  to	  
go	  to	  sea.	  
Interviews	  revealed	  that	  poachers	  could	  work	  “up	  to	  11,	  12	  times	  a	  month,”	  but	  that	  
“four	   or	   five”	   operations	   were	   usually	   sufficient	   for	   them	   to	   live	   off24.	   During	   this	  
study,	   however,	   poaching	   groups	   appeared	   to	   work	   a	  maximum	   of	   two—and	   very	  
rarely	   three—nights	   a	   week,	   interspersed	   with	   periods	   of	   less	   frequent	   activity.	   It	  
thus	   seems	  unlikely	   that	   groups	   conduct	  more	   than	   eight	   operations	   a	  month	   on	   a	  
regular	  basis.	  
While	  there	  are	  perhaps	  thirty	  poaching	  rubber	  ducks	  in	  Hangberg	  at	  present,	  not	  all	  
are	   in	  working	   condition.	   Furthermore,	   a	   significant	   number—perhaps	   one	   third—
are	   locked	   up	   after	   being	   confiscated	   by	   law	   enforcement	   officials.	   Participants	  
claimed	   that	   approximately	   ten	   vessels	   were	   currently	   in	   use;	   covert	   observations	  
suggest	   this	   number	   is	   closer	   to	   15	   in	   reality.	   Not	   all	   these	   vessels	   are	   in	   use	  
concurrently,	   however,	   and	   the	  maximum	  size	   of	   the	  Hangberg	  poaching	   fleet	   on	   a	  
given	  night	  is	  probably	  fewer	  than	  ten.	  	  
Up	  to	  ten	  divers	  can	  work	  on	  board	  a	  single	  rubber	  duck.	  Smaller	  vessels	  carry	  fewer	  
divers—one	  group	  routinely	  works	  with	   just	   two.	  A	  carrying	  capacity	  of	   five	  divers	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  This	  figure	  was	  higher	  for	  individuals	  in	  low-­‐paying	  jobs—carriers,	  for	  example,	  who	  only	  earn	  up	  to	  
R1000	  for	  one	  operation.	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appears	   to	   be	   a	   reasonable	   average,	   based	   on	   interviews	   and	   observations;	   this	  
means	  that	  more	  than	  40	  divers	  can	  work	  on	  a	  single	  night.	  
Measurements	  and	  observations	  of	  discarded	  shells	  
Measurements	   of	   two	   batches	   of	   discarded	   shells—representing	   two	   separate	  
poaching	   operations	   at	   Robben	   Island—revealed	   that	   approximately	   40%	   of	   each	  
harvest	   was	   below	   the	   legal	   size	   limit	   of	   114	   mm	   shell	   breadth.	   Fewer	   than	   10%	  
measured	   less	   than	  95	  mm,	  however,	  and	  close	  to	  20%	  of	  each	  sample	  consisted	  of	  
shells	   larger	   than	  13	  mm	  shell	  breadth.	  This	   indicated	   that	  divers	  were	  still	   able	   to	  
locate	  pockets	  of	  decent-­‐sized	  abalone,	  and	  that	  they	  did	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  targeting	  
smaller	   individuals.	   Observations	   of	   other	   discarded	   batches	   also	   revealed	   sizeable	  
proportions	  of	  medium	  and	  large	  shells,	  giving	  tentative	  support	  to	  this	  idea.	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2.3.5 Modus	  operandi	  
After	   initially	   being	   restricted	   to	   shore-­‐based	   diving,	   the	   illegal	   abalone	   fishery	   in	  
Hangberg	  has	  developed	  into	  a	  highly	  organized	  boat-­‐based	  operation	  within	  the	  last	  
decade.	   Poaching	   groups	   use	   inflatable	   rubber	   ducks	   fitted	   with	   high-­‐powered	  
outboard	   motors—the	   most	   powerful	   boat	   observed	   in	   this	   study	   was	   fitted	   with	  
twin	  250	  HP	  engines—to	  access	  reefs	  around	  the	  Cape	  Peninsula.	  Fishers	  explained	  
that	  they	  prefer	  these	  vessels	  to	  hard-­‐hulled	  ski	  boats	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons:	  they	  
are	   faster	   and	  more	  manoeuvrable,	   can	   safely	  navigate	   in	   shallower	  water,	   and	  are	  
safer	   for	  picking	  up	  divers	   from	  the	  water	  (a	  hard	  hull,	  bouncing	   in	  rough	  seas,	  can	  
kill	  a	  surfacing	  diver	  with	  a	  single	  blow	  to	  the	  head).	  Rubber	  ducks	  also	  offer	  skippers	  
a	  wider	  field	  of	  vision,	  which	  is	  important	  both	  for	  evading	  law	  enforcement	  officials	  
and	  spotting	  divers	  as	  they	  surface.	  
Planning	  
Interviews	   revealed	   that	   poaching	   operations	   are	   carefully	   planned	   in	   advance,	  
usually	   involving	   input	   from	   all	   the	   main	   poaching	   groups	   in	   the	   Hangberg	  
community.	   This	   cooperation	   allows	   groups	   to	   share	   information	   about	   law	  
enforcement	   activity,	   particularly	   regarding	   the	   location	   of	   patrol	   vessels.	   This	  
information—officials	  from	  the	  SAPS	  Water	  Wing	  termed	  it	  “counter-­‐intelligence”—is	  
gathered	  from	  paid	  lookouts	  positioned	  at	  strategic	  locations	  like	  Cape	  Town	  harbour	  
and	   Signal	   Hill;	   corrupt	   officials	   working	   at	   DAFF,	   SANParks,	   and	   the	   SAPS;	   and	  
accomplices	  working	   aboard	   commercial	   fishing	   vessels,	   who	   report	   on	   any	   patrol	  
activity	  they	  witness.	  
After	   establishing	   the	   whereabouts	   of	   patrol	   vessels,	   the	   poaching	   groups	   select	   a	  
target.	   Participants	   claimed	   to	   target	  more	   than	   50	   different	   reefs,	   extending	   from	  
Seal	  Island	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  False	  Bay,	  around	  Cape	  Point,	  to	  beyond	  Melkbos	  up	  the	  
west	  coast	  (Figure	  2).	  Interviews	  revealed	  that	  poaching	  groups	  usually	  launch	  their	  
vessels	   from	   Hout	   Bay	   harbour,	   only	   occasionally	   using	   other	   slipways	   on	   the	  
peninsula.	  
Next,	  groups	  inform	  their	  members	  and	  begin	  preparing	  their	  boats	  and	  equipment.	  
Dive	  cylinders	  are	  filled,	  trailers	  are	  hitched	  to	  four-­‐wheel	  drives,	  and	  fuel	  tanks	  are	  
filled	  at	  petrol	  stations	  in	  Hout	  Bay.	  Changes	  in	  weather	  are	  closely	  monitored,	  with	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poachers	   claiming	   to	   prefer	   slightly	   rougher	   seas	   to	  make	   it	   easier	   to	   avoid	   patrol	  
vessels.	  A	  pilot	  explained	  his	  preference	  for	  stormy	  weather:	  
“You	  see,	  when	  the	  wind	  is	  blowing	  hard,	  then	  the	  boere	  (police)	  don’t	  like	  to	  
go	  to	  sea	  …	  that’s	  when	  we	  can	  work.”	  
The	  operation	  
Interviews	   revealed	   that	  most	  poaching	  operations	   take	  place	   at	   night.	   From	  about	  
5pm	   onwards—the	   time	   local	   DAFF	   compliance	   officials	   end	   their	   shift—rubber	  
ducks	  are	  driven	  to	  the	  slipway	  in	  Hout	  Bay	  harbour	  and	  launched	  without	  divers	  or	  
diving	  equipment	  on	  board.	  On	  some	  occasions	  vessels	  are	  pre-­‐launched	  in	  the	  days	  
preceding	   a	   poaching	   operation	   and	   moored	   beside	   larger	   fishing	   vessels	   in	   the	  
harbour.	  This	  makes	  it	  easier	  for	  them	  to	  depart	  without	  being	  detected.	  
A	  skeleton	  launch	  team—usually	  comprising	  just	  a	  skipper	  and	  one	  assistant—pilots	  
the	  vessel	  out	  of	  the	  bay	  to	  a	  remote	  secondary	  launch	  site,	  collecting	  divers	  and	  crew	  
who	  have	  hiked	  there	  over	  a	  steep	  mountain	  path.	  Once	  these	  poachers	  have	  boarded	  
with	  their	  gear,	  the	  skipper	  heads	  for	  the	  chosen	  dive	  location,	  maintaining	  cellphone	  
contact	   with	   other	   vessels	   to	   check	   their	   progress	   and	   monitor	   patrol	   activity,	  
changes	  in	  the	  weather	  …	  and	  other	  threats:	  
“We	  sometimes	  see	  whales	  in	  the	  water,	  yes—but	  we	  never	  hit	  them!	  We	  don’t	  
go	  up	  close.”	  
Upon	  reaching	  their	  destination,	  divers	  enter	  the	  sea	  equipped	  with	  scuba	  tanks	  and	  
the	   skipper	   retreats	   to	   deeper	   water	   for	   safety.	   Poaching	   groups	   usually	   work	  
separately	  from	  one	  another,	  keeping	  lucrative	  patches—discovered	  during	  previous	  
operations	   or	   on	   reconnaissance	   dives—a	   closely	   guarded	   secret.	   Divers	   are	   often	  
deployed	  a	  short	  distance	  away	  from	  the	  reef	  they	  are	  targeting,	  to	  avoid	  giving	  the	  
exact	  location	  away	  to	  other	  groups.	  
Divers	   use	   powerful	   torch	   beams	   to	   illuminate	   the	   sea	   floor	   at	   night.	   These	  
waterproof	  devices	  are	  attached	  to	  the	  sides	  of	  their	  dive	  masks	  or	  strapped	  to	  their	  
forearms,	   freeing	  their	  hands	  to	  handle	  abalone.	  Many	  divers	  use	  two,	  or	  even	  four,	  
torches	  at	  a	  time;	  each	  diver	  is	  said	  to	  prefer	  a	  slightly	  different	  configuration.	  Viewed	  
from	  the	  surface,	  a	  police	  official	  described,	  the	  orbs	  cast	  by	  the	  torches	  look	  “almost	  
alien,	  hovering	  silently	  across	  the	  sea	  floor.”	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Working	   quickly	  with	   a	   flat	   blade,	   divers	   prise	   abalone	   from	   the	   rocks	   and	   collect	  
them	   in	   large	   waist	   bags,	   which	   they	   deliver	   to	   the	   surface	   when	   full	   with	   the	  
assistance	  of	  buoyancy	  control	  (BC)	  devices.	  They	  inform	  the	  skipper	  when	  they	  are	  
surfacing	  using	  cellphones	  double-­‐wrapped	  inside	  condoms.	  Most	  divers	  interviewed	  
claimed	   not	   to	   shuck	   their	   abalone	   underwater,	   like	   divers	   on	   the	   south	   coast	   are	  
reported	  to	  do	  (Serge	  Raemaekers,	  pers.	  com),	  explaining	  that	  competition	  with	  other	  
divers	  forces	  them	  to	  work	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible.	  
“When	  you’re	  working	  in	  a	  big	  group,	  there’s	  no	  time	  to	  shuck	  …	  you	  just	  steek	  
(stab),	   put	   in	   the	  bag,	   steek,	   put	   in	   the	  bag	  …	   if	   you’re	   so	   busy	   shucking	   the	  
others	  will	  get	  all	  the	  abalone	  before	  you.”	  
On	   board	   the	   rubber	   duck,	   the	   bootsman	  helps	   lift	   the	   heavy	   bags	   from	   the	   water	  
while	  the	  skipper	  controls	  the	  vessel.	  Larger	  boats,	  which	  carry	  more	  divers,	  usually	  
have	  two	  bootsmanne	  on	  deck.	  Each	  diver’s	  catch	  is	  sealed	  and	  kept	  separate	  from	  the	  
rest	  to	  ensure	  correct	  payment	  upon	  returning	  to	  Hangberg.	  Colour-­‐coded	  cable	  ties	  
are	  one	  method	  used	  to	  tell	  the	  bags	  apart.	  
In	  case	  of	  trouble	  
If	  patrol	  boats	  arrive	  during	  a	  poaching	  operation,	   the	   task	  of	   the	   skipper	   is	   to	   flee	  
immediately,	  leaving	  the	  divers	  behind	  to	  fend	  for	  themselves.	  This	  is	  to	  avoid	  having	  
the	   rubber	   duck,	   a	   poaching	   group’s	   most	   valuable	   asset,	   confiscated.	   The	   divers	  
remain	  underwater	  for	  as	  long	  as	  possible,	  only	  surfacing	  once	  their	  air	  supplies	  have	  
run	  out.	  Sometimes	   they	  swim	  ashore	   to	  wait.	   If	   the	  skipper	  escapes	  successfully—
which	   happens	   “ten	   out	   of	   every	   eleven	   times”,	   according	   to	   police	   officials—he	  
returns	   to	   collect	   the	   divers	   as	   soon	   as	   it	   is	   safe.	   If	   he	   does	   not,	   the	   divers	   must	  
arrange	   a	   lift	   with	   another	   boat,	   or	   make	   alternative	   arrangements.	   One	   poacher	  
claimed	   to	   have	   attempted	   swimming	   from	   Robben	   Island	   back	   to	   Sea	   Point	   one	  
night,	   only	   to	   turn	   back	   after	   getting	   too	   fatigued.	   	   He	   hinted,	   however,	   that	   other	  
divers	  had	  managed	  this	  feat	  in	  the	  past.	  
Returning	  home	  
After	  a	  successful	  poaching	  operation	  the	  vessels	  return	  to	  the	  secondary	  launch	  site,	  
where	  bags	  of	  abalone	  are	  offloaded	  and	  divers	  disembark.	  A	  skeleton	  crew	  returns	  
the	  boat	  to	  the	  harbour,	  empty	  and	  with	  no	  evidence	  of	  poaching	  activity	  on	  deck.	  At	  
the	   drop-­‐off	   point,	   teams	   of	   carriers	   immediately	   begin	   shucking	   the	   harvest,	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discarding	   the	  shells	  and	  packing	   the	   flesh	   into	   large	  plastic	  sacks.	  An	  armed	  guard	  
escorts	   the	   carriers	   over	   the	   mountain	   to	   a	   drop-­‐off	   point	   in	   Hangberg,	   where	  
employees	  of	  a	   local	  middleman	  receive	  the	  goods.	  The	  abalone	  is	  weighed,	  and	  the	  
following	  day	   the	  divers	  get	  paid	   in	  cash	   for	   their	  harvest.	  They	  confess	   to	  sleeping	  
very	   late,	   usually	   only	   waking	   in	   the	   afternoon,	   after	   returning	   from	  work	   shortly	  
before	  the	  break	  of	  dawn.	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2.3.6 Conflict	  and	  cooperation	  between	  abalone	  poachers	  
Conflict	  between	  local	  groups	  
Poaching	  groups	  in	  Hangberg	  cooperate	  when	  planning	  dive	  operations,	  primarily	  to	  
share	   information	   about	   law	   enforcement	   activity.	   This	   helps	   them	   to	   evade	   patrol	  
boats	  while	  working	  (see	  section	  on	  Modus	  operandi).	  Different	  groups	  often	  launch	  
their	   boats	   together	   and	   travel	   in	   tandem	   to	   their	   chosen	   destination,	  maintaining	  
cellphone	  contact	  en	  route.	  Interviews	  also	  indicated	  that	  groups	  assist	  each	  other	  in	  
times	  of	  need,	  rescuing	  abandoned	  divers	  and	  towing	  stricken	  vessels	  home:	  
“We	  don’t	  work	  together—but	  we	  are	  together	  with	  the	  phones,	  you	  know?	  If	  
something	  happens	   to	   that	  boat	  we	  come	  with	  our	  boat;	  we	  help	  each	  other	  
that	  way.”	  
Much	   of	   this	   cooperation	   appears	   to	   mask	   deeper	   tensions,	   however.	   Interviews	  
revealed,	   for	   instance,	   that	   a	   second	   motivating	   factor	   causing	   groups	   to	   work	  
together	  was	  simply	  that	  it	  prevented	  poachers	  from	  selling	  each	  other	  out.	  
“If	  you	  go	  to	  sea	  alone	  somebody	  will	  piemp	  you	  to	  the	  boere,	  it’s	  guaranteed!	  
That’s	   why	   it’s	   better	   for	   us	   to	   do	   things	   together,	   then	   nobody	   can	   cause	  
trouble.”	  
Poaching	   groups	   also	   seek	   safety	   in	   numbers	   by	   working	   together.	   A	   SAPS	   official	  
explained	  that	  their	  patrol	  vessels	  usually	  travel	  singly;	  this	  means	  only	  one	  poaching	  
boat	  can	  be	  pursued	  at	  a	  time.	  This	  means	  a	  group	  only	  needs	  to	  be	  second	  slowest	  to	  
avoid	  being	  captured	  at	  sea.	  A	  white	  boat	  owner	  who	  works	  with	   locals	  was	  candid	  
when	  questioned	  about	  this:	  
“You	   see	   that	   big	   superduck	   there?	   I	   like	   working	   when	   that	   guy	   is	   on	   the	  
water.	  I	  know	  my	  boat	  can	  outrun	  his,	  every	  time.”	  
Conflict	  between	  middlemen	  
Most	   participants	   denied	   that	   the	   two	   groups	   of	   middlemen	   in	   Hangberg	   compete	  
with	  one	  another,	   repeatedly	   claiming	   that	  divers	  were	   free	   to	   sell	   their	  abalone	   to	  
whomever	   they	   wished.	   Interviews	   suggested	   that	   these	   two	   groups	   adjust	   their	  
prices	   according	   to	   their	   available	   storage	   capacity	   and	   demand	   from	   upstream	  
buyers.	  As	  a	  result,	   it	  appears	  that	  one	  group	  will	  occasionally	  offer	  divers	  superior	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prices	   to	   the	   other.	   It	   was	   claimed	   that	   there	   was	   never	   any	   animosity	   from	  
middlemen	  if	  divers	  chose	  to	  do	  their	  business	  with	  the	  other	  group	  instead.	  	  
Interviews	   with	   a	   participant	   who	   previously	   worked	   as	   a	   middleman,	   however,	  
revealed	   a	   slightly	   different	   story.	   He	   suggested	   that	   rival	   buying	   groups	   had	  
repeatedly	  tipped	  off	  law	  enforcement	  officials	  about	  his	  activities,	  contributing	  to	  his	  
eventual	   arrest	   delivering	   a	   carload	   of	   abalone	   to	   Sea	   Point.	   He	   also	   claimed	   that	  
another	  middleman	  had	  “stolen”	  abalone	  from	  him	  by	  soliciting	  business	  from	  one	  of	  
“his”	   suppliers	  without	  permission25.	  This	   suggests	   that	  middlemen	  do	  engage	   in	  at	  
least	   minor	   tussles	   over	   control	   of	   the	   Hangberg	   abalone	   market.	   Another	   former	  
middleman	  put	  it	  more	  strongly	  when	  questioned:	  
“I	  wouldn’t	  call	   it	  competition,	  man	  …	  it’s	  more	   like	  those	  other	  guys	  try	  and	  
actively	  undermine	  you.”	  
In	   the	   past,	   carriers	   have	   been	   ambushed	   en	   route	   to	   Hangberg	   from	   the	   drop-­‐off	  
point	   and	   had	   bags	   of	   abalone	   stolen.	   This	   stolen	   abalone	   is	   worthless	   without	   a	  
buyer;	  carriers	  claim	  that	  it	  simply	  gets	  sold	  to	  a	  certain	  part-­‐time	  middleman	  in	  the	  
community.	  While	   it	   could	   not	   be	   determined	  whether	   this	   contributes	   to	   tensions	  
with	  other	  middlemen,	  it	  seems	  highly	  likely	  that	  it	  does.	  	  
Conflict	  with	  outside	  poaching	  groups	  
The	   tense	   cooperation	   observed	   between	   poaching	   groups	   in	   Hangberg	   does	   not	  
automatically	  extend	  to	  poachers	  from	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  country.	  During	  this	  study,	  it	  
emerged	   that	   groups	   from	   Port	   Elizabeth,	   Gaansbaai,	   Hermanus,	   Hawston,	   and	  
Mamre—among	  others—have	  operated	  out	  of	  Hangberg	  previously,	  using	  the	  same	  
secondary	   launch	   site	   as	   local	   groups,	   and	   working	   alongside	   poachers	   in	   the	  
community.	  Many	   of	   these	   groups	   appear	   to	   be	   no	   longer	  welcome,	   however,	   after	  
failing	  to	  pay	  sufficient	  dues	  or	  respect	  to	  local	  poachers:	  
“Those	  white	  dudes	  from	  PE	  pay	  you	  kak	  for	  carrying;	  they	  don’t	  understand	  
how	  steep	  the	  path	  is!	  Now	  we	  don’t	  work	  with	  them	  anymore.”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  “I	   don’t	   understand	   it,”	   he	   said,	   “I	   was	   offering	   the	   guy	   a	   better	   price!”	   The	   rival	   middleman,	  
however,	   funds	  a	   local	  soccer	   team;	   the	  disloyal	  abalone	  poacher	   in	  question	   is	  a	  part-­‐time	  manager	  
and	  fanatical	  supporter.	  “Ja,	  maybe	  it’s	  because	  he	  bought	  the	  team	  kit	  or	  something,”	  the	  participant	  
answered	  when	  questioned.	  “I	  don’t	  understand	  these	  people	  sometimes.”	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Exactly	   how	   access	   by	   foreign	   poaching	   groups	   is	   controlled,	   however,	   remains	  
unclear.	   Law	   enforcement	   officials	   repeatedly	   alleged	   that	   foreign	   poachers	   were	  
charged	   “fees”	   to	   work	   in	   the	   community,	   giving	   the	   impression	   that	   access	   was	  
tightly	  regulated	  and	  under	  some	  form	  of	  centralized	  control.	  Interviews	  in	  Hangberg	  
suggested	   that	   this	   is	   only	   partially	   true,	   however,	   revealing	   a	   complex	   system	   of	  
personal	  alliances	  and	  informal	  working	  arrangements	  instead.	  
There	  appear	  to	  be	  two	  main	  ways	  for	  foreign	  poachers	  to	  work	  in	  the	  community:	  as	  
divers	  working	  aboard	  local	  boats,	  or	  as	  boat	  owners	  employing	  local	  divers.	  In	  both	  
cases	   agreements	   are	   forged	   between	   the	   individuals	   involved;	   there	   was	   no	  
indication	   that	   local	   ‘authority	   figures’	   interfere	   in	   the	   process.	   That	   locals	   are	  
employed	  in	  some	  form	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  important	  prerequisite,	  though.	  In	  the	  words	  
of	  an	  experienced	  older	  skipper:	  
“We	  only	  let	  them	  in	  if	  they	  use	  our	  guys	  in	  the	  community,	  that’s	  the	  rule	  ja.”	  
It	  appears	  that	  foreign	  groups	  usually	  get	  ‘banned’	  from	  Hangberg	  following	  disputes	  
about	  money.	   Local	   poachers	   claimed	   that	   certain	   groups	  paid	   them	  poorly;	   others	  
were	  said	   to	  owe	   individuals	   in	   the	  community	   large	  sums	   for	  previous	  operations.	  
While	   this	   can	   lead	   to	   foreign	   groups	   falling	   out	   of	   favour	  with	   local	   individuals,	   it	  
does	  not	  necessarily	  prevent	  them	  from	  working	  in	  Hangberg.	  It	  was	  alleged	  that	  one	  
white	  boat	  owner,	  for	  example,	  had	  the	  pontoons	  on	  his	  rubber	  duck	  slashed	  after	  an	  
argument	  with	  a	  carrier.	  Another	  was	  said	  to	  have	  been	  targeted	  by	  a	  powerful	  local	  
boat	  owner	  who	  wanted	  to	  “burn	  his	  boat	  out”	  over	  an	  issue	  of	  non-­‐payment.	  At	  the	  
time	  of	  writing	  both	   individuals	  were	  still	  working	   in	  Hangberg,	  having	  maintained	  
alliances	  with	  other	  local	  individuals.	  
On	   other	   occasions,	   however,	   foreign	   groups	   have	   been	   forced	   to	   stop	   operating	  
altogether	  in	  Hangberg.	  It	  appears	  that	  if	  enough	  local	  poachers	  get	  angry,	  or	  perhaps	  
if	  key	  local	  figures	  get	  involved,	  a	  former	  ally	  can	  be	  declared	  unwelcome.	  This	  can	  be	  
accompanied	   by	   a	   range	   of	   punishments—including	   outright	   violence,	   damage	   to	  
boats	  and	  property,	  abalone	  being	  stolen	  en	  route	  home	  from	  the	  drop-­‐off	  point,	  and	  
abandonment	  at	  sea—until	  the	  individuals	  in	  question	  give	  up,	  and	  move	  off.	  A	  police	  
official	  took	  a	  cynical	  view	  of	  this	  process:	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“The	   guys	   arrive	   and	  make	   friends	   in	   the	   community,	   find	  out	  where	   all	   the	  
good	  spots	  are,	   that	  sort	  of	   thing	  …	   inevitably	   they	  piss	  somebody	  off	  by	  not	  
paying	   them	   or	   something,	   and	   then	   the	   relationship	   sours.	   It	   usually	   takes	  
about	  eight	  months.”	  
When	  larger	  groups	  are	  involved,	  the	  main	  method	  of	  exclusion	  appears	  to	  be	  tipping	  
off	   law	   enforcement	   officials	   about	   planned	   poaching	   operations.	   One	   interview	  
revealed	  that	  a	  convoy	  of	  poachers,	  en	  route	  from	  Hawston	  with	  rubber	  ducks	  in	  tow,	  
was	   once	   intercepted	   after	   local	   poachers	   alerted	   the	   police.	   A	   skipper	   in	   the	  
community	   claimed	   that	   other	   poaching	   groups—particularly	   from	   Port	   Elizabeth,	  
who	  seem	  to	  be	  major	  rivals—had	  been	  obstructed	  in	  similar	  ways:	  
“You	  must	  tell	  the	  cops	  we’re	  doing	  their	  job	  for	  them—we	  keep	  the	  PE	  guys	  
out	  the	  water!”	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2.3.7 Perceived	  socio-­‐economic	  impacts	  	  
Interviews	   indicated	   that	   abalone	   poaching	   has	   had	  mixed	   effects	   in	   the	   Hangberg	  
community,	   generating	   widespread	   employment	   and	   supporting	   the	   livelihoods	   of	  
hundreds	   of	   residents	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   but	   introducing	   conflict	   and	   eroding	   social	  
cohesion	  on	  the	  other.	  
Negative	  impacts:	  Abalone	  as	  a	  social	  ill	  
Social	  workers	  and	  community	  leaders	  frequently	  blamed	  abalone	  poaching	  for	  what	  
they	  perceived	  as	  a	  general	  loss	  of	  values	  among	  the	  youth	  in	  Hangberg,	  claiming	  that	  
“easy	   money”	   had	   contributed	   to	   the	   spread	   of	   irresponsible	   behaviour	   and	  
unsustainable	  consumption	  patterns	   in	  the	  community.	  Poachers	  were	  criticized	  for	  
wasting	  money	  on	  status	  symbols	   like	   fast	  cars,	  expensive	  clothes,	  and	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐
art	  home	  theatre	  systems,	  instead	  of	  “investing	  in	  their	  futures”.	  Many	  were	  accused	  
of	   “living	   the	   high	   life”	   by	   staying	   out	   late	   at	   night,	   purchasing	   large	   quantities	   of	  
drugs	  and	  alcohol,	  and	  trying	  to	  impress	  women	  with	  conspicuous	  displays	  of	  wealth.	  
A	  community	  leader	  and	  former	  poaching	  middleman	  explained:	  	  
“In	   the	   past	   you	   lived	   within	   your	   means,	   but	   now	   it’s	   the	   opposite	   way	  
around.	  These	  damn	  kids	  have	  expensive	  lifestyles	  to	  support	  now!”	  
Compliance	   officials	   from	   DAFF	   repeated	   a	   similar	   message,	   claiming	   that	   abalone	  
poaching	  had	  “snowballed”	  in	  Hangberg	  by	  attracting	  young	  men	  in	  pursuit	  of	  quick	  
riches:	  	  
	  “Kids	   are	   dropping	   out	   of	   school	   to	   start	   poaching	   …	   a	   few	   months	   later	  
they’re	  driving	  Nissan	  Navaras26.”	  
A	  senior	  member	  of	  the	  SAPS	  Water	  Wing,	  meanwhile,	  argued	  that	  most	  poachers	  in	  
Hangberg	  had	  no	  interest	  in	  harvesting	  sustainably	  or	  protecting	  resources,	  and	  were	  
“just	   in	   the	   game	   to	   get	  wealthy.”	   He	   also	   accused	   poachers	   of	   living	   beyond	   their	  
means	  and	  wasting	  money,	  and	  was	  scornful	  of	  the	  notion	  that	  poaching	  contributed	  
meaningfully	  to	  people’s	  livelihoods:	  
“You	  must	  understand,	   these	  guys	  aren’t	   just	  poaching	   for	   survival,	   like	   they	  
always	  say—it’s	  to	  survive	  with	  a	  very	  specific	  kind	  of	  lifestyle	  that	  matters.”27	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  The	  Navara	  is	  a	  powerful	  double-­‐cab	  utility	  vehicle.	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One	   resident	  of	  Hangberg,	  not	   a	  poacher	  himself,	   complained	   that	  poaching	  groups	  
made	   little	   effort	   to	   support	  poorer	  members	  of	   the	   community—“They	  don’t	   even	  
make	  a	  big	  pot	  of	   soup	  or	  buy	  us	  bread	  once	   in	  a	  while”—	  but	  expected	  assistance	  
during	   confrontations	   with	   the	   law.	   This	   was	   probably	   a	   reference	   to	   a	   widely	  
publicized	  incident	  in	  March	  2012,	  when	  attempts	  to	  apprehend	  suspected	  poachers	  
sparked	  violent	  uprisings	  in	  the	  community28.	  	  
Undermining	  education	  
Interviews	  in	  Hangberg	  confirmed	  that	  a	  number	  of	  local	  youths	  had	  dropped	  out	  of	  
high	  school	  to	  begin	  poaching.	  It	  was	  claimed	  most	  of	  these	  individuals	  started	  off	  by	  
carrying	  abalone	  and	  running	  errands	  for	  older	  poachers,	  with	  some	  progressing	  to	  
working	   aboard	   boats	   or	   diving	   for	   abalone	   themselves.	   One	   prominent	   diver	  
explained	   how	   poverty	   had	   influenced	   his	   decision	   to	   start	   working	   in	   the	   illegal	  
fishery:	  
“When	  I	  was	  in	  school,	  and	  I	  saw	  the	  weather	  is	  calm	  like	  today,	  then	  I—	  Fuck	  
the	   school!	   I	   went	   to	   go	   dive	   because	   you	   can	   earn	   two	   thousand,	   three	  
thousand	   bucks	   in	   a	   day!	   You	   see,	   those	   were	   hungry	   days:	   daddy	   was	   a	  
druggie,	  and	  mommy	  worked	  by	  a	  garage	  …	   	  so	   I	  went	  to	  go	  dive!	   I	  dropped	  
out	  of	  school	  when	  I	  was	  in	  Standard	  Nine,	  and	  I’m	  still	  diving	  today.”	  
This	  phenomenon	  was	  perceived	  as	  negative	  by	  two	  local	  social	  workers	  but	  positive	  
by	   many	   older	   poachers,	   who	   argued	   that	   having	   a	   matric	   certificate	   made	   little	  
difference	  for	  young	  people	  seeking	  a	  job.	  Many	  interviewees	  referred	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  
opportunities	   facing	  educated	  young	  people	   in	   the	   community,	   contrasting	   it	   to	   the	  
conspicuous	  wealth	  and	  status	  on	  display	  in	  the	  illegal	  abalone	  economy:	  
“You	   study	   and	   do	   exams	   for	   what,	   so	   you	   can	   go	   work	   some	   kak	   job	   at	  
Checkers,	  make	  a	  thousand	  rand	  for	  the	  whole	  week?”	  
Building	   on	   this	   theme,	   a	   retired	   teacher	   from	   a	   local	   school	   explained	   that	   many	  
teenage	   boys	   in	   his	   class	   had	   seen	   little	   value	   in	   education,	   regarding	   wealthy	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  A	  fellow	  officer,	  however,	  confided	  separately	  that	  he	  “understood”	  poachers	  in	  Hangberg,	  claiming	  
he	  would	   find	   it	  difficult	   to	  resist	   the	  allure	  of	  poaching	  himself	   if	  he	   lived	   in	  similarly	   impoverished	  
circumstances.	  
	  
28	  The	  clashes	  took	  place,	  rather	  ironically,	  on	  Human	  Rights	  Day,	  a	  public	  holiday.	  See	  ‘Hangberg	  goes	  
to	  war	  over	  abalone	  raid,’	  Cape	  Argus,	  22	  March	  2012.	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poaching	   kingpins	   as	   role	   models.	   “They	   asked	   me	   what	   the	   point	   of	   all	   my	  
qualifications	  was	  if	  they	  could	  drop	  out	  and	  start	  earning	  more	  then	  me,”	  he	  said.	  “I	  
told	   them	   that	   things	   like	   morals	   were	   also	   important—and	   that	   my	   income	   was	  
more	  sustainable.”	  Besides	  causing	  some	  pupils	  to	  drop	  out,	  he	  claimed	  that	  poaching	  
had	   also	   had	   other	   impacts	   in	   his	   classroom:	   carriers	   bunking	   after	   late-­‐night	  
operations,	   or	   repeatedly	   falling	   asleep	   in	   class.	   “Some	   of	   them	   had	   no	   interest	   in	  
learning	  whatsoever.	  Like	  I	  told	  their	  parents,	  it	  was	  like	  they	  just	  came	  to	  school	  to	  
chat	  to	  girls.”	  
A	   social	   worker	   in	   the	   community	   offered	   an	   alternative	   view	   of	   the	   link	   between	  
poaching	   and	   education	   in	  Hangberg,	   arguing	   that	   an	   influx	   of	   black	   children	   from	  
Imizamo	  Yethu	  to	  the	  local	  high	  school	  in	  the	  1990s,	  and	  subsequent	  overcrowding,	  
had	   caused	   many	   coloured	   students	   to	   drop	   out,	   feeling	   marginalized.	   This,	   she	  
claimed,	  had	  contributed	  to	  the	  rapid	  growth	  of	   the	   illegal	  abalone	  fishery,	  as	  “local	  
kids	   were	   just	   sitting	   around	   with	   nothing	   to	   do.”	   According	   to	   recent	   newspaper	  
reports	   the	   school	   is	   now	   predominantly	   attended	   by	   black	   students,	   and	   severely	  
under-­‐resourced	  (Cape	  Argus,	  July	  2011)	  
While	   poachers	   frequently	   scoffed	   at	   the	   value	   of	   education,	   a	   small	   number	  
expressed	  regret	  at	  having	  made	  “stupid	  decisions”	  by	  not	  completing	  matric.	  “I	  wish	  
I	  had	  finished,”	  a	  carrier	  confided	  once,	  “it	  would	  have	  made	  such	  a	  difference.	  I	  want	  
to	   get	   a	   proper	   job	   again—I’m	   not	   earning	   enough	   from	   abalone.”	   Another	   young	  
participant	  shared	  a	  similar	  story	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  this	  research:	  
“My	  broe,	   I	  am	  over	  the	  abalone	  poaching	  game.	   I	  want	  a	   job	  now—anything	  
that	  gives	  me	  a	  paycheck	  at	  the	  end	  of	  each	  month,	  annual	  leave	  …	  It	  doesn’t	  
matter	  what.	  I	  don’t	  wanna	  work	  in	  this	  game	  no	  longer.”	  
Abalone	  poaching	  and	  gangsterism	  
Hangberg	   residents	   repeatedly	   challenged	   the	   popular	   conception	   that	   abalone	  
poachers	   are	   ‘gangsters’	   during	   this	   study,	   arguing	   that	   “the	   real	   gangsters”—
members	  of	  notorious	  Cape	  Flats	  groups	  like	  the	  Americans	  and	  prison	  gangs	  like	  the	  
26s—had	  been	  chased	  out	  of	  Hout	  Bay	  more	  than	  a	  decade	  ago,	  and	  that	  gangsterism	  
was	   now	   “very	   limited”	   in	   the	   community	   as	   a	   result.	   Despite	   this,	   participants	  
attributed	   a	   range	   of	   criminal	   activities—including	   trading	   in	   drugs,	   abalone,	   and	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prostitution—to	  certain	   local	  middlemen.	  According	   to	  many	  participants,	  however,	  
this	  paled	  in	  comparison	  to	  crimes	  committed	  by	  corrupt	  government	  officials.	  
“You	  want	   to	  know	  who	   the	  biggest	  gangsters	  are?	  My	  broe,	   they’re	   running	  
the	  fucking	  country!”	  
However,	   interviews	   also	   revealed	   worrying	   indications	   of	   mob	   behaviour	   in	  
Hangberg,	  with	  reports	   that	  corrupt	  police	  officials	  sometimes	  revealed	  the	   identity	  
of	  residents	  who	  had	  ‘anonymously’	  reported	  poaching	  activity,	  who	  then	  proceeded	  
to	   be	   ‘punished’	   by	   poachers.	   One	   participant,	   not	   a	   poacher	   herself,	   expressed	  
dismay	  at	  the	  sense	  of	  powerlessness	  this	  gave	  her:	  
“The	   police	   are	   supposed	   to	   protect	   you,	   but	   if	   you	   assist	   them	   with	  
information	   then	   it’s	   just	   one	  phone	   call	   and	   the	  poachers	  know	   it	  was	  you!	  
There	  is	  nothing	  you	  can	  do	  about	  it.”	  
Positive	  impacts:	  The	  contribution	  of	  abalone	  to	  economic	  development	  
Flagrant	  displays	  of	  wealth	  aside	  (see	  Fisher	  Profile),	  this	  research	  also	  revealed	  that	  
some	  money	   from	  abalone	  poaching	  was	  used	  more	   responsibly	   than	  state	  officials	  
claimed.	  A	  few	  examples	  are	  listed	  below:	  
• A	  diver	  complaining	  about	  the	  increased	  price	  of	  dog	  food,	  pointing	  to	  a	  large	  
bag	  in	  the	  corner	  of	  his	   lounge.	  Most	  of	  his	  neighbours’	  dogs,	  by	  comparison,	  
are	  fed	  scraps.	  
• The	  wife	  of	  a	  boat	  owner	  deliberating	  over	  whether	  to	  send	  her	  daughters	  to	  a	  
girls-­‐only	   convent	   school	  30	  minutes	  drive	   from	  Hout	  Bay.	  Many	  mothers	   in	  
Hangberg	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  afford	  the	  transport	  costs,	  let	  alone	  the	  higher	  
fees.	  
• A	   skipper	   stressing	   his	   need	   to	   “work	   hard”	   over	   December	   to	   buy	   his	   four	  
children	  Christmas	  presents.	  
• A	   diver	   explaining	   how,	   instead	   of	   buying	   himself	   a	   car,	   he	   had	   installed	   a	  
bathroom	  with	  a	  flush	  toilet	  in	  his	  family’s	  bungalow,	  to	  make	  it	  “better	  for	  the	  
wife	  and	  kids”.	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2.3.8 Perceptions	  of	  law	  enforcement	  
Police	  records	  of	  poaching-­‐related	  arrests	  in	  Hangberg	  could	  not	  be	  accessed	  during	  
this	   study29 .	   Interviews	   with	   poachers	   and	   law	   enforcement	   officials,	   however,	  
provided	   valuable	   insight	   into	   some	   perceived	   successes	   and	   failures	   of	   law	  
enforcement	  activity.	  A	  few	  key	  themes	  are	  reported	  on	  below.	  
The	  inadequacy	  of	  deterrence	  measures	  
Most	  poachers	   encountered	  during	   this	   study	  appeared	   confident	   in	   their	   ability	   to	  
evade	   the	   law.	  By	   combining	   surveillance	  work	  with	   information	   leaked	  by	   corrupt	  
law	   enforcement	   officials,	   the	   poachers	   claimed	   to	   have	   a	   reliable	   picture	   of	   patrol	  
activity	  while	  planning	  their	  operations,	  shifting	  dive	  sites	  or	  timing	  their	  launches	  to	  
avoid	  encountering	  compliance	  officials	  on	  the	  water.	  Poachers	  frequently	  claimed	  to	  
be	  “on	  standby”	  during	  this	  study,	  awaiting	  further	  information	  before	  committing	  to	  
going	   to	  sea.	  On	  at	   least	   ten	  occasions	  operations	  were	  cancelled	  at	   the	   last	  minute	  
reports	  were	  received	  of	  unanticipated	  patrol	  activity.	  
Poachers	   also	   appeared	   largely	   unconcerned	   about	   the	   possible	   consequences	   of	  
being	   caught.	  Many	   claimed	   to	   employ	   expensive	   lawyers	   to	   defend	   them	   in	   court,	  
boasting	  that	  this	  made	  them	  almost	  immune	  to	  prosecution:	  
“They	  mustn’t	   come	  play	  with	  me—I’ve	  got	  gevaarlikke	  (dangerous)	   lawyers	  
my	  broe!”	  	  
An	  interview	  with	  a	  senior	  prosecutor	  at	  the	  Cape	  Town	  Magistrate’s	  court	  revealed	  
that	  poor	  coordination	  between	  different	  state	  agencies,	  for	  example	  the	  Department	  
of	   Justice,	   DAFF,	   and	   the	   SAPS,	   was	   often	   responsible	   for	   failed	   prosecutions.	   He	  
highlighted	  poor	  quality	  police	  work	  and	  “inexperienced”	  prosecutors	  as	  two	  areas	  of	  
particular	   concern,	   but	   added	   that	   that	  measures	   had	   been	  put	   in	   place	   to	   address	  
these	   shortcomings.	   He	   also	   complained	   that	   judges	   often	   meted	   out	   lenient	  
sentences	   to	   convicted	   poachers,	   which	   failed	   to	   present	   poachers	   a	   big	   enough	  
deterrent.	  
Notwithstanding	   the	   confidence	   projected	   by	   most	   abalone	   poachers	   in	   Hangberg,	  
some	  also	  revealed	  signs	  of	  vulnerability.	  One	  participant,	  a	  youth	  standing	  trial	   for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Obtaining	  police	  records	  entails	  long	  and	  complicated	  application	  procedures	  that	  frequently	  result	  
in	  failure	  (Gregg	  Brill,	  UCT;	  pers.	  com.).	  Attempts	  were	  made	  during	  this	  study,	  to	  no	  avail.	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poaching	  at	  Robben	  Island,	  described	  spending	  nearly	  two	  weeks	  in	  Pollsmoor	  prison	  
before	  being	  released	  on	  bail:	  
“The	  gangsters	  in	  there,	  we	  couldn’t	  understand	  what	  they	  were	  saying	  to	  us.	  
They	  were	  scary	  people,	  broe	  …	  ”	  
Corruption	  in	  government	  agencies	  
Interviews	  with	  poachers	  and	   law	  enforcement	  officials	   revealed	   that	   corruption	   in	  
government	   agencies	  makes	   curbing	   the	   illegal	   fishery	   even	  more	   difficult.	   A	   SAPS	  
official	   explained	   how	   corrupt	   colleagues	   of	   his	   could	   “make	   evidence	   disappear”	  
after	   poachers	   were	   apprehended,	   critically	   weakening	   the	   State’s	   case	   later	   on.	   A	  
senior	  compliance	  official	  from	  DAFF,	  while	  reluctant	  to	  divulge	  details,	  admitted	  that	  
his	  unit	  faced	  similar	  problems.	  
Poachers	  in	  Hangberg	  spoke	  candidly	  about	  their	  relationships	  with	  corrupt	  officials,	  
even	  divulging	  names	  on	  a	  number	  of	  occasions.	  They	  revealed	  that	  certain	  officials	  
allowed	  them	  to	  keep	  their	  diving	  equipment	  after	  being	  apprehended,	  enabling	  them	  
to	  continue	  working	  while	  waiting	  to	  appear	   in	  court.	  Another	  official,	   the	  poachers	  
alleged,	  allowed	  them	  to	  re-­‐purchase	  their	  confiscated	  rubber	  ducks	  for	  a	  fraction	  of	  
the	  usual	  price,	  rather	  than	  putting	  them	  on	  public	  auction	  as	  he	  was	  supposed	  to.	  
Notwithstanding	   these	   negative	   reports,	   police	   and	   other	   compliance	   officials	  
interviewed	  appeared	  confident	   in	   their	  ability	   to	  apprehend	  poachers—eventually.	  
One	  experienced	  SAPS	  captain	  explained	  that,	  sooner	  or	  later,	  everybody	  ran	  into	  the	  
law:	  
“The	  guys	  get	  away	  most	  times,	  ja,	  but	  we	  catch	  them	  in	  the	  end.	  If	  you	  poach,	  
you	  must	  know:	  one	  day,	  your	  time	  will	  come.”	  
The	  same	   individual	  was	  unwilling	   to	  discuss	  how	  effectively	   the	   legal	  system	  dealt	  
with	  poachers;	  he	  emphasized	  that	  his	  job	  was	  simply	  presenting	  suspected	  criminals	  
to	   court.	   He	   was	   pragmatic	   about	   the	   challenges	   facing	   law	   enforcement	   officials,	  
meanwhile,	  describing	  his	  anti-­‐poaching	  work	  as	  “an	  ongoing	  game	  of	  chess”.	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These	  findings	  have	  profiled	  the	  historical	  development	  and	  current	  status	  of	  abalone	  
poaching	  in	  Hangberg,	  which	  has	  evolved	  into	  a	  highly	  organized	  illegal	  fishery	  within	  
the	  last	  15	  years.	  Some	  of	  its	  key	  social	  and	  economic	  impacts	  in	  the	  community	  were	  
reported	  on,	  revealing	  the	  major	  role	  abalone	  poaching	  has	  assumed	  since	  local	  
individuals	  first	  established	  links	  with	  larger	  criminal	  syndicates.	  Diverse	  elements	  of	  
the	  illegal	  fishery	  system—ranging	  from	  conflicts	  between	  poachers,	  to	  coloured	  
identity	  politics,	  to	  corruption	  in	  state	  institutions—were	  investigated,	  contributing	  
to	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  comprehensive	  picture	  of	  poaching	  operations	  today.	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2.4 Discussion	  
2.4.1 Abalone	  poaching	  is	  deeply	  embedded	  in	  Hangberg	  
Abalone	   poaching	   has	   become	   deeply	   embedded	   in	   the	   Hangberg	   community.	   In	   a	  
period	   of	   less	   than	   15	   years,	   the	   illegal	   fishery	   has	   evolved	   from	   a	   small,	   informal	  
operation	   into	  a	  highly	  organized	  criminal	  one,	   characterized	  by	  substantial	  profits,	  
widespread	   involvement,	   and	   complex	   systems	   of	   control.	   In	   doing	   so,	   abalone	  
poaching	  has	  assumed	  a	  central	  position	  in	  the	  local	  economy,	  directly	  contributing	  to	  
the	  employment	  of	  at	  least	  250	  residents	  and	  indirectly	  supporting	  the	  livelihoods	  of	  
hundreds	  more.	  It	  has	  also	  become	  important	  for	  other	  reasons,	  not	  directly	  related	  
to	  money:	  as	  a	  protest	  against	  perceived	  injustices	  in	  the	  small-­‐scale	  fisheries	  sector,	  
and	   indeed	   South	  African	   society	   as	   a	  whole;	   as	   an	   opportunity	   for	   local	   fishers	   to	  
gain	   recognition	   for	   their	   skills	   in	   the	   community;	   and	   as	   an	   outlet	   for	   young	  men	  
seeking	   the	   excitement	   and	   adventure	   of	   an	   ‘outlaw’	   lifestyle.	   Abalone	   poaching	   in	  
Hangberg	   is	   thus	   a	   complex	   phenomenon,	   motivated	   and	   sustained	   by	   multiple,	  
interlinked	  factors.	  
Compliance	  breakdown:	  Is	  abalone	  poaching	  in	  Hangberg	  rational?	  
Like	   all	   crime,	   poaching	   is	   essentially	   an	   issue	   of	   non-­‐compliance	   with	   particular	  
rules.	  It	  is	  thus	  useful	  to	  frame	  questions	  about	  poaching	  within	  the	  broader	  context	  
of	   understanding	   compliance	   (e.g.	   Hauck	   2008).	   Early	   ‘instrumentalist’	   compliance	  
theories	   emphasized	   the	   importance	   of	   rule	   enforcement	   for	   preventing	   criminal	  
activity	   (Keane	  and	   Jones	  2008).	  Rational,	   self-­‐interested	   individuals	  were	  expected	  
to	   transgress	   rules	   whenever	   the	   perceived	   benefits	   of	   doing	   so	   outweighed	   the	  
costs—expressed	   in	   economic	  models	   as	   the	   severity	   of	   punishment,	  multiplied	   by	  
the	   likelihood	   of	   being	   caught	   (Becker	   1974).	   While	   subsequent	   research	   has	  
revealed	   the	   importance	   of	   additional	   factors,	   this	   kind	   of	   personal	   cost-­‐benefit	  
analysis	   remains	   key	   to	   understanding	   compliance	   behaviour	   in	   many	   natural	  
resource	  systems	  today	  (Keane	  and	  Jones	  2008).	  	  
In	   Hangberg,	   lucrative	   profits	   from	   abalone	   poaching	   appear	   to	   comfortably	   dwarf	  
the	  threat	  of	  law	  enforcement.	  There	  are	  far	  too	  few	  compliance	  officials	  to	  monitor	  
the	  entire	  Cape	  Peninsula	  at	  any	  given	  time,	  and	  poachers	  are	  usually	  able	  to	  evade	  
capture	  by	  gathering	  and	  sharing	  information	  about	  the	  location	  of	  patrol	  vessels.	  If	  
	   84	  
they	  are	  caught,	  poachers	  know	  how	  difficult	  it	   is	  for	  the	  state	  to	  prove	  them	  guilty,	  
and	   employ	   expensive	   lawyers	   to	   defend	   them	   in	   court.	   In	   the	   event	   of	   being	  
sentenced,	  their	  fines—which	  seldom	  match	  the	  lucrative	  profits	  from	  poaching—are	  
usually	   paid	   by	   wealthy	   ‘kingpins’	   in	   the	   community,	   allowing	   poachers	   to	   escape	  
imprisonment	  and	  resume	  their	  illegal	  activities	  with	  apparently	  little	  fuss.	  	  
In	  other	  words,	  neither	  the	  probability	  of	  being	  caught	  nor	  the	  severity	  of	  punishment	  
currently	  appear	  remotely	  high	  enough	  to	  deter	  abalone	  poaching	  in	  Hangberg.	  Time	  
constraints	  meant	   that	   it	  was	  not	  possible	   to	  model	  poaching	  behaviour	  during	  this	  
study,	   as	   has	   been	   attempted	   elsewhere	   using	   simple	   cost-­‐benefit	   analyses	   (Knapp	  
2012).	  It	  is	  highly	  likely,	  however,	  that	  the	  illegal	  abalone	  economy,	  and	  not	  the	  threat	  
of	   law	   enforcement,	   would	   emerge	   victorious	   from	   such	   an	   exercise.	   Poachers	   are	  
aware	  of	  this	  fact,	  and	  project	  an	  attitude	  of	  impunity	  towards	  the	  law.	  Some	  of	  this	  
can	  be	  attributed	  to	  posturing,	  certainly:	  the	  poachers	  exist	  within	  a	  subculture	  that	  
rewards	   bravado,	   and	   probably	   over-­‐emphasize	   their	   ability	   to	   avoid	   being	  
apprehended.	   Nevertheless,	   evidence	   from	   this	   study	   suggests	   that	   current	  
compliance	  efforts	  are	  for	  the	  most	  part	  unable	  to	  prevent	  individuals	  from	  poaching	  
on	  a	  regular	  basis,	  and	  that	  much	  of	  their	  confidence	  is	  thus	  entirely	  justified.	  
The	  effect	   this	  has	  had	  on	   the	  rapid	  growth	  of	   the	   illegal	  abalone	   fishery	  cannot	  be	  
quantified,	  but	   is	  probably	  highly	   important.	  Over	   the	   last	  15	  years,	  a	   succession	  of	  
Hangberg	   residents	   would	   have	   observed	   rampant	   and	   lucrative	   poaching	   activity	  
going	   unchecked	   in	   their	   community,	   weighed	   up	   their	   options,	   and	   decided	   to	  
participate.	   While	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   the	   rapid	   rate	   of	   growth	   of	   the	   fishery	   has	  
subsequently	   slowed,	   in	   response	   to	   increased	   law	   enforcement	   activity	   in	   recent	  
years,	   there	   is	   little	   indication	   that	   it	   has	   dropped	   to	   zero	   yet—or	   indeed	   that	   the	  
fishery	  has	  started	  to	  shrink.	  
However,	   some	   evidence	   suggests	   that	   a	   small	   number	   of	   individuals	  have	   left	   the	  
fishery	   to	  avoid	  encountering	  problems	  with	   the	   law.	  One	  rubber	  duck	  allegedly	  no	  
longer	   operates	   because	   its	   owners,	   considered	   “small-­‐time	   players”	   by	   other	  
poachers,	  feel	  that	  going	  to	  sea	  has	  become	  too	  risky30.	  A	  former	  abalone	  middleman	  
now	   only	   deals	   in	   illegal	   rock	   lobster,	   after	   having	   large	   shipments	   of	   abalone	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  This	   caused	   considerable	   consternation	   for	   at	   least	   one	   active	   poacher,	  who	   felt	   aggrieved	   that	   a	  
good	  rubber	  duck	  was	  going	  to	  waste.	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confiscated	   and	   paying	   a	   series	   of	   harsh	   fines.	   It	   is	   difficult	   to	   know	  what	   the	   net	  
effect	  of	  these	  decisions	  on	  the	  size	  of	  the	  fishery	  is,	  though:	  there	  were	  also	  reports	  
of	  new	  entrants	  getting	  involved	  during	  this	  study,	  and	  of	  new	  poaching	  vessels	  and	  
equipment	  being	  purchased.	  
In	   revealing	   the	   inability	   of	   law	   enforcement	   to	   combat	   abalone	   poaching	   in	  
Hangberg,	  this	  research	  mirrors	  earlier	  work	  on	  fisheries	  compliance	  in	  South	  Africa,	  
which	   has	   revealed	   that	   capacity	   constraints,	   poor	   coordination	   between	   different	  
state	   institutions,	   and	   corruption—among	   other	   problems—frequently	   hamper	   the	  
effectiveness	  of	  deterrence	  measures	  by	  the	  state	  (Hauck	  &	  Kroese	  2006;	  Sundstrom	  
2012).	   This	   has	   been	   vividly	   illustrated	   in	   the	   abalone	   fishery,	   which	   has	   virtually	  
collapsed	   in	   the	   face	   of	   rampant	   illegal	   harvesting	   (Raemaekers	   et	   al.	   2011).	   In	  
response,	   fisheries	   authorities	   have	   invested	   heavily	   in	   law	   enforcement	   and	  
developed	   a	   series	   of	   new	   anti-­‐poaching	   strategies	   (Hauck	   &	   Kroese	   2006;	  
Raemaekers	  et	  al.	  2011).	  This	  study,	  however,	  suggests	  that	  these	  efforts	  have	  not	  yet	  
made	  a	  tangible	  difference,	  despite	  having	  been	  identified	  as	  a	  management	  priority	  
over	  a	  decade	  ago	  (Hauck	  &	  Kroese	  2006).	  
Social	  drivers	  of	  the	  Hangberg	  abalone	  fishery	  
Alternative	   compliance	   theories	   highlight	   the	   importance	   of	   so-­‐called	   ‘normative’	  
factors—including	   ethical	   obligations,	   respect	   for	   regulatory	   institutions,	   and	  
perceptions	   of	   fairness	   and	   justice—for	   influencing	   individuals’	   decisions	   to	   obey	  
laws	   and	   regulations	   (Hauck	   2008;	   Keane	   and	   Jones	   2008).	   In	   Hangberg,	   these	  
motivations	   for	   complying	  with	   fisheries	   regulations	   appear	   to	   be	   extremely	  weak.	  
Previous	   research	   has	   revealed	   that	   the	   national	   fisheries	   authority	   is	   held	   in	  
extremely	   low	  regard	  by	  members	  of	   the	  community,	  where	   it	   is	  perceived	  to	  cater	  
for	   the	   needs	   of	   big	   commercial	   companies	   instead	   of	   local	   fishers	   (Hauck	   2009b).	  
The	   establishment	   of	   the	   Karbonkelberg	   no-­‐take	   MPA	   in	   2004,	   with	   no	   prior	  
consultation	  with	   the	   local	   rock	   lobster	   fishers	  whose	   traditional	   fishing	  grounds	   it	  
absorbed31 ,	   was	   particularly	   unpopular	   with	   residents	   (Sowman	   et	   al.	   2011a).	  
Despite	  attempts	   to	  adopt	  more	  participatory	  systems	  of	  governance,	  decisions	   like	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  The	  area	  encompassed	  by	   the	  Karbonkelberg	  no-­‐take	  MPA	  was	   formerly	  a	   rock	   lobster	   sanctuary,	  
established	  in	  1934	  to	  protect	  the	  interests	  of	  an	  emerging	  industrialized	  export	  fishery,	  by	  excluding	  
traditional	  fishers.	  The	  decision	  to	  locate	  the	  new	  marine	  reserve	  in	  exactly	  the	  same	  place	  as	  the	  old	  
sanctuary,	  in	  all	  likelihood	  motivated	  by	  a	  misguided	  sense	  of	  pragmatism,	  paid	  scant	  attention	  to	  the	  
perceptions	  of	  local	  residents,	  who	  were	  understandably	  aggrieved	  (Sowman	  et	  al.	  2011a).	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these	   continue	   to	   be	   made	   in	   a	   top-­‐down	   manner	   by	   fisheries	   and	   conservation	  
authorities,	   severely	   damaging	   their	   legitimacy	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   community	   and	  
contributing	   to	   ongoing	   non-­‐compliance	   (Hauck	   2009b;	   Sowman	   et	   al.	   2011a).	  
Research	   presented	   here	   suggests	   that	   abalone	   poaching	   is	   just	   the	   latest	  
manifestation	  of	  these	  deeper,	  unresolved	  problems.	  
During	  this	  study,	  poachers	  repeatedly	  justified	  their	  illegal	  activities	  by	  arguing	  that	  
existing	   fisheries	   regulations	   were	   unfair.	   The	   exclusion	   of	   their	   people	   from	  
important	   marine	   resources—both	   historically	   and	   at	   present—was	   cited	   as	   a	  
primary	  motivation	  for	  poaching,	  with	  many	  poachers	  claiming	  that	  they	  would	  cease	  
their	  illegal	  activities	  altogether	  if	  they	  were	  allocated	  abalone	  permits.	  The	  granting	  
of	  formal	  rights	  to	  abalone	  poachers	  in	  Hawston	  in	  the	  2000s	  was	  frequently	  hailed	  to	  
as	  a	  positive	  solution	  to	  illegal	  harvesting;	  in	  this	  way,	  poachers	  in	  Hangberg	  could	  be	  
said	   to	   be	   engaging	   in	   similar	   ‘protest	   fishing’	   to	   that	   which	   took	   place	   on	   the	  
Overberg	  coast	  more	  than	  a	  decade	  ago	  (Hauck	  and	  Sweijd	  1999).	  	  
The	  terms	  of	  this	  protest,	  however,	  appear	  to	  be	  broader	  than	  simply	  a	  call	  for	  fishing	  
rights.	  During	  interviews	  it	  became	  apparent	  that	  poaching	  was	  often	  motivated	  by	  a	  
deeper	  sense	  of	  social	  injustice	  in	  South	  Africa,	  of	  which	  inequalities	  in	  the	  fisheries	  
sector,	   while	   important	   in	   their	   own	   right,	   were	   regarded	   as	   just	   one	   symptom.	  
Participants	  repeatedly	  expressed	  frustration	  at	  the	  plight	  of	  coloured	  people	  in	  this	  
country,	   whom	   they	   considered	   to	   have	   been	   largely	   overlooked	   since	   the	   end	   of	  
apartheid.	  The	  perceived	  preferential	   treatment	  of	   Imizamo	  Yethu,	  a	  predominantly	  
black	  township	  across	  the	  Hout	  Bay	  valley,	  was	  frequently	  cited	  as	  a	  local	  example	  of	  
this	   ongoing	   political	   favouritism,	   which	   one	   individual	   claimed	   was	   “worse	   than	  
under	  apartheid”.	  
According	  to	  Cape	  Town	  historian	  Mohamed	  Adhikari,	  such	  perceptions	  are	  common	  
among	  colored	  people	  in	  South	  Africa,	  many	  of	  whom	  have	  come	  to	  feel	  “victimized”	  
by	  the	  ruling	  African	  National	  Congress	  (Adhikari	  2004;	  p.	  176).	  Flawed	  attempts	  to	  
transform	   South	  Africa’s	   fisheries	   sector	   in	   the	   late	   1990s,	  which	   resulted	   in	  many	  
new	   black	   entrants	   with	   no	   fishing	   experience	   receiving	   quotas	   at	   the	   expense	   of	  
bona	   fide	   colored	   fishers	   (Isaacs	   2006),	   no	   doubt	   contributed	   to	   these	   feelings	   of	  
resentment	  in	  coastal	  communities.	  This	  research	  revealed	  that	  abalone	  poaching	  in	  
Hangberg	  is	  inexorably	  bound	  with	  larger	  questions	  of	  race	  and	  identity,	  and	  cannot	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be	  understood	  fully—nor,	  in	  all	  likelihood,	  prevented—in	  isolation	  of	  them.	  There	  is	  a	  
pressing	  need	  for	  input	  from	  the	  social	  sciences	  to	  explore	  these	  sorts	  of	  links	  further.	  
Once	   again,	   the	   depth	   to	   which	   fishery	   systems	   must	   be	   understood	   in	   order	   to	  
develop	  appropriate	  management	  strategies	  is	  highlighted	  by	  this	  example.	  	  
Status	  and	  the	  thrill	  of	  the	  chase	  
In	   addition	   to	   these	   negative	   drivers	   of	   non-­‐compliance	   in	  Hangberg,	   this	   research	  
revealed	   a	   number	   of	   positive	   factors,	   also	   embedded	   in	   the	   social	   fabric	   of	   the	  
community,	  that	  appear	  to	  attract	  individuals	  to	  the	  abalone	  fishery.	  Firstly,	  abalone	  
poaching	   provides	   men	   with	   an	   opportunity	   to	   be	   recognized	   for	   their	   skill	   and	  
bravery,	   both	   of	   which	   are	   essential	   for	   conducting	   illegal	   poaching	   operations	   at	  
night.	   Successful	   divers	   are	   highly	   regarded	  within	   the	   community,	   as	   are	   skippers	  
who	   can	   safely	   navigate	   rubber	   ducks	   in	   rough	   seas.	   In	   interviews,	   a	   number	   of	  
abalone	   carriers	   admitted	   that	   they	   didn’t	   dive	   or	   work	   aboard	   poaching	   vessels	  
because	   they	  were	   afraid	   for	   their	   safety.	   In	   other	  words,	   despite	   the	   substantially	  
better	  pay	  these	   jobs	  offer,	  not	  everybody	  in	  Hangberg	  is	  willing	  or	  able	  to	  perform	  
them.	  Those	  who	  can	  appear	  to	  take	  immense	  pride	  in	  the	  fact—as	  well	  as	  earn	  the	  
respect	  of	  others	  who	  understand	  the	  substantial	  risks	  their	  work	  involves.	  	  
Secondly,	  abalone	  poaching	  appears	  to	  offer	  individuals	  the	  chance	  to	  live	  an	  exciting	  
‘outlaw’	   lifestyle,	   breaking	   rules	   and	   living	   life	   on	   the	   run	   from	   the	   law.	   This	  
phenomenon	   has	   been	   noted	   elsewhere:	   Forsyth	   &	   Marckese	   (1993)	   argued	   that	  
pleasure	   from	   the	   excitement	   of	   poaching,	   as	   well	   as	   from	   outsmarting	   game	  
wardens,	  was	  a	  primary	  motivation	  behind	  illegal	  hunting	  in	  Louisiana,	  U.S.A.	  While	  it	  
could	  be	  argued	  that	  poachers	  in	  that	  part	  of	  the	  world	  are	  financially	  better	  off,	  and	  
thus	   in	   a	   better	   position	   to	   derive	   enjoyment	   from	   their	   illegal	   activities,	   it	   is	  
inconceivable	   that	  abalone	  poachers	   in	  Hangberg	  do	  not	  share	  at	   least	  some	  of	   this	  
enthusiasm	   for	  doing	   their	   ‘job’.	  The	   fact	   that	  most	  youths	   in	   the	  community	   face	  a	  
severe	   lack	   of	   opportunities	   in	   later	   life	   is	   also	   likely	   to	   fuel	   this	   thrill-­‐seeking	  
behaviour.	  This	  driver	  of	  poaching	  behaviour	  in	  South	  Africa	  has	  received	  little	  to	  no	  
attention	   previously	   and	   warrants	   further	   investigation	   in	   the	   pursuit	   of	   holistic,	  
context-­‐specific	  understanding	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  in	  small-­‐scale	  fishing	  communities.	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A	  mainstay	  of	  the	  local	  economy	  
Through	   a	   combination	   of	   factors,	   abalone	   poaching	   appears	   to	   have	   assumed	   a	  
central	   role	   in	   Hangberg’s	   impoverished	   local	   economy.	  While	   it	   is	   not	   possible	   to	  
quantify	   its	   overall	   contribution	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   this	   study,	   indications	   are	   that	   the	  
illegal	   abalone	   fishery	   generates	   substantially	   more	   activity	   than	   many	   other	  
economic	   sectors	   in	   the	   community.	   In	   a	  decent	  month,	   a	   skilled	  diver	   can	   feasibly	  
earn	  nearly	  R90	  000	  and	  pay	  out	  R32	  000,	  for	  personal	  takings	  of	  around	  R55	  000.	  In	  
doing	   so	   he	   also	   contributes	   directly	   to	   the	   employment	   of	   at	   least	   seven	   other	  
individuals,	   not	   including	   middlemen	   and	   their	   workers.	   A	   boat	   owner	   with	   a	  
medium-­‐sized	  rubber	  duck,	  meanwhile,	  can	  earn	  R55	  000	  without	  setting	  foot	  in	  the	  
water,	  taking	  home	  more	  than	  R35	  000	  after	  paying	  for	  petrol.	  If	  he	  dives	  aboard	  his	  
own	  vessel,	  as	  many	  boat	  owners	  do,	  his	  profits	  from	  one	  month	  can	  exceed	  R90	  000	  
(calculations	   in	   Appendix	   A).	   The	   economic	   multiplier	   effects	   of	   this	   kind	   of	   cash	  
income	  must	  be	  substantial	  to	  say	  the	  least—not	  to	  mention	  its	  social	  importance	  in	  
an	  otherwise	  highly	  marginalized	  and	  poor	  community.	  
Among	   other	   things,	   this	   study	   revealed	   that	   money	   from	   abalone	   poaching	   funds	  
renovations,	  plumbing	  installations,	  school	  fees,	  and	  Christmas	  presents	  in	  Hangberg;	  
in	   this	  regard,	   the	  abalone	   fishery	  preforms	  a	  range	  of	   important	   functions	   that	   the	  
formal	  economy	  currently	  does	  not.	  While	   it	   is	   true	  that	  poaching	  also	  supports	  the	  
upkeep	   of	   extravagant,	   ‘wasteful’	   lifestyles,	   these	   substantial	   contributions	   to	  
hundreds	  of	  peoples’	  livelihoods	  cannot	  be	  ignored.	  Attempting	  to	  stamp	  out	  abalone	  
poaching	  without	  offering	  people	  viable	  alternatives	   is	  not	  only	   likely	   to	   fail:	   it	  also	  
represents	  a	  miscarriage	  of	  social	  justice.	  The	  new	  SSF	  policy	  recognizes	  this	  fact,	  and	  
aims	   to	   combat	   poverty	   and	   food	   insecurity	   en	   route	   to	   tackling	   non-­‐compliance	  
(DAFF	  2012a).	   Yet	   the	   policy,	   like	   the	  MLRA	  before	   it,	   comes	  with	   important—and	  
very	  necessary—caveats.	  	  
“The	  vision	  of	  the	  small-­‐scale	  fisheries	  policy,”	  a	  plain-­‐language	  summary	  of	  the	  50-­‐
page	   document	   explains,	   “is	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   well-­‐being	   of	   small-­‐scale	   fishers	   is	  
secured	  and	   the	  health	  of	   fish	  stocks	  and	  the	  sea	   is	  maintained”	  (DAFF	  2012b;	  p.	  1;	  
italics	   added).	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   SSF	   policy	   as	   a	   tool	   for	   poverty	  
alleviation	   is	   tightly	   constrained—especially	   considering	   that	   abalone	   and	   rock	  
lobster,	  by	  far	  the	  country’s	  two	  most	  valuable	  nearshore	  marine	  resources,	  are	  both	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currently	   in	   a	   “depleted	   to	   very	   depleted	   state”	   (DAFF	   2012c).	   Dissuading	   the	  
impoverished	   residents	   of	   Hangberg—and	   other	   fishing	   communities	   like	   it—from	  
harvesting	   these	   species	   illegally,	   but	   not	   having	   the	   wherewithal	   to	   grant	   them	  
formal	  access,	  is	  likely	  to	  continue	  to	  present	  challenges	  to	  fisheries	  and	  conservation	  
management.	   In	   the	  absence	  of	  viable	  alternatives	  to	  poaching,	  poaching	   is	   likely	   to	  
continue—and	  if	  the	  new	  SSF	  policy	  fails	  to	  provide	  these	  then	  it	  will	  be	  far	  less	  likely	  
to	  usher	  in	  real,	  lasting	  change.	  	  
Systems	  of	  rules	  
Despite	  being	   illegal	   in	   terms	  of	   South	  African	   law,	   it	  was	   found	   that	   the	  Hangberg	  
abalone	   fishery	   operates	   according	   to	   informal	   rules	   and	   norms	   of	   its	   own.	   This	  
research	  revealed	  the	  existence	  of	  complex	  hierarchies	  and	  codes	  of	  practice	  among	  
poachers	   in	   the	   community,	   ranging	   from	   rules	   regarding	   the	   payment	   of	   fees	   to	  
procedures	   for	   limiting	   and	   resolving	   conflict.	   From	   a	   legal	   pluralist	   perspective,	  
these	  informal	  structures	  could	  be	  argued	  to	  represent	  a	  functional	  alternative	  to	  the	  
formal	   legal	  system:	  although	  not	  recognized	  by	  the	  state,	   they	  are	   instrumental	   for	  
regulating	   poaching	   behaviour,	   and	   thus	   perform	   at	   least	   some	   of	   the	   functions	   of	  
statutory	   law,	   albeit	   in	   a	   markedly	   different	   form	   (Bavinck	   2007;	   von	   Benda-­‐
Beckmann	  2002).	  	  
Unlike	   the	   formal	   legal	   system,	   these	   informal	   structures	   are	   mostly	   considered	  
legitimate	   in	   Hangberg,	  where	   they	   have	   evolved	  within	   the	   community	   instead	   of	  
being	   enforced	   from	  outside.	   Researching	   rock	   lobster	   poaching	   in	   the	   community,	  
Hauck	  (2009a)	  argued	  that	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  fishery	  was	  based	  on	  historical	  fishing	  
practices,	  allowing	  poachers	  to	  operate	  “with	  very	  little	  conflict	  at	  the	  local	  level”	  (p.	  
154).	   It	   appears	   that	   the	   abalone	   fishery,	   which	   developed	   later,	   was	   established	  
along	   similar	   lines.	   Both	   fisheries	   comprise	   teams	   of	   boat	   owners,	   fishers,	   and	  
carriers,	   with	   local	   middlemen	   who	   sell	   the	   product	   on	   to	   outside	   groups	   (Hauck	  
2009b)	  and	  have	  become	  embedded	  in	  the	  social	   fabric	  of	   the	  community.	  This	  will	  
continue	   to	   present	   significant	   obstacles	   to	   authorities	   hoping	   to	   bring	   them	   to	   an	  
end.	  	  
Housing	  and	  abalone	  poaching	  
Abalone	   poaching	   also	   cannot	   be	   understood	   in	   isolation	   from	   housing	   issues	   in	  
Hangberg.	  In	  September	  2010,	  violent	  protests	  erupted	  after	  police	  attempted	  to	  evict	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residents	   from	  a	   small	   informal	   settlement	   that	   had	   encroached	   across	   a	   firebreak,	  
and	  onto	  SANParks	   land.	  Two	  years	   later,	   in	  March	  2012,	  similar	  scenes	  played	  out	  
when	  police	  attempted	  to	  confiscate	  poached	  abalone	  from	  a	  private	  residence	  in	  the	  
community:	  tires	  were	  burned,	  vehicles	  were	  stoned,	  and	  a	  number	  of	  residents	  and	  
policemen	   suffered	   injuries.	   The	   parallels	   do	   not	   appear	   to	   be	   coincidental.	  
Participants	  repeatedly	  equated	  their	  dispute	  over	  land	  with	  their	  ongoing	  exclusion	  
from	  marine	  resources	  during	  this	  study,	  arguing	  that	  both	  illustrated	  the	  low	  regard	  
in	   which	   they,	   as	   coloured	   people,	   were	   held	   by	   the	   state.	   This	   perception	   fuelled	  
further	  animosity	   towards	   fisheries	   regulations,	  which	  were	  seen	   to	  be	   intertwined	  
with	  deeper	  injustices,	  and	  thus	  for	  the	  most	  part	  illegitimate.	  
Abalone	  poaching	  and	  housing	  issues	  in	  Hangberg	  are	  linked	  in	  other	  ways.	  A	  number	  
of	   informal	   dwellings	   above	   the	   firebreak	   are	   used	   as	   drop-­‐off	   points	   for	   poached	  
abalone,	   as	   they	   are	   situated	   immediately	   below	   the	   path	   home	   from	   the	   remote	  
drop-­‐off	  point.	  The	  slopes	  are	  poorly	  lit	  and	  there	  are	  no	  roads,	  making	  it	  extremely	  
difficult	   for	   the	   police	   to	   gain	   access.	   The	   informal	   settlement	   thus	   represents	   an	  
important	  strategic	  asset	  for	  abalone	  poachers,	  some	  of	  whom	  are	  alleged	  to	  own	  and	  
control	  certain	  sections	  of	   it—as	  well	  as	  stir	  up	  anger	  whenever	  problems	  with	   law	  
enforcement	   arise.	   This	   example	   reveals	   how	   complex—and	   difficult	   to	   trace—the	  
linkages	  between	  seemingly	  disparate	  elements	  of	  a	  fishery	  system	  can	  be	  (e.g.	  Garcia	  
and	  Charles	  2007)	  and	  how	  important	  it	  is	  to	  heed	  the	  human	  dimensions	  of	  fisheries	  
management.	  
Déjà	  vu?	  Parallels	  with	  the	  past	  
There	  are	  striking	  similarities	  between	  the	  findings	  presented	  in	  this	  dissertation	  and	  
previous	  studies	  of	  marine	  poaching	  in	  South	  Africa,	  suggesting	  little	  has	  changed	  in	  
the	  broad-­‐scale	  dynamics	  driving	  the	  illegal	  abalone	  fishery.	  Hauck	  (2009b)	  revealed	  
how	   abalone	   poaching	   had	   evolved	   from	   a	   “traditional,	   politically-­‐driven	   informal	  
fishery”	  on	  the	  Overberg	  coast	  to	  a	  “highly	  organised	  fishery	  dominated	  by	  a	  lucrative	  
illicit	  international	  trade”	  (p.	  113).	  In	  doing	  so,	  she	  emphasized	  how	  repeated	  failures	  
by	   government	   to	   translate	   apparently	   sound	   policies	   and	   management	   strategies	  
into	   action	   had	   critically	   undermined	   attempts	   to	   curb	   the	   booming	   illicit	   abalone	  
economy	   (Hauck	   2009b;	   also	   Hauck	   &	   Kroese	   2006).	   The	   root	   causes	   of	   non-­‐
compliance	  she	  discussed—poverty,	  unemployment,	  poor	  law	  enforcement,	  an	  utter	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lack	   of	   normative	   support	   for	   fisheries	   regulations—apply	   as	   equally	   to	   Hangberg	  
today	   as	   they	   did	   to	   Hawston	   almost	   two	   decades	   ago.	   Comparisons	   with	   Hauck’s	  
work	  on	  rock	  lobster	  poaching	  in	  Hangberg,	  meanwhile,	   indicate	  that	  the	  social	  and	  
economic	  drivers	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  in	  the	  community	  have	  changed	  little	  in	  the	  last	  
decade	  (Hauck	  2009b).	  One	  might	  be	  forgiven	  for	  feeling	  a	  creeping	  sense	  of	  déjà	  vu.	  
What	  are	  the	  implications	  for	  fisheries	  governance	  in	  South	  Africa	  if	  twenty	  years	  of	  
dedicated	  anti-­‐poaching	  efforts	  have,	  for	  all	  intents	  and	  purposes,	  failed	  to	  bear	  fruit?	  
And	  what	  are	  the	  prospects	  for	  implementing	  the	  new	  SSF	  policy	  when	  all	  evidence	  
suggests	   that	   its	   predecessor,	   the	   2003	   Abalone	   Policy—which	   was	   similarly	  
premised	   on	   co-­‐management,	   social	   justice	   and	   other	   core	   tenets	   of	   ‘good	  
governance’—made	   at	   most	   a	   small	   dent	   in	   South	   Africa’s	   thriving	   illegal	   abalone	  
economy?	  These	  questions	  will	  be	  returned	  to	  in	  the	  third	  section	  of	  this	  discussion.	  
2.4.2 Lasting	  social	  impacts	  
South	   Africa’s	   abalone	   stocks	   have	   proved	   to	   be	   more	   resilient	   to	   poaching	   than	  
previously	   expected	   (Raemaekers	  pers.	   com.),	   yet	   consensus	   appears	   to	   be	   that	   the	  
resource	   is	   heading	   for	   commercial	   extinction	   (Raemaekers	   et	   al.	   2011).	  
Measurements	  and	  observations	  of	  freshly	  shucked	  shells	  during	  this	  study	  suggested	  
that	  poachers	  in	  Hangberg	  are	  still	  able	  to	  locate	  pockets	  of	  decent-­‐sized	  abalone	  on	  
the	   Cape	   Peninsula.	   However,	   the	   biological	   reality	   is	   that	   H.	   midae	   grows	   and	  
reproduces	   far	   too	   slowly	   to	   sustain	   current	   levels	   of	   harvest	   (Raemaekers	   et	   al.	  
2011),	   and	   it	   probably	   only	   a	  matter	   of	   time	   before	   stocks	   on	   the	   Cape	   Peninsula	  
collapse	   beyond	   any	   form	   of	   commercial	   viability,	   as	   has	   already	   happened	   on	   the	  
Overberg	  coast.	  
Between	  now	  and	  that	  future	  date,	  however,	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  worrying	  potential	  
for	   conflict	   in	   Hangberg,	   the	   effects	   of	   which	   will	   probably	   be	   felt	   long	   after	   the	  
abalone	   resource	   has	   declined.	   This	   research	   revealed	   that	   abalone	   poaching	   has	  
become	  an	  important	  pillar	  of	  the	  local	  economy,	  supporting	  expensive	  lifestyles	  and	  
contributing	   meaningfully	   to	   people’s	   livelihoods.	   As	   resources	   dwindle,	   these	  
functions	  of	   the	   illegal	   fishery	  are	   likely	  come	  under	   increased	  pressure,	  potentially	  
spurring	  greater	  competition	  between	  its	  participants.	  Already,	   incidents	  of	  theft	  on	  
the	  path	   from	   the	  drop-­‐off	  point	  have	  prompted	   local	  middlemen	   to	  employ	  armed	  
	   92	  
escorts	  to	  guard	  their	  product.	  While	  these	  guards	  do	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  called	  
into	  action	  yet,	  they	  represent	  a	  very	  real	  threat	  of	  violent	  conflict	  over	  abalone	  in	  the	  
future.	  
As	   income	   from	  the	   illegal	   fishery	  subsides,	  poachers	  are	  also	   likely	   to	  begin	   taking	  
greater	  risks.	  In	  the	  weeks	  preceding	  Christmas,	  a	  number	  of	  participants	  expressed	  
an	  urgent	  desire	   to	  work,	  needing	  money	  to	  purchase	  gifts	   for	   family	  members	  and	  
friends.	  Brazen	  daytime	  launches	  were	  observed	  more	  frequently	  during	  this	  period	  
than	  at	  any	  other	  time.	  This	  circumstantial	  evidence	  supports	  the	  prediction	  that,	  as	  
the	  gap	  between	  poachers’	  earnings	  and	  expenditure	  widens,	  they	  may	  be	  tempted	  to	  
abandon	   caution	   and	   place	   themselves	   in	   danger—for	   example	   by	   working	   in	  
rougher	   seas,	  diving	  with	   faulty	  equipment,	   launching	   in	  daylight	  hours,	  or	   stealing	  
from	  rival	  groups.	  
In	   parallel,	   poachers	   may	   attempt	   to	   substitute	   their	   earnings	   from	   alternative	  
sources.	   Few	   are	   skilled	   or	   educated,	   however,	   and	   it	   is	   unlikely	   that	  any	   will	   find	  
formal	  jobs	  that	  pay	  as	  well	  as	  abalone	  poaching	  does.	  By	  extension,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  
some	  poachers	  will	  turn	  to	  other	  forms	  of	  crime	  instead.	  During	  interviews,	  a	  number	  
threatened	  to	  “break	  into	  houses”	  or	  “rob	  white	  people”	  if	  forced	  to	  stop	  working	  at	  
sea.	  On	  other	  occasions,	  poachers	  said	  they	  would	  return	  to	  catching	  rock	   lobster	   if	  
the	  abalone	   fishery	  collapsed32.	   In	  other	  words,	   certain	  abalone	  poachers	  appear	   to	  
have	  lost	  the	  opportunity	  to	  start	  operating	  in	  the	  formal	  system	  again—bringing	  to	  
mind	   journalist	   Hunter	   S.	   Thompson’s	   (1966)	   description	   of	   a	   different	   group	   of	  
outlaws	  altogether,	  the	  United	  States	  motorbike	  gang	  known	  as	  the	  Hell’s	  Angels:	  
	  “A	  man	  who	  has	  blown	  all	  his	  options	  can’t	  afford	  the	  luxury	  of	  changing	  his	  
ways.	   He	   has	   to	   capitalize	   on	   whatever	   he	   has	   left,	   and	   he	   can’t	   afford	   to	  
admit—no	  matter	   how	   often	   he’s	   reminded	   of	   it—that	   every	   day	   of	   his	   life	  
takes	  him	  farther	  down	  a	  blind	  alley.”	  
Unrelenting	  pressure	  from	  outside	  groups	  
Adding	   to	   existing	   tensions	   between	   poachers	   in	   the	   community,	   the	   Hangberg	  
abalone	   fishery	   is	   likely	   to	   come	   under	   increasing	   pressure	   from	   outside	   poaching	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  There	  is	  a	  possibility	  that	  this	  has	  already	  begun:	  during	  one	  interview,	  a	  SANParks	  official	  claimed	  
to	  have	  observed	  a	  substantial	  increase	  in	  lobster	  poaching	  activity	  around	  Hangberg	  in	  2012,	  like	  he	  
had	  “never	  seen	  before”.	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groups.	  With	  abalone	  resources	  on	  South	  Africa’s	  east	  and	  south	  coasts	  having	  been	  
severely	   depleted	   by	   illegal	   harvesting,	   poachers	   have	   begun	   targeting	   the	   Cape	  
Peninsula	   and	   west	   coast	   more	   heavily	   in	   recent	   years.	   There	   is	   little	   reason	   to	  
believe	  that	  this	  trend	  will	  cease	  in	  the	  near	  future.	  	  
Meanwhile,	   a	   combination	   of	   factors	   continues	   to	   make	   Hangberg	   a	   particularly	  
appealing	  destination	  for	  foreign	  poaching	  groups.	  First,	  the	  community	  has	  become	  
accustomed	   to	   poaching	   activity,	   and	   does	   not	   condemn	   it	   outright.	   Second,	   many	  
poachers	   in	   the	   community	   are	   willing	   to	   work	   with	   outside	   groups,	   although	  
possibly	  less	  readily	  than	  they	  were	  in	  the	  past.	  Third,	  Hout	  Bay	  harbour	  has	  one	  of	  
the	  only	  slipways	  on	  the	  Cape	  Peninsula	  that	  can	  be	  accessed	  at	  night;	  it	  is	  probably	  
also	  the	  only	  harbour	  on	  the	  peninsula	  where	  pre-­‐launching	  poaching	  vessels	  during	  
the	   day	   is	   feasible 33 	  (Steve	   Benjamin,	   pers.	   com).	   Fourth,	   Hangberg’s	   nearby	  
mountain	  slopes	  provide	  a	  safe	  drop-­‐off	  point	  for	  poached	  abalone,	  as	  it	  is	  difficult	  for	  
law	  enforcement	  officials	   to	   gain	   access.	   For	   these	   reasons	  and	  others,	  Hangberg	   is	  
likely	   to	   continue	   attracting	   foreign	   poaching	   groups	   in	   the	   future,	   increasing	   the	  
potential	  for	  conflict	  as	  time	  goes	  by.	  
The	  Hawston	  precedent:	  Lasting	  social	  impacts	  
Lessons	   about	   the	   lasting	   damage	   poaching	   can	   cause	   can	   be	   drawn	   from	   fishing	  
communities	  on	  the	  south	  coast,	  where	  organized	  illegal	  abalone	  fisheries	  have	  been	  
operating	   for	   longer.	   Hawston,	   for	   example,	   was	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   early	   syndicated	  
poaching	   operations	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1990s,	   attracting	   members	   from	   Cape	   Flats	   gangs	  
who	  had	  begun	  dealing	  with	  Chinese	  criminal	  groups	  (Steinberg	  2005).	  A	  number	  of	  
prominent	   gangsters	   bought	   homes	   in	   the	   community	   and	   began	   conducting	  
poaching	  operations	  of	  their	  own,	  resulting	  in	  conflict	  with	  local	  groups	  and	  a	  series	  
of	  violent	  confrontations	  that	  became	  known	  as	  the	  ‘abalone	  wars’	  (Hauck	  and	  Sweijd	  
1999).	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   so-­‐called	   ‘gang	  culture’	   infiltrated	   the	   community,	   causing	  
dramatic	  increases	  in	  drug	  abuse	  and	  violence	  (Hauck	  2009b;	  Steinberg	  2005).	  	  
Fieldwork	  in	  Hawston,	  backed	  by	  a	  wealth	  of	  secondary	  sources,	  revealed	  that	  these	  
social	  impacts	  have	  lingered	  in	  the	  community,	  despite	  the	  substantial	  decline	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  This	  refers	  to	  the	  practice	  of	   launching	  a	  vessel	   from	  the	  harbour	  slipway	  and	  mooring	   it	  between	  
larger	  fishing	  vessels,	  making	  it	  easier	  to	  depart	  later	  on	  without	  being	  noticed.	  Poaching	  groups	  were	  
frequently	  observed	  doing	  this	  in	  Hout	  Bay.	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abalone	  fishery	  in	  recent	  years.	  A	  series	  of	  murders	  and	  turf	  wars	  have	  taken	  place	  in	  
the	  last	  decade;	  tik	  addiction	  is	  rife;	  and	  many	  youths	  are	  members	  of	  powerful	  Cape	  
gangs	  (Steinberg	  2004).	  The	  situation	  came	  to	  a	  head	  in	  October	  2012—less	  than	  one	  
month	  after	  I	  visited	  the	  community—when	  Hawston	  erupted	  following	  the	  death	  of	  
a	   young	   abalone	   poaching	   suspect	   in	   police	   custody.	   Furiously	   claiming	   that	   the	  
teenager	   had	   been	  murdered,	   residents	   rampaged	   through	   the	   town	   for	   two	   days,	  
culminating	   in	  vehicles	  being	   torched	  and	  a	   local	  police	  building	  being	   razed	   to	   the	  
ground.	  “This	  is	  a	  gangster	  town,”	  a	  local	  contact	  explained	  shortly	  afterwards.	  “The	  
police	   know	   they	   can’t	   come	   in	   here	   and	   stamp	   us	   out	   …	   they	   know	   certain	  
individuals	  in	  this	  community	  won’t	  rest	  until	  the	  people	  responsible	  for	  that	  murder	  
are	  tracked	  down	  and	  shot.”	  
Social	  breakdown	  and	  fisheries	  governance	  
A	   livelihoods	   approach	   tells	   us	   that	   fishing	   communities	   rely	   heavily	   on	   marine	  
resources	   (Allison	   &	   Ellis	   2001;	   FAO	   2005).	   An	   interactive	   governance	   approach,	  
meanwhile,	   recognises	   that	   cooperation	   between	   different	   actors	   is	   essential	   for	  
managing	  complex	  fisheries	  systems	  sustainably	  (Charles	  1995;	  Kooiman	  &	  Bavinck	  
2005).	   Exploring	   this	   paradox,	   Jentoft	   (2000;	   p.	   53)	   flips	   the	   statement	   “viable	  
fisheries	   communities	   require	  viable	   fish	   stocks”	   to	   read	   “viable	   fish	   stocks	   require	  
viable	   fisheries	   communities”.	   In	   other	   words,	   social	   and	   ecological	   processes	   are	  
intrinsically	  linked—they	  are	  two	  sides	  of	  the	  same	  coin	  (Folke	  et	  al.	  2005).	  
The	  finding	  that	  abalone	  poaching	  has	  sown	  seeds	  of	  discord	  in	  Hangberg—and	  other	  
fishing	  communities	   like	   it—thus	  has	  broader	   implications	   for	   fisheries	  governance	  
in	  South	  Africa.	  Interactive	  governance	  theory	  is	  fundamentally	  premised	  on	  dialogue	  
and	  cooperation	  between	  different	  actors	  (Kooiman	  et	  al.	  2008;	  Kooiman	  &	  Bavinck	  
2005).	   Co-­‐management	   has	   been	   proposed	   as	   a	   mechanism	   for	   facilitating	   this	  
process	  by	  drawing	  new	  voices	  into	  decision-­‐making	  and	  executive	  processes	  (Jentoft	  
2000;	  Jentoft	  et	  al.	  1998).	  Drawing	  on	  these	  themes,	  the	  new	  SSF	  policy	  has	  a	  strong	  
emphasis	   on	   enabling	   fisher	   representation	   (DAFF	   2012a)—but	   without	   strong	  
community	   ties	   underpinning	   them,	   these	   kinds	   of	   ideals	   are	   unlikely	   to	   be	  met	   in	  
reality	  (Jentoft	  2000).	  
This	   research	   was	   based	   on	   a	   single	   case	   study	   in	   Hangberg—and	   on	   a	   single,	  
extraordinarily	   high-­‐value	   species.	   Extrapolating	   lessons	   for	   South	  African	   fisheries	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management	  must	  necessarily	  be	  done	  with	  caution.	  Nevertheless,	  previous	  work	  on	  
abalone	   poaching	   (Hauck	   and	   Sweijd	   1999;	   Raemaekers	   and	   Britz	   2009;	   Steinberg	  
2005)	   as	  well	   as	   a	   large	   database	   of	   newspaper	   reports	   suggests	   that	   the	   findings	  
from	   this	   study	   have	   relevance	   elsewhere	   in	   this	   country.	  While	   it	   is	   true	   that	   the	  
price	  of	  abalone	  is	  an	  anomaly,	  meanwhile,	  other	  South	  African	  species	  also	  trade	  on	  
the	  black-­‐market:	   rock	   lobster	   (Hauck	  2009b)	  and	  sharks	   (HSI	  2006;	  Oceana	  2010)	  
are	  two	  examples34.	  The	  socially	  divisive	  aspects	  of	   illegal	   fishing	  reported	  here	  are	  
thus	  likely	  to	  apply	  to	  other	  fisheries	  as	  well.	  	  
2.4.3 Hard	  lessons	  for	  small-­‐scale	  fisheries	  governance	  
According	  to	  a	  recent	  summary	  document,	  the	  new	  SSF	  policy	  aims	  to	  provide	  small-­‐
scale	  fishers	  with	  “the	  opportunity	  to	  fish,	  to	  increase	  the	  benefits	  from	  fishing	  …	  to	  
feed	  their	  families	  as	  well	  as	  help	  them	  make	  a	  successful	  living”	  (DAFF	  2012b;	  p.	  1).	  
It	   has	   been	   somewhat	   ironic	   to	   discover	   that	   the	   illegal	   abalone	   fishery	   currently	  
fulfils	   all	   of	   these	   objectives	   in	   Hangberg.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   abalone	   poaching	  
certainly	  does	  not	  “promote	  biodiversity	  and	  the	  sustainable	  use	  and	  management	  of	  
marine	   living	  resources,”	  a	  guiding	  principle	  behind	  the	  SSF	  policy	  (DAFF	  2012a;	  p.	  
14).	  This	  appears	  far	  less	  likely	  to	  bother	  disadvantaged	  fishers,	  though—in	  the	  short	  
term	   at	   least—than	   it	   does	   conservationists	   and	   fisheries	   managers,	   to	   whom	  
poaching	  understandably	  represents	  an	  issue	  of	  grave	  concern.	  
In	  the	  nearly	  20	  years	  that	  have	  elapsed	  since	  the	  end	  of	  apartheid,	  fisheries	  reform	  
has	   failed	   to	   bring	  meaningful	   change	   to	  Hangberg,	  which	   remains	   extremely	   poor	  
and	   marginalized	   today.	   Fewer	   than	   150	   residents	   currently	   hold	   fishing	   rights,	   a	  
remarkable	   fact	   considering	   the	   community’s	   deep	   roots	   in	   traditional	   fishing.	  
Meanwhile,	  individuals	  from	  Imizamo	  Yethu	  and	  further	  afield	  have	  begun	  competing	  
strongly	   for	   jobs	   in	   local	   processing	   factories	   and	   on	   board	   commercial	   vessels,	  
contributing	  to	  reduced	  job	  opportunities	  for	  Hangberg	  residents	  (Witte	  2010).	  This	  
has	  resulted	  in	  a	  bizarre	  situation	  whereby	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  community	  currently	  
have	   neither	   formal	   direct	   access	   to	  marine	   resources,	   nor	   indirect	   access	   through	  
employment	  in	  the	  commercial	  sector.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  During	   this	   study,	   one	   participant	   claimed	   that	   sea	   cucumbers	   were	   “even	   more	   valuable	   than	  
abalone,”	  but	  that	  he	  didn’t	  have	  access	  to	  a	  buyer.	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A	  functional	  alternative	  to	  the	  formal	  fisheries	  sector	  
That	  abalone	  poaching	   in	  Hangberg	  has	  begun,	   in	  many	  ways,	   to	  resemble	  a	   formal	  
fishery—with	  dedicated	  vessels,	  specialized	  division	  of	  labour,	  and	  complex	  rules	  and	  
operational	   procedures	   in	   place—is	   thus	   entirely	   unsurprising.	   The	   state	   has	  
repeatedly	  failed	  to	  cater	  for	  fishers	  in	  the	  community:	  but	  the	  criminal	  economy	  has	  
offered	   them	  a	   lucrative	   alternative,	   and	   a	   number	   of	   individuals	   have	   grasped	   the	  
opportunity	   with	   both	   hands.	   Effectively,	   local	   middlemen	   and	   boat	   owners	   are	  
entrepreneurs	  who	   have	   capitalized	   on	  what	   policymakers	  might	   call	   an	   “enabling	  
environment”	   for	   job	   creation	   and	   economic	   growth	   (e.g.	   DAFF	   2012a;	   p.	   28),	  
establishing	   themselves	   as	   key	   players	   in	   a	   lucrative—but	   highly	   criminalized—
fishery.	   In	  other	  words,	   fishers	   in	  Hangberg	  have	   filled	   the	  vacuum	   left	  by	  a	   lack	  of	  
formal	  opportunities	  by	  inserting	  themselves	  deeply	  into	  the	  national	  abalone	  black-­‐
market.	  
This	   has	   taken	   place	   despite	   there	   being	   little	   to	   no	   history	   of	   dedicated	   abalone	  
harvesting	   in	  Hangberg.	  While	   interviews	   revealed	   that	   local	   fishers	   had	   taken	   out	  
abalone	  in	  the	  past,	  this	  appears	  to	  have	  happened	  on	  a	  sporadic	  and	  ad-­‐hoc	  basis.	  By	  
comparison,	  communities	  like	  Hawston	  and	  Gansbaai	  on	  the	  south	  coast	  formed	  the	  
nexus	  of	   the	  commercial	  abalone	   fishery,	   supplying	  a	  pool	  of	   skilled	  divers	   to	  work	  
for	  white-­‐owned	   companies	   during	   apartheid	   (Sauer	   et	  al.	  2003).	   There	  were	   thus	  
clear	   links	  between	  traditional	   fishers	  and	  the	  birth	  of	  syndicated	  abalone	  poaching	  
in	   the	   region	   (Hauck	   1997).	   This	   research	   has	   suggested	   that	   Hangberg’s	   illegal	  
fishery	   grew	   on	   the	   back	   of	   outside	   influence	   instead,	   with	   poaching	   groups	   from	  
elsewhere	  in	  the	  country	  helping	  establish	  a	  new	  tradition	  of	  marine	  resource	  use	  in	  
the	  community	  that	  rapidly	  became	  entrenched.	  
There	  is	  an	  important	  lesson	  for	  South	  African	  fisheries	  governance	  in	  this.	  While	  the	  
state	  fumbled	  with	  its	  reform	  efforts,	  fishers	  in	  Hangberg	  essentially	  made	  a	  plan	  and	  
ran	  with	  it,	  quickly	  learning	  a	  new	  trade	  and	  adopting	  it	  as	  a	  core	  livelihood	  strategy.	  
This	  was	  possible	  because	  a	  powerful	  rival	  actor—the	  criminal	  economy—had	  risen	  
to	  prominence	  and	  could	  facilitate	  the	  evolution	  of	  a	  fully	  alternative	  fishery	  system.	  	  
This	  actor’s	  hand	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  operating	  in	  Hangberg’s	  rock	  lobster	  fishery,	  where	  
the	   state’s	   interim	   relief	   measures	   have	   been	   co-­‐opted	   to	   enable	   an	   explosion	   in	  
poaching	  activity,	  made	  possible	  by	  weak	  monitoring	  and	  enforcement	  programs.	  In	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both	   cases,	   a	   clandestine	   parallel	   system	   has	   completely	   subverted	   fisheries	  
management	   and	   conservation	   efforts	   by	   gaining	   the	   support	   of	   members	   of	   the	  
community.	  It	  has	  been	  informative	  to	  discover	  that	  entirely	  new	  fishing	  practices—
boat-­‐based	  abalone	  poaching—can	  become	  established	  within	  this	  system	  alongside	  
older,	  customary	  practices.	  
The	  role	  of	  planning	  and	  policy	  in	  bringing	  change	  to	  complex	  fisheries	  systems	  must	  
be	  examined	  here.	  The	  2003	  Abalone	  Policy	  was	  specifically	  designed	  to	  address	  the	  
root	   causes	   of	   poaching	   by	   reaching	   out	   to	   marginalized	   fishers	   who	   had	   been	  
overlooked	  by	  post-­‐apartheid	  fisheries	  reform.	  Ten	  years	  on,	  however,	  it	  is	  debatable	  
whether	  this	  had	  much	  lasting	  positive	  impact	  at	  all	  (Hauck	  2009b;	  Raemaekers	  et	  al.	  
2011).	   Instead,	   the	   Abalone	   Policy—like	  many	   fisheries	  management	   interventions	  
before	   and	   since—appears	   to	   have	   been	   poorly	   implemented	   and	   hamstrung	   by	  
failures	   to	   fully	   appreciate	   the	   complexities	   at	   play	   in	   the	   very	   small-­‐scale	   fishing	  
communities	   to	  which	   it	  was	  designed	   to	  apply.	  This	  has	   left	   the	   status	  quo	   largely	  
intact	   in	  places	   like	  Hangberg,	  maintaining	   the	   social	   and	  economic	   conditions	   that	  
continue	  to	  fuel	  the	  illegal	  abalone	  economy	  today.	  
This	  research	  adds	  to	  a	  growing	  literature	  arguing	  that	  many	  of	  South	  Africa’s	  most	  
persistent	   fisheries	   problems	   have	   their	   roots	   in	   inappropriate	   governance	  
approaches	   and	   arrangements,	   manifested	   in	   poorly	   planned	   and	   implemented	  
management	   strategies	   (e.g.	   Hauck	   &	   Kroese	   2003,	   Hauck	   2009b,	   Sowman	   2011,	  
Sowman	  et	  al.	  2011b,	  Isaacs	  2012).	  As	  the	  example	  of	  the	  failed	  2003	  Abalone	  Policy	  
clearly	   illustrates,	   however,	   it	   is	   not	   sufficient	   simply	   to	   embrace	   the	   progressive	  
language	   of	   good	   governance—co-­‐management,	   inclusiveness,	   flexibility,	   holism—
without	  ensuring	  that	  these	  lofty	  concepts	  are	  linked	  to	  tangible	  interventions	  at	  the	  
ground	  level.	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  in	  fishing	  communities	  that	  continue	  to	  bear	  the	  
brunt	  of	  South	  Africa’s	  extremely	  high	  levels	  of	  social	  and	  economic	  inequality.	  
Economic	  incentives	  to	  break	  the	  law	  
Nearly	   15	   years	   after	   syndicated	   abalone	   poaching	   began	   in	   Hangberg	   (and	   much	  
longer	   after	   the	   birth	   of	   illegal	   rock	   lobster	   fishing)	   the	   state	   has	   made	   would-­‐be	  
poachers	   a	   counter-­‐offer	   with	   its	   new	   SSF	   policy,	   promising	   fishers	   participatory	  
governance,	   multi-­‐species	   quotas,	   and	   preferential	   fishing	   areas	   in	   return	   for	  
improved	  compliance.	  Crucially,	  however,	  this	  progressive	  gesture	  is	  constrained	  by	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the	   need	   to	   conserve	   resources	   and	   manage	   for	   sustainability	   (abalone,	   which	   is	  
considered	  to	  be	  on	  the	  brink	  of	  commercial	  extinction	  (DAFF	  2012c),	  will	  not	  appear	  
on	  any	  multi-­‐species	  quota	  list	  emanating	  from	  the	  SSF	  policy).	  	  
The	  criminal	  economy,	  by	  comparison,	  is	  unfettered	  in	  this	  regard:	  evidence	  from	  the	  
Overberg	  coast	  suggests	   that	   illegal	  harvesting	  will	  continue	  until	  abalone	   is	  almost	  
entirely	  depleted.	  What	   this	  means	   is	   that	   short-­‐term	  economic	   interests—whether	  
purchasing	  a	  new	  pair	  of	  Nike	  shoes,	  refurbishing	  a	  bathroom,	  putting	  supper	  on	  the	  
table,	   or	   repaying	   a	   drug	   loan—are	   likely	   to	   continue	   fuelling	   non-­‐compliance	   in	  
Hangberg,	   potentially	   undermining	   the	   new	   SSF	   policy	   as	   they	   have	   undermined	  
fisheries	  management	  efforts	  in	  the	  past.	  For	  all	  that	  it	  embraces	  new	  paradigms	  and	  
creative	  approaches,	  the	  SSF	  policy	  cannot	  offer	  fishers	  a	  fraction	  of	  the	  income	  that	  
abalone—or	  rock	  lobster	  for	  that	  matter,	  or	   linefish	  if	  prohibitive	  quota	  restrictions	  
are	   flaunted—is	   capable	   of	   at	   present.	   In	   impoverished	   coastal	   communities	   like	  
Hangberg,	  this	  is	  likely	  to	  remain	  a	  significant	  weakness.	  
Of	  course,	  compliance	  is	  motivated	  by	  normative	  factors	  as	  well	  (Kuperan	  &	  Sutinen	  
1998);	   the	   SSF	   policy	   aims	   to	   encourage	   voluntary	   compliance	   with	   fisheries	  
regulations	  by	  improving	  normative	  support.	   	  However,	  rival	  actors	  will	  continue	  to	  
undermine	  management	  efforts	  unless	  the	  root	  causes	  that	  allow	  these	  actors	  to	  gain	  
prominence	  are	  addressed.	  The	  socially	  divisive	  aspects	  of	  abalone	  poaching	  are	  an	  
example	   of	   how	   the	   illegal	   fishery	   system	   can	   resist	   attempts	   to	   bring	   it	   under	  
control.	  
A	  reality	  check	  for	  implementation	  	  
What	   hope	   is	   there	   for	   the	   SSF	   policy,	   then?	   Some,	   certainly—but	   only	   if	   its	  
implementation	   is	   grounded	   in	   reality.	   This	   research	  has	   illustrated	   the	   formidable	  
challenge	   illegal	   fishing	   poses	   to	   fisheries	   governance	   in	   South	   Africa.	   More	   than	  
anything	  else,	  abalone	  poaching	  is	  symptomatic	  of	  unresolved	  inequalities	  and	  social	  
injustice	  in	  this	  country;	  it	  is	  motivated	  and	  sustained	  by	  a	  range	  of	  interacting	  social	  
and	   economic	   factors.	   In	   a	   sense,	   then,	   illegal	   fishing	   is	   embedded	   not	   only	   in	   the	  
poverty	   and	   hopelessness	   of	   Hangberg’s	   overcrowded	   tenement	   blocks,	   but	   in	   the	  
social	  fabric	  of	  post-­‐apartheid	  South	  Africa	  itself.	  Recognizing	  this	  fact	  is	  the	  first	  step	  
to	  dealing	  with	  ongoing	  problems	  of	  non-­‐compliance.	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This	   dissertation	   has	   argued	   that	   progressive,	   community-­‐oriented	   policies	   for	   the	  
small-­‐scale	  sector,	  while	  undeniably	  a	  step	  in	  the	  right	  direction,	  are	  not	  enough.	  To	  
be	  successful,	  they	  need	  to	  be	  accompanied	  by	  coordinated	  efforts	  to	  tackle	  some	  of	  
the	   surrounding	   socio-­‐economic	   drivers	   of	   illegal	   fishing	   along	   the	   coast:	   housing	  
problems,	   unemployment,	   and	   education,	   for	   example,	   in	   addition	   to	   inequitable	  
quota	   allocations	   and	   poorly	   planned	   MPAs.	   Bringing	   positive	   change	   to	   fishing	  
communities,	   in	   other	   words,	   will	   require	   integrated	   development	   strategies,	   not	  
piecemeal,	  sector-­‐specific	  interventions.	  Without	  attention	  to	  these	  broader	  elements	  
of	  the	  fishery	  system,	  the	  SSF	  policy	  is	  likely	  to	  fail.	  
This	  is	  not	  news	  to	  policymakers:	  a	  guiding	  principle	  of	  the	  SSF	  policy	  is	  to	  “recognise	  
the	   interdependency	   of	   the	   social,	   cultural,	   economic	   and	   ecological	   dimensions	   of	  
small-­‐scale	   fishery	   systems”.	   Among	   its	   14	   strategic	   objectives	   are	   aims	   to	   “co-­‐
manage	  the	  small-­‐scale	  fisheries	  sector	  …	  in	  an	  integrated	  and	  holistic	  manner”	  and	  
to	   “promote	  poverty	   alleviation,	   food	   security,	   sustainable	   livelihoods,	   fair	   and	   safe	  
labour	  practices,	  and	  local	  economic	  development”	  (all	  DAFF	  2012b;	  p.	  14).	  That	  the	  
policy	   acknowledges	   these	   points	   in	   the	   first	   place	   is	   laudable—it	   represents	   a	  
considerable	  shift	  from	  old-­‐school,	  reductionist	  approaches	  to	  fisheries	  management.	  
However,	  without	  a	  real	  appreciation	  of	  the	  ways	  illegal	  fishing	  behaviour	  can	  embed	  
itself	   in	   fishing	   communities,	   there	   is	   a	   risk	   of	   these	   grand	   intentions	   coming	   to	  
nothing.	  There	  is	  thus	  a	  crucial	  need	  for	  well-­‐planned	  implementation	  strategies	  that	  
take	  these	  factors	  into	  account.	  	  
The	  new	  SSF	  policy	  certainly	  has	  a	   lot	   to	  offer	   in	   the	   long	  term:	   it	   is	  developmental	  
and	  visionary	  in	  scope,	  and	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  catalyse	  lasting	  economic	  and	  cultural	  
revival,	  as	  well	  as	  improved	  community	  collaboration	  in	  places	  where	  it	   is	  has	  been	  
deeply	   eroded.	   Its	   benefits	   may	   thus	   extend	   beyond	   the	   monetary	   to	   the	   societal,	  
which	  is	  arguably	  more	  necessary	  in	  South	  Africa	  now	  than	  anything	  else.	  Rebuilding	  
communities	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   apartheid’s	   brutal	   social	   engineering	   is	   of	   equal	  
importance	  as	  redistributing	  wealth	  and	  facilitating	  economic	  development.	  But	  one	  
cannot	  happen	  without	  the	  other,	  and	  the	  new	  SSF	  policy	  must	  pay	  careful	  attention	  
to	  the	  realities	  of	  non-­‐compliance	   in	   fishing	  communities	  to	  avoid	  being	   judged	  one	  
day	  as	  being	  high	  on	  rhetoric,	  but	  low	  on	  practicality.	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CHAPTER	  3: CONCLUSION	  
3.1 Overview	  of	  study	  
The	   overall	   aims	   of	   this	   study	   were	   to	   profile	   the	   human	   dimensions	   of	   abalone	  
poaching	  in	  Hangberg	  and	  to	  explore	  some	  of	  its	  implications	  for	  implementing	  South	  
Africa’s	   new	   small-­‐scale	   fisheries	   (SSF)	   policy.	   To	   achieve	   these	   broad	   aims,	   the	  
following	   four	  objectives	  were	   identified:	  1)	  Situating	  Hangberg	  within	   the	  broader	  
context	  of	  small-­‐scale	  fisheries	  governance,	  both	  internationally	  and	  in	  South	  Africa;	  
2)	   Reviewing	   the	   evolution	   of	   syndicated	   abalone	   poaching	   in	   South	   Africa;	   3)	  
Profiling	   the	   human	   dimensions	   of	   abalone	   poaching	   in	   Hangberg,	   including	   its	  
historical	   development,	   current	   operations,	   structure,	   and	   scale,	   and	   major	   socio-­‐
economic	   drivers	   and	   impacts;	   and	   4)	   Drawing	   lessons	   from	   this	   profile	   to	   inform	  
implementation	   strategies	   for	   the	  new	  SSF	  policy,	   as	  well	   as	   to	   recommend	   further	  
research.	  
These	  objectives	  were	  targeted	  using	  a	  ‘fisheries	  systems’	  research	  framework,	  which	  
highlighted	   the	   need	   to	   understand	   abalone	   poaching	   in	   Hangberg	   holistically,	   and	  
not	   in	   isolation	   from	   its	   broader	   social,	   cultural,	   economic,	   historical,	   and	   political	  
contexts.	  Time	  constraints	  precluded	   investigating	   the	   full	   fishery	   system,	  however,	  
and	  a	  conscious	  decision	  was	  made	  to	  focus	  on	  its	  human	  dimensions,	  which	  had	  not	  
received	  dedicated	  attention	  before.	  	  
Qualitative	  research	  methods	  were	  used	  to	  probe	  the	   illegal	   fishery	  and	  to	   facilitate	  
access	   to	   clandestine	   groups,	   a	   process	   that	   required	   the	   gradual	   and	   iterative	  
development	   of	   trust.	   Key	   concepts	   from	   the	   small-­‐scale	   fisheries	   governance	  
literature,	  particularly	  those	  underpinning	  the	  progressive	  principles	  and	  objectives	  
of	  South	  Africa’s	  new	  SSF	  policy,	  were	  the	  framework	  of	  analysis	  used	  to	  interpret	  the	  
findings.	  
A	   comprehensive	   review	   of	   new	   approaches	   to	   small-­‐scale	   fisheries	   governance,	  
presented	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  provided	  the	  theoretical	  backbone	  of	  this	  study.	  Conventional	  
management	   strategies,	   developed	   to	   control	   big	   commercial	   fisheries	   in	   the	  
northern	   hemisphere,	   were	   shown	   to	   be	   largely	   inappropriate	   for	   the	   small-­‐scale	  
sector,	   which	   is	   characterized	   by	   far	   greater	   social	   and	   ecological	   complexity	   than	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industrial	  fisheries,	  and	  thus	  requires	  more	  nuanced	  forms	  of	  management.	  Particular	  
attention	  was	  paid	  to	  highlighting	  the	  fundamental	  importance	  of	  understanding	  the	  
human	   and	   social	   dimensions	   of	   fisheries	   management.	   Compliance	   theory	   was	  
introduced	  as	  a	  key	   framework	   for	  understanding	   recurring	  problems	   in	   the	   small-­‐
scale	   sector,	   with	   particular	   attention	   paid	   to	   the	   importance	   of	   normative	  
motivations	   for	   influencing	   fishers’	   behaviour.	   Concepts	   from	   the	   legal	   pluralism	  
literature	  were	  also	  touched	  on,	  revealing	  how	  informal	  legal	  systems	  could	  operate	  
in	  parallel	  to	  formal,	  statutory	  law.	  
Concepts	   from	   this	   first	   section	   were	   then	   used	   to	   trace	   the	   history	   of	   fisheries	  
transformation	  in	  South	  Africa,	  which	  sought	  to	  correct	  gross	  racial	  imbalances	  after	  
the	  end	  of	  apartheid	  but	  repeatedly	  failed	  to	  address	  the	  needs	  of	  small-­‐scale	  fishers.	  
It	  was	  shown	  how	  frustration	  at	  slow	  reform	  helped	   fuel	  non-­‐compliance	   in	  coastal	  
fishing	  communities,	  where	  the	  perceived	  legitimacy	  of	  state	  fishing	  regulations	  had	  
begun	  to	  wane.	  This	  process	  was	  most	  vividly	  evident	   in	  the	  abalone	  fishery,	  which	  
witnessed	   an	   explosion	   of	   organized	   poaching	   activity	   shortly	   after	   the	   end	   of	  
apartheid,	  when	  criminal	  groups	  began	  operating	  an	  illegal	  export	  market	  to	  wealthy	  
consumers	  in	  the	  Far	  East.	  
This	   set	   the	   scene	   for	   Chapter	   2,	   an	   in-­‐depth	   case	   study	   of	   the	   human	   dimensions	  
abalone	   poaching	   in	   Hangberg.	   A	   creative,	   multi-­‐method	   approach	   was	   used	   to	  
investigate	  the	  evolution	  and	  current	  operations	  of	  the	  illegal	  fishery,	  which	  had	  not	  
been	   studied	   in	   any	   detail	   before.	   Methods	   used	   included	   interviews,	   participant	  
observation	   and	   covert	   surveillance,	   accompanied	   by	   reference	   to	   secondary	   data	  
sources	  like	  newspaper	  articles	  and	  court	  documents.	  Together,	  these	  contributed	  to	  
a	   comprehensive	   understanding	   of	   abalone	   poaching	   in	   the	   Hangberg	   community	  
today.	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3.2 Key	  findings	  and	  recommendations	  
The	  abalone	  fishery	  is	  deeply	  embedded	  
This	   research	   revealed	   that	   abalone	   poaching	   has	   become	   deeply	   embedded	   in	  
Hangberg,	   fuelled	  and	  sustained	  by	  a	  wide	   range	  of	   social	  and	  economic	  drivers.	   In	  
less	   than	   20	   years,	   a	   highly	   organized	   boat-­‐based	   fishery	   has	   developed	   in	   the	  
community,	  targeting	  reefs	  right	  around	  the	  Cape	  Peninsula	  and	  supplying	  abalone	  to	  
larger	   criminal	   syndicates.	   In	  many	  ways	   these	   poaching	   operations	   have	   begun	   to	  
resemble	   a	   formal	   fishery,	   apparently	   filling	   a	   vacuum	   left	   by	   ineffective	  
transformation	   efforts	   by	   the	   state.	   Showing	   this	   juxtaposition	   of	   the	   criminal	  
economy	   with	   the	   formal	   fishery	   system	   has	   been	   a	   major	   contribution	   of	   this	  
dissertation.	  	  
At	   least	   five	   local	   poaching	   groups	   currently	   operate	   in	   Hangberg,	   along	   with	   a	  
handful	   of	   outside	   groups	  who	  work	  with	  poachers	   in	   the	   community.	   Profits	   from	  
abalone	  poaching	  are	  substantial,	  but	  vary:	  poachers	  were	  found	  to	  operate	  according	  
to	  a	  loose	  hierarchy,	  performing	  a	  range	  of	  different	  tasks	  in	  the	  fishery.	  Nevertheless,	  
in	  most	  cases	  abalone	  poaching	  comfortably	  dwarfs	  other	  forms	  of	  income	  available	  
to	  Hangberg	  residents,	  and	  the	  illegal	  fishery	  appears	  to	  have	  become	  a	  mainstay	  of	  
the	   impoverished	   local	   economy.	   In	   total,	   the	   abalone	   fishery	   probably	   employs	   at	  
least	   250	   individuals	   at	   present,	   contributing	   to	   the	   livelihoods	   of	  more	   than	   1000	  
people	  in	  total.	  
From	   the	   perspective	   of	   compliance	   theory	   (Gezelius	   &	   Hauck	   2011),	   neither	  
instrumentalist	   not	   normative	   motivations	   currently	   appear	   remotely	   sufficient	   to	  
offset	   the	   attractions	   of	   abalone	   poaching	   in	   the	   community,	   which	   are	   primarily	  
economic	  but	  also	  linked	  to	  political	  protest,	  thrill-­‐seeking,	  and	  the	  pursuit	  of	  status.	  
Law	  enforcement	  efforts,	  while	  occasionally	  successful,	  remain	  hampered	  by	  capacity	  
constraints,	  institutional	  inefficiency,	  and	  endemic	  corruption,	  and	  do	  not	  yet	  appear	  
remotely	  sufficient	  threat	  to	  deter	  abalone	  poaching.	  Meanwhile,	  fisheries	  regulations	  
continue	   to	   be	   regarded	   as	   largely	   illegitimate.	   Partly	   because	   of	   this,	   and	   partly	  
because	  abalone	  poaching	  has	  begun	  to	  play	  such	  a	  pivotal	  role	  in	  the	  local	  economy,	  
the	   illegal	   fishery	   is	  effectively	  condoned	  by	   large	  parts	  of	   the	  community.	  From	  an	  
interactive	  governance	  perspective	  there	  is	  thus	  conflict	  between	  two	  major	  actors	  in	  
the	  Hangberg	   fishery	  system:	   the	  state	  and	   the	  criminal	  economy.	  This	  mismatch	   is	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likely	   to	   pose	   tough	   challenges	   to	   implementing	   SSF	   policy	   objectives,	   for	   example	  
including	  local	  small-­‐scale	  fishers	  in	  co-­‐management	  structures:	  beneath	  the	  surface,	  
a	  lucrative	  rival	  fishery	  system	  continues	  to	  operate.	  	  	  
This	   research	   has	   shown	   that	   the	   illegal	   abalone	   economy	   continues	   to	   thrive	   in	  
communities	  like	  Hangberg	  and	  that	  efforts	  to	  curb	  it—for	  example	  the	  2003	  Abalone	  
Policy—have	  largely	  been	  unsuccessful.	  Comparisons	  with	  previous	  research	  (Hauck	  
1997;	  Hauck	  2009b;	  Raemaekers	  &	  Britz	  2009)	  suggest	  that	  little	  has	  changed	  in	  the	  
abalone	  poaching	  game	  in	  the	  last	  two	  decades:	  small-­‐scale	  fishing	  communities	  are	  
still	   ripe	  breeding	  grounds	   for	  non-­‐compliance	  due	   to	  ongoing	   social	   and	  economic	  
marginalization;	   law	   enforcement	   is	   still	   crippled	   by	   corruption;	   there	   is	   still	   little	  
normative	  support	  for	  fisheries	  regulations;	  and	  so	  on.	  This	  Hangberg	  case	  study	  also	  
adds	   support	   to	   anecdotal	   evidence	   that	   South	   Africa’s	   illegal	   abalone	   fishery	   has	  
significantly	  expanded	  westwards	  to	  the	  Cape	  Peninsula	  in	  the	  last	  decade	  following	  
stock	  collapse,	  and	  possibly	  improved	  policing,	  on	  the	  Overberg	  coast.	  
An	   important	   theme	   in	   this	   research	   was	   the	   link	   between	   abalone	   poaching	   and	  
identity	   politics	   in	  Hangberg,	  with	  many	   participants	   claiming	   that	   poaching	  was	   a	  
response	  to	  systematic	  discrimination	  against	  coloured	  people	  by	  the	  state.	  Perceived	  
injustices	  in	  the	  small-­‐scale	  fisheries	  sector	  were	  seen	  to	  symbolize	  deeper	  injustices	  
in	   South	   African	   society.	   From	   this	   perspective,	   it	   emerged	   that	   problems	   with	  
housing,	   education,	   and	   other	   types	   of	   service	   delivery	   in	   Hangberg	   are	   deeply	  
intertwined	  with	  the	  ongoing	  exclusion	  of	  small-­‐scale	  fishers	  from	  marine	  resources.	  
As	  key	  elements	  of	   the	   fishery	  system,	   they	  cannot	  be	  understood	   in	   isolation	   from	  
one	  another.	  
Mixed	  social	  impacts	  and	  potential	  for	  conflict	  
This	  study	   found	  that	   the	   illegal	  abalone	   fishery	  has	  had	  both	  positive	  and	  negative	  
social	   impacts	   in	   Hangberg.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   money	   from	   abalone	   poaching	  
contributes	   to	   local	   economic	   development	   and	   to	   the	   livelihoods	   of	   at	   least	   1000	  
residents.	   On	   the	   other,	   lucrative	   profits	   encourage	   extravagant	   spending,	   and	   a	  
culture	   of	   conspicuous	   consumption	   appears	   to	   have	   taken	  hold	   in	   the	   community.	  
Abalone	  poaching	  thus	  funds	  lifestyles	  in	  addition	  to	  livelihoods,	  with	  substantial	  cash	  
sums	   spent	   on	   clothes,	   fast	   cars,	   and	   recreational	   drug	   use.	   The	   widely	   held	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perception	   that	   poachers	   are	   fast	   living,	   wasteful,	   and	   irresponsible	   individuals	   is	  
neither	  wholly	  accurate	  nor	  entirely	  false.	  
By	   elevating	   the	   living	   standards	   of	   many	   residents,	   abalone	   poaching	   appears	   to	  
have	   increased	   the	   potential	   for	   conflict	   in	   the	  Hangberg	   community.	   Poachers	   are	  
likely	   to	   struggle	   to	   maintain	   their	   current	   levels	   of	   income	   as	   abalone	   resources	  
decline,	  possibly	   fuelling	   increased	   competition	  between	   local	  poaching	  groups	  and	  
with	  outsiders	   in	   the	   future.	  This	   research	  revealed	   that	   confrontations	  are	  already	  
commonplace	  in	  Hangberg’s	  illegal	  abalone	  fishery:	  the	  recent	  deployment	  of	  armed	  
guards	   to	   escort	   batches	   of	   abalone	   from	   a	   remote	   drop-­‐off	   point	   is	   of	   particular	  
concern.	  Hawston,	   a	   fishing	   community	  on	  South	  Africa’s	   south	   coast	  with	  a	   longer	  
history	  of	  abalone	  poaching	  than	  Hangberg,	  was	  used	  as	  an	  example	  of	  the	  negative	  
social	   impacts	  poaching	  can	  have	  in	  fishing	  communities	   if	   left	  unchecked.	  Violence,	  
gangsterism,	  and	  drug	  abuse	  have	  become	  firmly	  established	  there,	  despite	  the	  illegal	  
abalone	  fishery	  having	  declined	  in	  recent	  years.	  	  
Implications	  for	  small-­‐scale	  fisheries	  governance	  in	  South	  Africa	  
In	   the	   almost	   20	   years	   that	   have	   elapsed	   since	   the	   end	   of	   apartheid,	   fisheries	  
transformation	   efforts	   have	   largely	   failed	   to	   bring	   meaningful	   change	   to	   coastal	  
communities	  like	  Hangberg.	  The	  criminal	  economy,	  however,	  has	  offered	  a	  lucrative	  
alternative	   to	   legal	   fishing,	   and	   a	   powerful,	   highly	   organized	   illegal	  abalone	   fishery	  
has	  evolved	   in	  response.	  This	   fishery	  operates	   in	  parallel	   to	   the	   formal	  system,	  and	  
has	  begun	  to	  perform	  a	  number	  of	  its	  most	  important	  social	  and	  economic	  functions:	  
providing	   employment,	   fostering	   economic	   development,	   and	   providing	   access	   to	  
marine	   resources.	   This	   dissertation	   has	   argued	   that	   this	   is	   likely	   to	   pose	   stern	  
challenges	   to	   small-­‐scale	   fisheries	   governance—particularly	   with	   regards	   to	  
implementing	  South	  Africa’s	  progressive	  new	  SSF	  policy.	  
While	  the	  new	  policy	  is	  developmental	  and	  forward-­‐looking	  in	  scope,	  it	  is	  necessarily	  
constrained	  by	  the	  need	  to	  conserve	  marine	  resources.	  This	  means	  that	  it	  will	  never	  
be	  able	  to	  match	  the	  profits	  offered	  by	  the	  criminal	  economy,	  which	  ‘allows’	  its	  fishers	  
to	   harvest	   at	   completely	   unsustainable	   levels	   and	   which	   is	   likely	   to	   continue	  
operating	  until	  abalone	  resources	  are	  almost	  entirely	  depleted.	  Short-­‐term	  economic	  
interests	   thus	   have	   the	   potential	   to	   sabotage	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   SSF	   policy,	  
which	   among	  other	   things	   fundamentally	   depends	   on	   community	   participation	   and	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assistance	   with	   compliance.	   Similarly,	   the	   divisive	   aspects	   of	   abalone	   poaching	  
reported	   here	   are	   likely	   to	   undermine	   attempts	   at	   participatory	   governance,	  
highlighting	  once	  again	   the	   importance	  of	   treating	   fisheries	  systems	  holistically	  and	  
not	  attending	  to	  biological,	  ecological	  and	  social	  considerations	  separately.	  Evidence	  
of	  the	  failure	  to	  curb	  South	  Africa’s	   illegal	  abalone	  fishery	  in	  the	  last	  two	  decades—
despite	   considerable	   attempts	   to	   adopt	   more	   progressive,	   holistic	   governance	  
arrangements—serves	  as	  a	  clear	  warning	  of	  what	  can	  go	  wrong	  if	  this	  need	  for	  better	  
integration	  is	  not	  heeded.	  
In	  pursuit	  of	  integrated	  solutions	  
This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  SSF	  policy	  is	  doomed	  to	  fail.	  The	  policy	  has	  the	  potential	  
to	  bring	  lasting	  change	  to	  coastal	  communities	  by	  facilitating	  increased	  participation	  
and	  contributing	  to	  more	  sustainable	  forms	  of	  social	  and	  economic	  development.	  Its	  
strong	   focus	   on	   human	   rights	   and	   social	   justice,	   combined	  with	   its	   firm	   theoretical	  
grounding	   in	   the	   resource	   governance	   literature,	   provides	   an	   unprecedented	  
opportunity	  to	  experiment	  with	  an	  entirely	  new	  approach	  to	   fisheries	  management.	  
Care	  must	  be	  taken,	  however,	  to	  ground	  future	  implementation	  strategies	  in	  reality.	  	  
This	   dissertation	   has	   argued	   that	   illegal	   fishing	   is	   symptomatic	   of	   persistent	  
inequalities	   in	   South	   African	   society,	   and	   that	   it	   cannot	   be	   understood	   in	   isolation	  
from	  this	  broader	  context.	  It	  has	  also	  argued	  that	  the	  criminal	  economy	  has	  become	  
an	   important	   actor	   in	   terms	   of	   fisheries	   governance,	   offering	   small-­‐scale	   fishers	   a	  
functional	   alternative	   to	   a	   formal	   system	   that	   continues	   to	  overlook	   their	   interests.	  
Unless	  steps	  are	   taken	   to	   tackle	   this	   illegal	   fishery	  system	  holistically,	  accompanied	  
by	   integrated	  socio-­‐economic	  development	   initiatives	  and	  enacted	   through	  multiple	  
government	   channels,	   the	  many	   positive	   and	   visionary	   objectives	   of	   the	   SSF	   policy	  
are	   unlikely	   to	   be	   met.	   Reforming	   South	   Africa’s	   fisheries	   sector	   remains	   more	  
important	  than	  ever	  before—but	  successfully	  addressing	  the	  country’s	  tainted	  legacy	  
will	  require	  more	  than	  just	  fish.	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3.3 Further	  research	  
The	  governance	  literature	  has	  a	  strong	  emphasis	  on	  dialogue	  and	  inclusion.	  However,	  
a	  core	  finding	  of	  this	  research	  was	  that	  a	  sophisticated	  criminal	  economy	  co-­‐existed	  
with,	  and	  in	  many	  ways	  had	  begun	  to	  rival,	  the	  formal	  South	  African	  fishery	  system,	  
severely	  undermining	  notions	  of	   cooperative	  governance.	  While	   legal	  pluralism	  has	  
been	  used	   to	  understand	   fisheries	   conflicts	   like	   these,	   its	   focus	  has	  mainly	  been	  on	  
recognising	  customary	  or	   local	   forms	  of	   law.	  There	   is	  a	  need	  to	  widen	  this	  scope	  to	  
include	  newer	  plural	   systems,	   and	   to	   investigate	  ways	  of	  bridging	   the	  gap	  between	  
state	  actors	  and	  their	  counterparts	  in	  the	  parallel	  economy.	  
This	   is	   linked	   to	   a	   second	   set	   of	   potential	   research	   questions:	   identifying	   possible	  
‘tipping	   points’	   that	   could	   steer	   abalone	   poachers	   back	   towards	   the	   formal	   fishery	  
system.	  Participants	  in	  this	  study	  claimed	  that	  they	  would	  cease	  harvesting	  illegally	  if	  
they	   were	   granted	   small	   individual	   abalone	   quotas.	   While	   it	   is	   unlikely	   that	   these	  
statements	   were	   entirely	   true,	   it	   is	   nevertheless	   conceivable	   that	   certain	  
combinations	  of	  social	  and	  economic	  motivations—increased	  government	  legitimacy,	  
preferential	  access	  to	  other	  valuable	  marine	  resources,	  tighter	  law	  enforcement,	  the	  
relative	   safety	  of	  operating	   legally—could	  entice	  poachers	   to	  abandon	   the	   lucrative	  
illegal	  abalone	  fishery,	  and	  thus	  provide	  a	  mechanism	  for	  curbing	  the	  increasing	  non-­‐
compliance	   trend.	   Answering	   these	   questions	   will	   require	   input	   from	   the	   fields	   of	  
economics	  and	  psychology,	  among	  others.	  
A	   third	  and	   final	  area	  of	   future	  research	  would	  be	   far	   less	  abstract:	  building	  on	   the	  
qualitative	   base	   provided	   by	   this	   study	   to	   conduct	   more	   quantitative	   studies	   in	  
Hangberg	   and	   other	   poaching	   communities.	   Value-­‐chain	   analyses,	   aimed	   at	  
estimating	   the	  overall	  worth	  of	   abalone	  poaching	  with	  all	   its	  multiplier	   effects,	   and	  
more	  rigorous	  evaluations	  of	  poaching	  effort,	  are	  two	  examples	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  work.	  
However,	   it	   will	   be	   important	   to	   bear	   the	   secretive	   nature	   of	   the	   illegal	   abalone	  
fishery	   in	  mind,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  potential	  dangers	   it	  poses	  to	  researchers.	  This	  short-­‐
term	   case	   study	   has	   shown	   that	   is	   possible	   to	   gain	   access	   to	   poaching	   groups	   and	  
profile	   aspects	   of	   their	   operations.	   There	  may	  ultimately	   be	   limits,	   however,	   to	   the	  
depths	  these	  clandestine	  groups	  can	  be	  penetrated.	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Appendix	  A:	  Hypothetical	  diving	  profits	  
	  
A)	  For	  one	  diver	  
Income:	   	  
Large	  abalone	  @	  R200	  /	  kg	   	   50	  kg	  
Mediums	  @	  R250	  /	  kg	   30	  kg	  
Total	  income	   R17	  500	  
Expenses:	   	  
Boat	  fee	  of	  10	  kg	  fresh	  abalone	   R2200	  
Skipper	  fees	  @	  R20	  /	  kg	   R1600	  
Bootsman	  fees	  @	  R10	  /	  kg	   R800	  
Carrier	  fees	  @	  R30	  /	  kg	   R2400	  
Contribution	  to	  spotter	  fee	  of	  R1000	  /	  boat	   R200	  
Total	  expenses	   R7200	  
Profit	  from	  single	  operation	   R10	  300	  
Profit	  from	  5	  operations	  in	  a	  month	   R51	  500	  
B)	  For	  one	  boat	  owner	  (non-­‐diving)	  
Income:	   	  
Diver	  fees	  @	  R2	  200	  /	  diver	  
(5	  divers	  on	  board)	  
	  
R11	  000	  
Expenses:	   	  
Petrol	  to	  Robben	  Island	   R4000	  
Profit	  from	  single	  operation	   R7000	  
Profit	  from	  5	  operations	  in	  a	  month	   R35	  000	  
C)	  For	  one	  boat	  owner	  (diving)	  
Income:	   	  
1. Diver	  fees	  @	  R2	  200	  /	  diver	  
(4	  other	  divers	  on	  board)	  
2. Personal	  harvest	  





Total	  income	   R28	  500	  
Expenses:	   	  
1. Petrol	  to	  Robben	  Island	  
2. Personal	  diving	  fees	  




Total	  expenses	   R9000	  
Profit	  from	  single	  operation	   R19	  500	  
Profit	  from	  5	  operations	  in	  a	  month	   R97	  500	  
 
